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FOREWORD
As this report is being released, the price of gold hit
a record high of almost $2,100 per ounce in August.
Gold prices had been rising for years but the threat
to economies from the novel coronavirus led to a
surge in prices — up about 35 percent this year —
as investors sought the perceived safety of gold.
As prices rise, so does demand and mining. These
circumstances make this report on the effects of
mining on indigenous people and their lands in the
Amazon particularly timely.
We know from previous WRI research that
deforestation rates on indigenous lands in the
Amazon are sharply lower than on similar land
not managed by indigenous people. Now we have
learned from this report that industrial mining
concessions and illegal small-scale mining occur
on more than 20 percent of indigenous lands in the
Amazon and that deforestation rates on indigenous
lands with mining are significantly higher than on
indigenous lands not affected by mining.
The Amazon is home to about 1.5 million
indigenous people. The forest is their home and
source of livelihood. Mining is environmentally
destructive and brings social and health risks.
Environmental degradation leads to the loss of
critical ecosystem services—such as water flow
regulation, biodiversity and carbon sequestration—
that benefit indigenous people and all humanity.
Mining also leads to conflict, especially between
miners and indigenous people. According to Global
Witness, mining was the deadliest sector for land
defenders in 2018 and 2019.
This report finds that while laws in Bolivia, Brazil,
Colombia, Ecuador, Guyana, and Peru recognize
some land rights for indigenous people, they do
not provide the legal protections needed for them
to secure their lands and take charge of their own
development. For example, of these countries, only
Guyana recognizes a limited form of consent, and
only Colombia provides the right of first refusal
when the government grants a mining concession
on their lands. Yet mining companies often have
sweeping rights to enter and use indigenous land
for their operations.

The case studies for this report reveal that some
indigenous people take extraordinary measures
to protect their lands from mining. In Peru, for
example, the Tres Islas indigenous communities
persuaded domestic courts to declare 127 mining
concessions on their land null and void. In
Colombia, when a mining company sought a
concession on their land, the Yaigojé Apaporis
people successfully convinced the government
to designate their land as a national natural park
where mining is prohibited.
The findings have implications for indigenous
people, governments, development agencies,
mining companies and civil society organizations
to correct the large power discrepancies between
indigenous people and miners. It calls on
governments to enact legislation that recognizes
additional land and mineral rights for indigenous
people, establish strong social and environmental
safeguards, and better monitor mining to ensure
compliance with national laws. It calls on mining
companies to respect indigenous rights and provide
indigenous people with fairer shares of mining
benefits. And it calls for indigenous people to build
the skills needed to protect themselves from harm.
Decisionmakers around the world have an
opportunity to support indigenous people and
protect forests. With mining rapidly expanding
deeper into the Amazon, it’s time to act. Not doing
so would have a massive cost to indigenous people
and the forest—a cost much greater than gold.

Andrew Steer
President
World Resources Institute
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Amazonian governments have promoted and supported the
exploitation of high-value minerals for decades, but in recent
years, have committed to mining as a key component of their
national development strategies. This has driven mining into
more remote parts of the Amazon with significant implications
for indigenous peoples and the forest. As mining expands deeper
into the Amazon, there is an urgent need to better understand
the law, practice, and outcomes of mining on indigenous lands in
the Amazon. This report analyzes the law regarding the rights of
indigenous people over their lands and the minerals on and below
them, the level of implementation of these rights and the links
between mining and forest cover change.
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HIGHLIGHTS

▪ Industrial mining concessions cover

approximately 1.28 million square
kilometers (more than 18 percent) of the
Amazon. Mining concessions and illegal
mining overlap with 450,000 sq. km (more
than 20 percent) of indigenous lands and
affect 1,131 (31 percent) indigenous lands.

▪ Indigenous lands on which mining is

carried out showed a higher rate of forest
loss (from 2000 to 2015) than indigenous
lands without mining. In Bolivia, Ecuador,
and Peru, the rate was at least three times
higher; in Colombia and Venezuela, it was
one to two times higher.

▪ National laws provide indigenous people

with some land rights but few rights to
the minerals on their lands. Only in Guyana
do indigenous people have a limited form of
consent, and only in Colombia do they have
the right of first refusal over commercial
mining on their lands.

▪ In practice, the law is not well implemented

by miners or enforced by governments.
Indigenous people have employed various
strategies, such as litigation, to protect their
lands from mining.

▪ There is a need to strengthen legal

protections for indigenous lands,
establish strong social and environmental
safeguards, build the capacity of
indigenous people to protect their lands,
ensure all mining meets established
safeguards, and provide for effective
law enforcement.

Introduction
The Amazon contains world-class deposits
of copper, tin, nickel, iron ore, bauxite,
manganese, and gold. All Amazonian countries
have promoted and supported the exploration,
exploitation, and export of high-value minerals
for decades. In recent years, however, governments
have committed to mining as a key component
of their national development strategies and
have provided more incentives to promote
investments. Mining as a percentage of gross
domestic product (GDP) has increased in several
Amazonian countries.
Artisanal and small-scale mining (ASM),
especially for gold, has been part of the
livelihood strategy of rural households
for centuries; large-scale industrial mining
has been underway for much of the 20th
century. Mining in the Amazon is dominated
by industrial mining in the east, although mining
for copper and gold is expanding into the lowland
forest. Large-scale mining blocks or concessions
overlap with many indigenous lands. Many other
indigenous lands are indirectly affected by mining,
from infrastructure (e.g., roads, rail lines, and
dams), new towns for workers, and other
associated developments.
ASM, especially for gold, takes place
throughout the Amazon. Today, more than
500,000 small-scale gold miners are estimated to
be active in the Amazon and many more people
provide ASM services or are dependent family
members. The expansion of ASM has been driven
largely by rising gold prices coupled with limited
livelihood opportunities. Illegal mining in the
Amazon, principally ASM, has been underway for
decades but has grown exponentially in recent
years. In 2016, it was estimated that about 28
percent of the gold mined in Peru, 30 percent
in Bolivia, 77 percent in Ecuador, 80 percent in
Colombia, and 80–90 percent in Venezuela was
produced illegally. Today, many indigenous lands
are affected by illegal mining by outsiders.
Brazil holds about 60 percent of the Amazon
basin and forest, and almost half of the
indigenous lands. Its 1988 Federal Constitution
allows for mining on indigenous lands but only
under rules approved by the National Congress.

6
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Since the National Congress has not established
such rules, mining on indigenous lands is effectively
prohibited although, in practice, illegal mining
is underway in many indigenous territories. The
government, however, is moving to open up the
Amazon to commercial development. In January
2019, the minister of mines and energy announced
that the government was preparing to overhaul
mining regulations that will include opening
indigenous lands to extractive resource exploitation
and infrastructure. On February 5, 2020, Brazil’s
president signed Bill 191/2020 that would open
indigenous lands to mining, oil and gas extraction,
electricity generation, and agriculture. The bill is
now in the Chamber of Deputies for discussion.
The COVID-19 pandemic, caused by the
novel coronavirus, has impacted mining
in Amazonian countries. Governments have
declared states of emergency and issued stayat-home orders, resulting in many sectors of the
economy essentially shutting down. In Peru and
other Amazonian countries, however, governments
have allowed large-scale mining to continue
and encouraged expansion while sidelining and
constraining livelihood possibilities for ASM.
Mining in Peru accounts for significant percentages
of the national and some regions’ GDPs, and largescale mining is the principal contributor to the
country’s Fiscal Stabilization Fund.
Gold prices have been steadily rising for
several years, but the threat to economies
from the novel coronavirus has led prices to
surge to record highs—up about 27 percent
so far in 2020—as investors flee stocks to the
safety of gold. As the price of gold rises, so does
demand. The surge has triggered a new, intensified
gold rush in the Amazon with implications for local
people and the environment (Nascimento and
Faleiros 2020). Soaring prices, coupled with the
withdrawal of the police and army from the mining
areas to enforce lockdowns and attend to the health
crisis, have allowed illegal mining to expand further
(Saffon 2020).
These and other developments have driven
mining into more remote parts of the
Amazon with significant implications for

indigenous peoples and the forest. The
Amazon is home to 44.9 million people, including
about 1.5 million indigenous people from 385
different ethnic groups as well as many Afrodescendants and other traditional people. Mining,
by its very nature, is environmentally destructive
and brings significant health and social risks.
Mining on or near indigenous lands can lead to
conflict, especially between miners and indigenous
people who depend on the land for their livelihood.
In 2018, at least 164 land and environmental
defenders were killed around the world.
And for the first time, mining was the world’s
deadliest sector, with 43 defenders, including
many indigenous people, killed while protesting
against the destructive effects of mining on their
lands and livelihoods. In 2019, a record 212 land
and environmental defenders were killed around
the world, an average of more than four people per
week. Seven of the top 10 worst-affected nations
are in Latin America, where more than two-thirds
of the total killings took place. Colombia was the
deadliest country with 64 killings—up from 25
in 2018—accounting for 30 percent of the global
total. Brazil had 24 killings, almost 90 percent
of which took place in the Amazon. Globally, 40
percent of defenders killed were indigenous people,
despite representing just 5 percent of the world’s
population. Mining was again the deadliest sector,
with 50 people killed. Ten percent of those killed
were women. Women also faced smear campaigns
using sexist or sexual content, and sexual violence
(Global Witness 2020; Guy 2020).

Research and Methods
The research for this report was designed to better
understand three issues:

▪
▪

The law regarding the rights of indigenous
people over their lands and the mineral
resources on their lands, as well as the powers
and obligations of miners operating on
indigenous lands.
The implementation and enforcement of these
laws and the experiences of indigenous people
when mining occurs on their lands.

Undermining Rights: Indigenous Lands and Mining in the Amazon
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▪

The environmental impacts of mining on
indigenous lands, especially the impact
on forests.

Data were collected through literature reviews,
geospatial analysis, legal reviews, and case studies.

▪

▪

▪

▪
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Literature reviews: The research involved
both a broad review of the literature on mining
on indigenous and community lands globally,
and more focused reviews of six countries—
Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, Guyana,
and Peru.
Geospatial analysis: Geospatial analysis was
conducted to examine the extent and impact of
mining on indigenous land and forest cover in
the Amazon. This geospatial analysis focused
on the biogeographic boundary of the Amazon.
Data on large-scale mining concessions and
illegal mining were available for Bolivia, Brazil,
Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, Suriname, and
Venezuela. Deforestation rates on indigenous
land with active concessions and/or illegal
mining were calculated for the period from
2000 to 2015 and compared with the rates on
indigenous land without mining.
Legal reviews: The legal reviews focused on
Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, Guyana,
and Peru, and addressed four critical issues:
ownership of mineral resources, allocation
of mineral rights, consultation and consent,
and protection of indigenous lands. National
(or federal) laws enacted before April 2020,
including constitutions, statutes, regulations,
decrees, technical directives, and court rulings
of relevant cases, were reviewed to the extent
they were available.
Case studies: To better understand the
implementation and enforcement of laws, and
the practice of mining on indigenous land,
case studies were developed of indigenous
peoples experiencing mining—or the threat of
mining—on their land. One case study each
was developed from Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia,
Ecuador, Guyana, and Peru. Data and
information on the case studies were collected
from the literature and through interviews with
local experts with knowledge of the affected
indigenous people.

Data and Findings

GIS analysis:
Large-scale mining concessions cover
approximately 1.28 million sq. km (excluding
French Guiana and Suriname) or more than 18
percent of the Amazon biogeographic region.
Nearly 45 percent of the mining area (567,000
sq. km) is considered “active” mining area (i.e.,
in exploration or extraction), while much of the
remaining portion is “inactive” (i.e., the concessions
are pending activity—open for bidding or under
tender). Approximately 57,000 sq. km of the active
mining concessions, or more than 10 percent,
overlap directly with indigenous territories. Active
mining concessions overlap indigenous lands
in all Amazonian countries. Many indigenous
lands are affected by multiple overlapping mining
concessions held by different mining companies.
The analysis of illegal mining focused on Bolivia,
Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela.
Most of the illegal mining area is in Peru and
Bolivia, while Brazil and Venezuela have the largest
estimated number of illegal mining extraction sites.
At least 30 rivers are affected by illegal mining
or are acting as routes for the entry of machinery
and inputs and the outlet of the minerals. Known
areas or sites of illegal mining operations overlap
with at least 370 indigenous lands, including 260
indigenous lands in Peru. Rivers affected by illegal
mining are within or on the border of 88 indigenous
lands, including 32 indigenous lands in Peru and 29
in Colombia.
In total, about 450,000 sq. km—more than 20
percent—of the 2.1 million sq. km of indigenous
land in the Amazon directly overlaps with mining
concessions and/or illegal mining and affects 1,131
of the 3,653 (31 percent) indigenous lands in the
Amazon (excluding French Guiana and Suriname).
Approximately 143,000 sq. km of indigenous
land overlaps with active mining concessions and
known illegal mining areas, while the remaining
302,000 sq. km of indigenous land overlaps with
inactive concessions. Much of the 143,000 sq. km
of indigenous land with active concessions and/or
illegal mining areas occurs in Venezuela, followed
by Brazil and Colombia. Most of indigenous land
with inactive concessions is in Brazil because of the
absence of an enabling law.

Indigenous lands that experienced mining (i.e.,
active concessions and/or illegal mining) had a
higher rate of forest loss in the period 2000 to
2015 than indigenous lands not affected by
mining. In Bolivia, Ecuador, and Peru, the rate
was at least three times higher and in Colombia
and Venezuela, the rate was one to two times
higher on indigenous lands with mining than on
indigenous lands absent mining.
In Brazil, there was not a large discrepancy between
the rate of deforestation on indigenous lands with
active mining activities and indigenous lands
without mining. The deforestation rate from 2000
to 2015 on indigenous lands with mining was only
0.3 percent higher than the rate on indigenous land
without mining. Overall, the deforestation rate on
indigenous land with mining in Brazil was lower
than in the other countries. With mining not legally
possible on indigenous land, this may be due to the
government labeling some mining concessions as
active when, in practice, they are inactive.
In Guyana, the deforestation rates were 0.3 percent
higher from 2000 to 2015 on indigenous lands that
did not experience any mining than the rates on
lands with mining. This may be due to legal ASM
and/or illegal mining on indigenous lands which
are widespread in the country. The Guyana analysis
only included active mining concessions as Amazon
Network of Georeferenced Socio-Environmental
Information (RAISG) does not have data on ASM
and illegal mining for the country.

Legal reviews:
Multiple international instruments address or
have implications for mining on indigenous land.
Two international instruments are of particular
importance as they have helped shape domestic
legislation that governs mining on indigenous land
in the six research countries—the International
Labor Organization’s Indigenous and Tribal
Peoples Convention, 1989 (ILO Convention 169)
and the United Nations Declaration on the Rights
of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP). Adopted in 1989,
ILO Convention 169 established international
standards on the rights of indigenous peoples
(ILO 1989). Of the six research countries, only
Guyana has not ratified ILO Convention 169. The

2007 UNDRIP provides a universal framework of
minimum standards for the survival, dignity, and
well-being of indigenous peoples (UN 2007). All six
research countries have adopted UNDRIP.

Land rights:
The national laws in Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia,
Ecuador, Guyana, and Peru recognize indigenous
land rights and customary tenure systems, and
domestic court decisions have stressed the
importance of these rights.
By law, the formalization of customary land rights is
not required for the rights to be legally recognized,
although, in practice, a land title or certificate can
help indigenous communities better protect their
rights against third parties. Formalization is central
to the integration of customary land rights into
official systems and the establishment of legally
recognized rights. In the research countries, the
established formalization procedures are costly and
time consuming, can bring exposure to unwanted
investors, and can result in fees and taxes.
Moreover, not all customary land and traditional
rights can be formalized (see Colombia and Guyana
Case Studies; Notess et al. 2018).
The rights recognized through formalization in
the six research countries vary by country, tenure
regime, and/or type of title. Indigenous peoples in
the research countries enjoy some level of access,
withdrawal/use, management, exclusion, and
alienation rights to lands and natural resources
found there. Rarely, however, do they have full,
unfettered land rights. For example, the right to
withdrawal or use is often restricted to renewable
natural resources and only for domestic or
subsistence purposes (although indigenous
people may apply to acquire these rights under a
separate procedure).
Indigenous peoples in the six research countries
also have limited alienation rights. By law,
indigenous lands are inalienable in Bolivia, Brazil,
and Colombia (in the case of indigenous reserves)—
the government or other entities cannot take
indigenous lands, and indigenous peoples may not
sell or otherwise transfer their titled land to another
entity. Indigenous land in Peru and Ecuador was

Undermining Rights: Indigenous Lands and Mining in the Amazon
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at one time inalienable but is no longer so due to
constitutional reforms. In Guyana, titled indigenous
land is not exempt from expropriation.
In Peru, indigenous people may sell their land,
although in Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador,
and Guyana, they are prohibited from doing so.
Indigenous people in Colombia, Guyana and
Peru may, however, lease some of their land
to third parties, including miners. The laws in
Bolivia, Brazil, and Ecuador do not explicitly allow
indigenous peoples to lease their collective lands.

Mineral rights:
In Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, Guyana, and
Peru, all mineral resources are the property of
the state, including the minerals on and below
indigenous land. In Bolivia, minerals are the
property of the Bolivian people, but the government
is responsible for their administration. In all six
research countries the government has authority
over minerals and mining operations in the
country, including the authority to grant rights to
third parties for the exploration and exploitation
of minerals.
In all research countries, indigenous people can
exploit minerals on their land for subsistence,
domestic, or customary purposes. In Brazil,
Colombia, and Guyana, indigenous people do
not need government authorization to do so,
but in Bolivia, Ecuador and Peru, government
authorization is required.
By law, commercial mining can take place on
indigenous land in Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador,
Guyana, and Peru. (In Brazil, an enabling law is
currently being debated that would allow mining
on indigenous land.) National laws in these five
countries establish procedures for acquiring
mineral rights for commercial exploration and
exploitation from the government mining
authority often in coordination with the
environmental agency.
In Colombia and Guyana, national law explicitly
provides for indigenous peoples to conduct
commercial mining. In Bolivia, Ecuador, and
Peru the law is silent on this matter but does not

10
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explicitly prohibit or restrict indigenous people
from applying for mineral rights. In Colombia,
indigenous peoples are provided with simplified
procedures to acquire the rights to commercially
mine their land. In Bolivia, Ecuador, Guyana,
and Peru, indigenous people must meet the same
requirements as other parties.
In Colombia, the law provides indigenous people
the right of first refusal to exploit minerals for
commercial purposes on their land. As such,
indigenous people must first refuse their right to
exploit mineral resources on their lands before the
government can grant the mineral rights to a third
party. The law does not provide indigenous people
this right in the other five research countries.
In Colombia, Article 326 of the National
Development Plan (2018–2022) Law (Law 1955 of
2019) provides that the government will establish
differentiated requirements for the granting of
mining concession contracts to indigenous people
and Afro-Colombian communities. It will also
establish “differentiated terms of reference for
the preparation of the environmental impact
study required for the environmental licensing
of these mining projects.” Moreover, the law
provides that once a mining concession is granted
to “ethnic peoples” the government will provide
them comprehensive technical support and their
mining activities will be subject to differentiated
monitoring. These specific requirements have yet
to be established. If the indigenous people exercise
their rights of first refusal but cannot meet the
requirements to be granted a mining concession,
the government may grant the mineral rights to a
third party.

Consultation and consent rights:
National laws in all six research countries establish
social and environmental safeguards designed
to protect the rights of indigenous people and
conserve indigenous land and natural resources,
although the specifics vary by country. National
laws in Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador,
and Peru require the government to consult
indigenous peoples whenever there are legislative
or administrative measures or decisions that
may affect them directly. In these five countries,

indigenous people must be formally recognized by
the government as indigenous to enjoy the right to
consultation, although they are not required to have
a title to their land.
At the international level, indigenous peoples have
the right to provide (or withhold) their free, prior
informed consent (FPIC) as recognized under
Article 19 of the UNDRIP. While no research
country recognizes FPIC as provided in UNDRIP,
the law in Guyana provides for a limited right
of consent. By law, indigenous people must be
recognized by the government as indigenous and
they must have a land title to exercise the right
of consent. For large-scale mining, however, the
minister of indigenous peoples’ affairs and the
minister of natural resources can override refusal
of consent and allow mining on indigenous land if
it is considered in the public interest. This authority
to override a refusal of consent is not consistent
with UNDRIP.

Easements:
When mining on indigenous land, miners often
seek the use of some additional indigenous land to
conduct their operations. In Colombia and Guyana,
the government may establish an easement on
indigenous land to enable miners to develop their
exploration and exploitation activities. In Bolivia,
Brazil, and Peru, the law prohibits the government
from establishing an easement on indigenous
lands. In Ecuador, national regulations provide
that the government may establish easements for
mining purposes without the authorization of the
landowner. National courts, however, have stated
that easements cannot be established on all types
of land. A 2010 court decision made clear that
easement rules apply only to lands that are not
considered indigenous.

Undermining Rights: Indigenous Lands and Mining in the Amazon
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Benefits:
National laws in all six research countries mandate
some form of benefit sharing with indigenous
peoples when third parties mine their land. In
Peru, national laws require the miner to make a
prior commitment through a sworn declaration
to, among other benefits, preferably hire local
personnel to carry out mining activities and provide
training that may be required.
In some countries, regulations explicitly provide
that indigenous peoples must benefit economically
from mining projects on their land. In Ecuador,
the Mining Law of 2009 states that “60% of the
royalty of the mining projects, to be allocated
for productive projects and sustainable local
development” and that “when necessary, 50% of
this percentage [be allocated] to the entities of
government of the indigenous peoples.” These
resources are to be distributed prioritizing the
needs of the indigenous peoples who are directly
affected by the mining activity.

Protection:
Mining is inherently damaging to the environment
and brings risks to health and local well-being. To
mitigate these damages and risks, national laws in
all research countries require miners to minimize
the impacts of their operations on the environment.
The laws in the research countries address a
range of critical environmental issues. Certain
environmental issues, however, are not addressed
in law and some minimum standards do not rise to
the level of international law or norms.
In all six research countries, Environmental Impact
Assessments (EIA) are required for projects that
may significantly affect the environment, including
large-scale mining operations. In Peru, a detailed
EIA report is required for mining activities with
significant negative environmental impacts, while
a less detailed EIA report is needed for moderate
negative environmental impacts. Mining operations
with minimal environmental impacts only need
a Declaración de Impacto Ambiental (DIA,
Environmental Impact Declaration). Detailed EIAs
are approved by the environmental authority, while
the semi-detailed EIAs and DIAs are approved by
the mining authority.

12
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In all research countries, mining is prohibited
on certain lands. In Ecuador, for example, the
extraction of nonrenewable resources (e.g.,
minerals, oil, and natural gas) is forbidden in
protected areas and areas declared “intangible”
(“untouchable”), which may include some
indigenous land. In Colombia, mining exploration
and exploitation activities may not be carried out
in national natural parks, regional parks, protected
forest reserve areas, and wetlands.
In the research countries, governments are by law
responsible for monitoring and overseeing mining
companies to ensure their operations are conducted
in accordance with the law, that they are meeting
their social and environmental commitments,
and that they mitigate and compensate for any
environmental damages or other losses caused by
their activities. The government in these countries
also has the authority to arrest, detain, and
punish miners for operating illegally, to impose
fines, and to mandate compensatory measures on
affected people. In all six countries, miners are also
responsible for monitoring their operations to avoid
environmental damages.

Case Studies
Below are the principal findings of the six case
studies (see the full report for details).

Bolivia (Isiboro Sécure Indigenous Territory
and National Park)
This case study highlights the importance of
strategic alliances among different indigenous
peoples to affect change. In Bolivia, the Mojeño,
Yuracaré, and Chimán indigenous peoples joined
efforts to effectively press the government to
suspend the construction of a road that would cause
environmental damage and open their lands to
unwelcome development, including mining. The
construction of the road remains on hold. The main
findings in this case study include:

▪

In May 2011, the Bolivian government approved
financing by the Brazilian National Bank for
Economic and Social Development (Banco
Nacional de Desenvolvimento Econômico e
Social, BNDES) for the construction of the Villa

▪

▪
▪

▪

Tunari–San Ignacio de Moxos highway through
the Isiboro Sécure Indigenous Territory and
National Park (Tipnis).
The Mojeño, Yuracaré, and Chimán indigenous
peoples of Tipnis participated in several
marches and protests. Their efforts paid off
when, in October 2011, Tipnis was, by law,
declared an “untouchable” area halting the
construction of the road and stopping all
industrial development, including mining.
In April 2013, Bolivia’s president announced
that the road would continue to be on hold for
a three-year period until extreme poverty in
Tipnis was eliminated.
In August 2017, a new law was passed that
annulled the “intangibility” status of Tipnis and
reopened the possibility of the road being built.
Given the ongoing controversies over the road,
however, the government again decided to put
the project on hold.
Nearly 3,800 hectares of forest cover in the
indigenous lands, roughly 0.8 percent of its
total area, were lost between 2000 and 2015.
This contrasts sharply with the significant forest
loss immediately outside Tipnis, especially on
the southern border of the indigenous lands.

Brazil (Yanomami Park)
This case study highlights the extent of illegal
mining in some indigenous lands in the Amazon.
Despite considerable efforts by the Yanomami and
Ye’kwana indigenous peoples which have put
their lives at risk, illegal mining is widespread
on their lands. To date, government efforts have
also failed to halt illegal miners from entering
and conducting operations in the Yanomami
territory. In recent years, the number of illegal
miners has increased, and the operations have
become more sophisticated. The main findings
in this case study include:

▪

Mining is not legally possible on indigenous
lands in Brazil. However, there are today
perhaps 20,000 illegal miners operating on
Yanomami lands.

▪
▪
▪
▪

▪

The Yanomami and their supporters have led
national campaigns, called for international
media attention, and received support from
NGOs, but these efforts have not halted illegal
mining on their lands.
The government is responsible for monitoring
and overseeing mining but, to date, has not
curtailed illegal mining on Yanomami lands.
Inactive mining concessions and illegal mining
areas overlap with about 55 percent of the
indigenous lands.
Over the 15-year period from 2000 to 2015
about 7,000 ha of forest cover were lost in
the Yanomami lands, a significant amount
although a relatively small percentage (0.07
percent) of the large Yanomami territory.
While some of this loss may be linked to
agricultural or forestry activities, much of
the forest loss is likely associated with the
illegal mining operations.
Outside the Yanomami territory, there was
significant forest loss between 2000 and
2015, especially to the east but also on the
southern border.

Colombia (Yaigojé Apaporis National
Natural Park)
This case shows the extreme measures that some
indigenous people will take to protect their lands
from mining. The Yaigojé Apaporis Reserve was
a formally recognized indigenous territory, but
when a mining company sought a concession on
the indigenous lands, the Yaigojé Apaporis people
asked the government to establish the reserve as a
national natural park where mining is prohibited.
In doing so, the indigenous people forfeited some
of their land use and management rights. The main
findings in this case study include:

▪
▪

By law, mining is not allowed in national
natural parks in Colombia.
In 2007, Cosigo Resources Ltd. (hereafter
Cosigo), a Canadian mining company, sought
a gold mining concession within the Yaigojé
Apaporis Reserve.
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▪
▪

▪
▪
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In response, the Yaigojé Apaporis indigenous
people asked the government to declare
their lands a national natural park. In 2009,
the Yaigojé Apaporis National Natural Park
was established.
Two days after the national natural park was
established, the government’s Department of
Mining Services granted a mining concession
to Cosigo inside the park. The concession was
quickly terminated after the National Parks
Unit demanded its cancellation in compliance
with the law.
Several lawsuits by Cosigo followed and,
in 2015, the Constitutional Court of Colombia
ordered the suspension of all mining
exploration and exploitation activities in
the park.
There has been limited forest loss in the
Yaigojé Apaporis National Natural Park before
and after the park was established. In the
15-year period from 2000 to 2015, the nearly

▪

1.06-million-ha park lost 4,200 ha of forest
cover, less than 0.4 percent of its total area.
Following the creation of the park in 2009,
deforestation dropped in the period 2010 to
2015 from the previous 10 years.
This contrasts sharply with deforestation
outside the Yaigojé Apaporis National
Natural Park. One active mining concession
on the eastern boundary of the park shows
some deforestation. There is also significant
deforestation near the northern and southern
borders of the park, with some deforestation
on the southern border linked to illegal mining
along a river. Other rivers north and south of
the park are also affected by deforestation.

Ecuador (Shuar indigenous lands)
This case study highlights the importance of
indigenous people being formally recognized by the
government as indigenous and holding a title to
their customary lands, even if formalization is not
required for legal recognition. It also provides an

example of a government establishing an easement
on indigenous lands for industrial mining purposes,
and the adverse impacts easements can have on
indigenous people and other local communities.
The main findings in this case study include:

▪
▪
▪

▪

▪

In March 2012, the government of Ecuador
granted several mining concessions to a
Chinese mining company, EcuaCorriente S.A.
(ECSA), that overlapped with peasant farmer
and Shuar indigenous lands.
At ECSA’s request, the government establish
several mining easements on indigenous and
farmer lands, and the landholders were
forcibly evicted.
In February 2018, the Amazon Community of
Social Action Cordillera del Cóndor Mirador
(Comunidad Amazónica de Acción Social
Cordillera del Cóndor Mirador, CASCOMI), an
organization established by those affected by
the mining, sued ECSA, arguing that the mine
was developed on ancestral lands and that the
evictions were conducted violently and without
prior and informed consultation.
Lower courts ruled in favor of ECSA and the
government on the grounds that CASCOMI
did not represent indigenous peoples since it
also included nonindigenous farmers. A final
appeal is currently being prepared for the
Constitutional Court of Ecuador, the country’s
highest court, and before the United Nations
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights (CESCR).
The indigenous lands that overlap with the
Mirador concessions—the Tundayme and Area
Del Proyecto De Desarrollo land—comprised
many separate plots of land that collectively
total more than 12,000 ha. Overall, the
Tundayme and Area Del Proyecto De Desarrollo
lands lost about 260 ha of forest cover over
the 15–year period from 2000 to 2015, about 2
percent of the total area. Much of the forest loss
occurred in the concessions.

▪

Forest loss increased nearly twofold from the
period 2005 to 2010 to the period 2010 to
2015. This corresponds to the time the Mirador
project was approved and operations began.

Guyana (Patamona indigenous lands)
This case study highlights the fact that some
indigenous peoples in the Amazon mine their
land for commercial purposes. Indigenous
mining operations must meet the same social and
environmental safeguards as all other miners. In
this case in Guyana, indigenous mining operations
are conducted with the approval of traditional
leaders, meet the interests of the community, and
allow for indigenous people to capture important
mining benefits. The main findings in this
case study include:

▪

▪

▪
▪

Many residents of Campbelltown, who are
primarily Patamona indigenous people, mine
their land. The indigenous miners have been
encouraged by their leaders to find innovative
ways to reduce the impact of mining (e.g.,
El Dorado—Responsible Mining for Guyana
Initiative), while also increasing production
and profits.
Like other Patamona villages in Guyana,
Campbelltown has requested an extension of
its 2006 land title arguing that the title does not
include the full extent of its customary lands.
The view among coastlander miners (miners
from the coast of Guyana) and dredge owners,
however, is that the Patamona indigenous
people are applying for an extension to gain
control of additional mining tracts.
In the nearly 6,000-ha Patamona lands, 96 ha
of forest cover was lost over the 15–year period
from 2000 to 2015, about 1.6 percent of the
area with the most recent time period (2010 to
2015) showing the greatest net loss.
Some deforestation has occurred on the
Patamona indigenous lands outside the three
mining concessions. This forest loss is likely
linked to the artisanal and small-scale miners
operating on the land with the permission of
the village council.
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Peru (Shipibo and Ese’Eja indigenous lands)
This case study provides the experience of the
Tres Islas community, mainly Shipibo and Ese’Eja
indigenous peoples, which effectively used local
and national courts as well as the Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) to
protect its lands from mining. In Peru, the courts
are increasingly engaging in the complexities of
indigenous affairs, including customary land tenure
systems. A growing number of courts now recognize
the unique forms of indigenous social organization
with regard to their lands and traditional land uses.
The main findings in this case study include:

▪
▪
▪
▪

▪
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In the early 2000s, the government of Peru
granted more than 100 mining concessions
and several logging concessions on Tres Islas’
lands without informing or consulting the
Tres Islas indigenous community.

▪

Recommendations
The research findings provide compelling
evidence of the following:

▪

In response, the Tres Islas community
assembly decided in August 2010 to construct
a booth and wooden gate to control access to its
lands. The booth was manned by members of
the community.
Two transport companies sued the Tres Islas
community demanding free transit into their
lands. The court ruled in favor of the companies
and ordered the removal of the booth and gate.
The Tres Islas community appealed the
decision and took the matter to the Peruvian
Constitutional Tribunal. In September
2012, the tribunal ruled that the Tres Islas
community had the right to control the entry
of third parties into its lands. The community
reestablished the booth and gate and resumed
controlling access to its lands.
Thereafter, the Tres Islas community sued
the regional government of Madre de Dios
in the regional Court of Justice over the
mining concessions granted without a prior
consultation process. In March 2019, the
Superior Courts of Justice of Peru declared
the 127 mining concessions on the Tres Islas
lands, including 8 concessions that were in the
process of being granted, to be null and void,
and ordered all activities resulting from them to
be halted.

In total, 93 percent of the deforestation that
occurred on the Tres Islas lands during the 15year time period from 2000 to 2015 occurred
in the portion of the lands that overlapped with
legal and illegal mining areas. Deforestation
drastically declined between 2010 and 2015,
coinciding with the community regaining
control of access to its lands.

▪

▪

The laws governing minerals and mining by
third parties on indigenous lands provide
indigenous peoples with some rights over
their lands and the minerals on and below
them. Overall, however, they put indigenous
peoples at a legal disadvantage with miners.
Legal miners have important authorities to
enter onto and use indigenous lands to realize
their mineral rights, while indigenous peoples
lack critical rights that would help them better
protect their lands.
Many indigenous peoples in the Amazon do
not want commercial mining by third parties
on their lands and have deployed a range of
measures, such as protests and litigation—some
successful, others less so—to keep miners off
their lands.
All mining, whether ASM or industrial mining,
on indigenous lands is linked to environmental
damage, including the loss of forests and
associated ecosystem services. Indigenous
lands without mining have significantly lower
deforestation rates than indigenous lands
with mining.

The research findings have implications for
indigenous peoples confronted with mining
as well as for governments, development
assistance agencies, miners, mining companies,
NGOs, and other civil society organizations. Five
recommendations are provided that recognize the
challenges confronting indigenous peoples in the
Amazon and that build on the law and experiences
in the six research countries. The broader literature

on mining makes clear that the challenges and
opportunities in the Amazon are not unique. As a
result, these recommendations likely also apply to
other countries around the world where mining
is occurring on indigenous or community lands,
threatening people and local environments. The five
recommendations are:

Provide strong legal rights to
indigenous peoples
While the national laws in the research countries
include provisions designed to empower indigenous
peoples and safeguard indigenous lands for
indigenous peoples, they do not establish the strong
legal protections needed for indigenous peoples to
manage and use their lands and forests for their
own development purposes. Stronger rights would
further empower indigenous peoples and help them
sustainably manage their lands and protect their
forests and other natural resources. Tenure security
creates critical incentives for indigenous peoples to
make land-related investments in their lands and
forests by providing them with high expectations of
rights over the returns. The research identified the
following four sets of rights critical for indigenous
peoples to protect their lands:

▪

▪
▪

Land rights: Like all citizens, indigenous
peoples need strong, secure land rights to
effectively protect, use, and manage their lands.
Governments should review and, if necessary,
reform national laws to ensure indigenous
peoples have the rights and authorities they
need to take charge of their own development.
Mineral rights: Indigenous peoples are
empowered when they have more rights and
greater control over the minerals (and other
natural resources) on and below the surface of
their lands.
Right of free, prior, and informed consent:
Governments should build on Guyana’s
example and recognize the right of free,
prior, and informed consent (FPIC)—not just
consultation—for indigenous peoples as well
as Afro-descendants and other communities
regarding mining and other developments that
may affect them or their lands.

▪

Right of first refusal: Given the interest of some
indigenous peoples to commercially mine their
land, governments should build on Colombia’s
example and recognize the right of first refusal
for indigenous peoples to exploit minerals for
commercial purposes.

Establish strong environmental safeguards
National laws in all research countries provide
for the protection of forests and the environment.
They require miners and mining companies to
minimize their environmental impacts, whether
mining on indigenous or other lands. While
some national environmental safeguards meet
international standards, others fall short and
should be strengthened to provide the level of
protection needed to adequately safeguard forests
and their critical ecosystem services, including
carbon sequestration. Stronger environmental laws
coupled with effective enforcement (see below for
details.) will help ensure that the forest homes of
indigenous peoples in the Amazon are protected.
To ensure mining operations do not irreparably
damage the environment and the nation’s valuable
mineral resources provide the promised benefits
of local and national development, governments
must be more selective in the allocation of mineral
rights and mining concessions. Companies with
strong track records of mining operations that
meet or exceed national and international social
and environmental standards, that make use of the
latest technologies, and that engage communities
and protect forests should be prioritized. Proposal
vetting processes should not just focus on the public
revenue generated or how quickly the mine can
begin production. Broader selection criteria can
create incentives for companies to adopt mining
practices and technologies that are less damaging to
the environment and more supportive of indigenous
peoples and other affected communities.
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Build indigenous capacity
As the threats to their lands, livelihoods, and
well-being escalate, many indigenous peoples
realize they lack the expertise, contacts, and
resources needed to effectively address these
challenges and mitigate the risks. Governments
and their development partners can provide
training and critical technical and financial
resources for indigenous peoples to develop new
skills and capacities to better protect their lands
and themselves. These include skills to effectively
negotiate with mining companies, monitor their
lands for illegal activities, and better protect
themselves and their community from harm.
To support government operations, indigenous
peoples can build skills in collecting data on illegal
activities that meet the legal burden of proof.
Indigenous organizations and NGOs can raise
awareness on the law or rules of evidence and
provide training on tools for collecting information
that meets the standard of evidence. In recent years,
new technologies have been developed and made
available to quickly and precisely map indigenous
lands and monitor large areas in real or near-real
time, including using data from unmanned aerial
vehicles/drones and satellites. At the same time,
government agencies and courts of law must accept
such information from indigenous peoples in their
investigative and sanctioning processes.
As the risks to themselves and their communities
increase, indigenous peoples are taking more
precautions while carrying out their activism
and campaigning safely and effectively. They are
also taking steps to defend themselves against
harassment and physical attacks. Many land
defenders would likely benefit from gaining a
better understanding of their legal rights, training
on risk assessment information systems, learning
how to better recognize threats and minimize risks,
building capacity in new approaches to deescalating
confrontational situations, and building skills in
self-defense techniques.

Ensure responsible mining
All mining in the Amazon, whether by large
companies or indigenous peoples, should be
responsible mining—mining that is safe, fair,
and mitigates social and environmental risks.
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Governments must provide stronger oversight
of mining operations and better enforce
applicable laws, but miners and mining companies
must also become better corporate citizens and
take more responsibility in meeting social and
environmental safeguards. New, stronger national
laws and regulations are needed to ensure miners
operate safely and cause the least social and
environmental harm.
Some mining companies and mining associations
have established social and environmental
standards, made voluntary commitments to
responsible mining, and established corporate
policies or guidelines that align with the
commitments. These efforts are to be applauded
and encouraged. There is, however, growing
evidence that voluntary approaches do not always
lead to responsible mining as many companies
fail to meet their standards. At the same time,
the effectiveness of company corporate social
responsibility (CSR) initiatives in mining (and in
oil and natural gas) is being questioned. Over time,
aspects of these voluntary approaches that meet
international standards should be incorporated into
national laws and regulations.
Companies must also increase their support to
indigenous peoples and other communities and
negotiate fairer agreements that provide benefitsharing packages that address community interests
and strengthen local capacity for self-determined
development. Indigenous people should insist
on formal agreements and governments should
mandate them. Such community-company benefitsharing agreements should include both financial
and nonfinancial benefits.

Ensure effective implementation
and law enforcement
To protect indigenous peoples, their lands, and
their livelihoods, Amazonian governments must
strengthen the public institutions with critical
roles in advancing indigenous matters. These
include government agencies and departments
responsible for establishing and implementing
indigenous policies; for mapping, demarcating, and
documenting indigenous lands; and for preventing
invasions of indigenous territories by unauthorized

outsiders. The National Indian Foundation
(Fundação Nacional do Índio, FUNAI) in Brazil,
the Ministry of Culture (Ministerio de Cultura) in
Peru, and similar agencies in other countries must
be empowered—politically, legally, and practically—
with sufficient human and financial resources to
effectively discharge their roles.
Amazonian governments must also strengthen
their oversight of mining on indigenous lands.
Mining operations must conform with the law
and meet the provisions of license and concession
agreements. Government efforts should not
be limited to capturing and prosecuting illegal
miners on indigenous lands. These efforts should
also target the individuals who hire, finance,
or otherwise facilitate the illegal miners. Those
who sell and profit from the illicit trade in gold,
diamonds, and other minerals must also be
identified and prosecuted.
Amazonian governments—and consumer country
governments—can address the demand for gold
and other minerals that are illegally mined by
establishing certification systems. Such schemes

can promote actions by miners that protect forests
and respect indigenous peoples. Governments
should identify an appropriate set of standards
for responsible mining in the Amazon and build
a chain-of-custody certification process. This
system would track certified minerals through
the extraction, processing, transformation,
manufacturing, and distribution processes.
Independent auditors would then be in a position
to assess production and issue certificates to
mining operations that comply with the agreedupon standards.
Consumer country governments can support
the implementation of responsible sourcing
certification schemes. For example, they can
implement an outreach and information campaign
designed to educate consumers about the value
of purchasing certified minerals or products that
use them. They can also encourage responsible
mineral sourcing through public procurement rules
by requiring bids to contain certified minerals or
through preferential bid evaluation.
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INTRODUCTION
As the price of gold and other minerals increases, so do the
impacts on the Amazon forest and its people, including the 1.5
million indigenous people whose livelihoods and wellbeing
depend on the forest. While national laws provide indigenous
people with some land rights, they grant few rights to the minerals
on their lands. In practice, the law is not well implemented by
miners or enforced by governments. As a response, indigenous
people have employed various strategies to protect their lands
from mining. Some of them have been successful, others, not.
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broad-based social and economic benefits while not
irreparably damaging the environment has proved
difficult (IRP 2019).

Minerals and metals underpin national economies
around the world and provide crucial raw materials
to almost every sector of the global economy
(World Bank 2017a; IRP 2019). Mining is an
important source of public and private investment,
employment, and government revenue.1 Globally,
commercial-scale mining provides employment
to more than two million people, and for every
commercial mining job, another two to five jobs are
created.2 Artisanal and small-scale mining (ASM)
provides employment and income to an additional
13 million workers and their families worldwide
(Walser 2002; EITI 2020).3

The Amazon contains world-class deposits of
copper, tin, nickel, iron ore, bauxite, manganese,
and gold. ASM, especially for gold, has been part
of the livelihood strategy of rural households for
centuries, while large-scale industrial mining has
been underway for much of the 20th century. All
Amazonian countries have promoted and supported
the exploration, exploitation, and export of highvalue minerals for decades (D.H. Bebbington et
al. 2018a, 2018b). In Peru and Bolivia, industrial
mining is concentrated in the Andes, but in the
other Amazonian countries, large-scale mining
operations are underway in the lowland forest.
In recent years, governments have committed
to mining as a key component of their national
development strategies and have provided more
incentives to promote investment. At the same
time, mining as a percentage of gross domestic
product (GDP) has increased in several Amazonian
countries (Figure 1.1).

With strong global demand and soaring prices,
mining has risen markedly in the last few
decades. Despite moves to increase recycling and
decouple economies from mineral use, mining is
expected to continue growing to serve the needs
of a larger, more affluent, and increasingly urban
and technology-driven population (IRP 2019).
If carefully managed, the mining sector presents
enormous opportunities for local and national
development, particularly in low-income countries
(IRP 2019). For many resource-rich developing
countries, however, ensuring that mining delivers

Figure 1.1 |

Mining as a Percentage of GDP in Amazonian Countries
Metallic mineral and coal production value as % of GDP (data between 2000 and 2006 does not include coal production value). Simple average.
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In Brazil, the 1988 Federal Constitution allows
for mining on indigenous lands but only under
rules approved by the National Congress. Since
the National Congress has not established such
rules, mining on indigenous lands is effectively
prohibited, although, in practice, illegal mining
is underway in many indigenous territories. The
government, however, is moving to open up the
Amazon to commercial development. In January
2019, the minister of mines and energy announced
that the government was preparing to overhaul
mining regulations that will include opening
indigenous lands to extractive resource exploitation
and infrastructure (Branford and Torres 2019).
On February 5, 2020, Brazil’s president signed
Bill 191/2020 that would open indigenous lands
to mining, oil and gas extraction, electricity
generation, and agriculture. The bill is now in the
Chamber of Deputies for discussion (André Lima,
personal communication, 2020; Brito 2020; DW
2020; Vilela 2020).
The COVID-19 pandemic has also impacted mining
in Amazonian countries. Governments have
declared states of emergency and issued stayat-home orders, resulting in many sectors of the
economy essentially shutting down. In Peru and
other Amazonian countries, however, governments
have allowed large-scale mining to continue
and encouraged expansion while sidelining and
constraining livelihood possibilities for ASM (Vila
Benites and Bebbington 2020). Mining in Peru
accounts for significant percentages of the national
and some regions’ GDPs. Large-scale mining is
the principal contributor to the country’s Fiscal
Stabilization Fund (Salas et al. 2018).4
On August 6, 2020, the price of gold hit a record
high of $2,070.80 per ounce. Gold prices had been
rising for years but the threat to economies from
the novel coronavirus led to a surge in prices—up as
much as 35 percent this year—as investors sought
the perceived safety of gold. As the price of gold
rises, so does demand. The surge has triggered
a new, intensified gold rush in the Amazon with
implications for local people and the environment
(Nascimento and Faleiros 2020). Soaring prices,
coupled with the withdrawal of the police and

army from the mining areas to enforce lockdowns
and attend to the health crisis, has allowed illegal
mining to expand further (Saffon 2020).
These and other developments have driven mining
into more remote parts of the Amazon with
sometimes significant implications for indigenous
peoples and the forest (D.H. Bebbington et al.
2018a; 2018b). The Amazon is home to a growing
population, including about 1.5 million indigenous
peoples. Indigenous peoples hold perhaps 2.5
million sq. km of land, almost half of that in Brazil.
Much of this land is formally recognized and
documented, although more than 20 percent of
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the indigenous lands is still held only under
customary tenure arrangements (RAISG 2019a).
Land, together with its natural resources and
ecosystem services, is the source of livelihood and
well-being for most indigenous peoples. This land
delivers food, water, fuelwood, medicinal plants,
and other critical resources, while providing
indigenous peoples with security, status, social
identity, and a safety net. For many indigenous
peoples, land is also historically, culturally, and
spiritually significant.
Indigenous peoples in the Amazon have a long
history of sustainably managing their lands and
natural resources. Research shows that the average
annual deforestation rates in tenure-secure
indigenous forestlands in Bolivia, Brazil, and
Colombia from 2000 to 2012 were two to three
times lower than in similar lands not managed by
indigenous peoples (Ding et al. 2016; Blackman
and Veit 2018). In the Peruvian Amazon, titling of
indigenous lands in 2002 reduced forest clearing
by more than three-quarters and forest disturbance
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by roughly two-thirds in just the two subsequent
years (Blackman et al. 2017). Other research has
produced similar results for Brazil and across
Latin America. Mining (and other developments,
such as agriculture and cattle production) threaten
to undermine the effectiveness of indigenous
peoples’ protection of the forest. The critical role of
indigenous lands in climate mitigation is recognized
by the United Nations’ Intergovernmental Panel on
Climate Change (IPCC 2019).
By its very nature, the extraction of minerals is
environmentally destructive (IRP 2019). Dredging
by ASM disrupts rivers and aquatic life,5 mercury—
used to separate gold from rock—contaminates
waterways, and the toxic pollutants enter into
plants, animals, and people. Large-scale surface
mining cuts back forest and other vegetation,
which is particularly damaging to fragile
environments. The degradation negatively affects
the provisioning of ecosystem services, such as
local climate and water flow regulation, and results
in the loss of biodiversity.

Further, toxic mine and ore-processing waste
poses a risk through failures of waste storage
facilities or leaching of contained residual metals
through acid mine drainage and other factors.
Major disasters such as the Mariana (or Bento
Rodrigues) tailings dam collapse in November 2015
(Phillips and Brasileiro 2018) and the Brumadinho
dam collapse in January 2019 (Senra 2019),
both near Belo Horizonte, the capital of Minas
Gerais state in southeastern Brazil, make clear the
consequences of such disasters. The dam collapses
highlight not only the risks of harmful substances
entering the waterways and the environment, but
of infrastructure and institutional failures that
endanger workers, injure and kill people, and
destroy towns.
There are also important synergies between
mining (and other extractive industries), enabling
infrastructure development (e.g., roads, rail lines,
waterways, and dams), and trends in financial flows
and financing mechanisms with significant land use
implications (D.H. Bebbington et al. 2018a, 2018b).
For example, the proposed Belo Sun Mine, a largescale gold mine on the Xingu River in Pará State,
Brazil, by Canadian firm, Forbes & Manhattan,
is economically viable because of available
hydropower (D. Bebbington et al. 2018a, 2018b).
Large-scale mines take up less than 1 percent of the
Amazon basin (Sonter et al. 2017), and, as a result,
mining has not received the same level of attention
as other drivers of land use change and forest loss,
such as cattle and soybeans. But mining is often
linked to other sources of forest loss, including
infrastructure, urban expansion to support the
workforce, and development of mineral commodity
supply chains. These and other developments
beyond the mine accounted for about 9 percent of
Amazon forest loss between 2005 and 2015 (Sonter
et al. 2017).
Mining can also profoundly impact local
populations. ASM can be dangerous work and
bring significant health risks (Box 1.1). The influx
of workers can lead to the displacement of local
people, a rise in prostitution and crime, and the
decline of culture and traditional livelihoods. Child
labor exploitation, intimidation, money laundering,
illegal drug trade, and gold smuggling are also

often linked to mining. Further, miners can bring
with them new diseases. The novel coronavirus, for
example, likely entered the Yanomami indigenous
territory in northern Brazil through illegal miners
(Branford 2020; ISA 2020); the first death of a
Yanomami from COVID-19, the disease caused
by the novel coronavirus, occurred in April 2020
(Kaur and Alberti 2020). Though July, there were
five Yanomami deaths due to the disease (Branford
2020). The most marginalized sectors of society—
indigenous people, women, children, and elders
and other disadvantaged people—are often the
first affected and suffer the most (Lahiri-Dutt and
Ahmad 2006; Bond and Quinlan 2018; Mancini
and Sala 2018). Evidence shows that women
disproportionately bear many of the costs of both
large-scale and artisanal mining, such as social
and family disruption, health and safety risks (e.g.,
increased violence against women and girls), and
environmental degradation (loss of land, pollution,
and increasing resource scarcity) (Hinton et al.
2003; Oxfam 2017).
There are also equity concerns regarding
the allocation of mineral benefits, including
public revenue from mining (e.g., taxes, fees,
and royalties) and mining jobs. Multinational
companies often capture disproportionately large
shares of mining profits because of their position
in commodity markets and generous tax breaks
from host governments. (Much of the profit from
mines in Africa, Asia, and Latin America are
taken out of the country and not reinvested in
the host country.) Many companies also bring in
skilled managers from the outside and offer local
people—or migrants—only low-skill jobs with little
opportunity for learning or advancement (CoderreProulx et al. 2016). Families and communities
around extraction sites, however, are often poorly
compensated for the damage to property caused by
mining, and local jurisdictions where mining takes
place do not receive adequate shares of the mining
revenue (although in several countries, the national
government has begun transferring more revenue
back to the producing regions) (Bauer et al 2016).
Mining companies or illegal miners operating
on or near indigenous lands can lead to conflict,
especially with indigenous peoples who depend
on the land for their livelihood (REPAM 2019a).
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In 2018, at least 164 land and environmental
defenders, including many indigenous people,
were killed around the world, while many more
were threatened, harassed, stigmatized, attacked,
or jailed (Global Witness 2019).6 More than half of
the murders took place in Latin America, which has
ranked as the worst-affected continent since 2012,
with Brazil, Colombia, Mexico, and Guatemala at
or near the top of the list (Global Witness 2019).
In 2018, mining was for the first time the world’s
deadliest sector, with 43 defenders, including
indigenous people, killed protesting against the
destructive effects of mining on their lands and
livelihoods (Global Witness 2019).7
In 2019, a record 212 land and environmental
defenders were killed around the world, an average
of more than four people per week. Seven of the top
10 worst-affected nations were in Latin America,
where more than two-thirds of the total killings
took place. Colombia was the deadliest country,
with 64 killings—up from 25 in 2018—accounting
for 30 percent of the global total. Brazil had 24
killings, almost 90 percent of which took place
in the Amazon. Globally, 40 percent of defenders
killed were indigenous people, despite representing
just 5 percent of the world’s population. Mining was
again the deadliest sector, with 50 people killed.
Ten percent of those killed were women. Women
also faced smear campaigns using sexist or sexual
content, and sexual violence (Global Witness 2020;
Guy 2020).
Given these developments, there is an urgent need
for indigenous peoples to have a say in mining and
other development matters that affect their lands,
and for mining that does take place on indigenous
lands to mitigate the social and environmental
risks. The research for this report was designed to
better understand three issues:

▪
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The law regarding the rights of indigenous
peoples over their lands and the mineral
resources on their lands, as well as the powers
and obligations of miners operating on
indigenous lands.

▪
▪

The implementation and enforcement of these
laws and the experiences of indigenous peoples
when mining occurs on their lands.

BOX 1.1 | Mercury Poisoning in Madre de
Dios, Peru

The environmental impacts of mining on
indigenous lands, especially the impacts
on forests.

In the gold mining region of Madre de Dios in southern Peru,
mercury is a serious and increasing environmental and public
health problem. High mercury concentrations are found in
most local people and in most of the wild caught fish sold
in markets and consumed in the regional capital city, Puerto
Maldonado. In a recent assessment, indigenous people had
levels of mercury roughly five times that considered safe by
the World Health Organization (WHO), whereas people in
urban areas had double the safe limit. Indigenous children
had unsafe mercury concentrations over three times the level
of their nonindigenous counterparts (indigenous children
had mercury levels more than five times the limit with some
having levels as high as 34 times the safe limit). Women of
childbearing age were also disproportionately affected as
mercury, a neurotoxin, can cause severe, permanent brain
damage to an unborn child.

The research examined mining on indigenous lands
in the Amazon with a focus on six countries—
Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, Guyana, and
Peru. Data and information on the three issues were
collected by conducting literature reviews;
reviewing the relevant national laws (legal reviews);
preparing six case studies of indigenous
experiences, one in each research country; and
conducting a geospatial analysis to examine forest
cover change on indigenous lands affected by
mining across the Amazon and the six case study
sites. This report presents the data, analysis, and
principal findings of this research.
Based on the findings, several practical
recommendations were developed. These
recommendations are designed to empower
indigenous peoples to take charge of their own
development and to ensure mining on indigenous
lands delivers positive social and economic
outcomes while not causing irreparable damage
to the environment. The recommendations target
four audiences:

▪
▪
▪

Government agencies and legislative
committees responsible for supporting
indigenous peoples and for minerals and
mining, as well as their development partners.
Domestic and international ASM actors and
industrial mining operators, as well as industry
associations, investors, and risk assessors.
Indigenous peoples and other local
communities, as well as their representative
bodies and supporters, including local civil
society organizations (CSOs) and international
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs).

Sources: Swenson et al. 2011; Ashe 2012; CAMEP 2013

▪

The broader human rights, land rights, forest
conservation, and climate change communities.

This report is organized in six sections.
Following this Introduction (Section I), Section
II provides some background information on the
forests, indigenous peoples, and mining in the
Amazon. Section III presents the research methods
used to collect and analyze the data. Section IV
presents the data and findings of the geospatial
analysis, legal reviews, and case studies. Finally,
Section V provides five recommendations for
empowering indigenous peoples and improving
the practice of mining on indigenous lands.
Several appendices are provided, including the
data sets used for the geospatial analysis, the
indicators/questions for the legal reviews, and the
international treaties, national laws, regulations,
and court cases reviewed.
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BACKGROUND
The Amazon is covered with large-scale mining concessions with
many overlapping with indigenous lands. Many other indigenous
lands are indirectly affected by mining, from infrastructure, new
towns for workers, and other associated developments. Artisanal
and small-scale gold mining also takes place throughout the
Amazon. Today, more than 500,000 small-scale gold miners are
estimated to be active in the Amazon. Due partly to rising gold
prices, illegal mining has grown exponentially in recent years.
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The Amazon river basin covers roughly 40 percent
of South America8 and includes parts of eight
countries: Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador,
Guyana, Peru, Suriname, and Venezuela, as well as
French Guiana, a department of France (Table 2.1).
The Amazon biogeographic region—the area
where the animals and plants have similar or
shared characteristics—is larger than the river
basin.9 The biogeographic region is a mosaic of
ecosystems, including rainforests, seasonal forests,
deciduous forests, flooded forests, and savannas.
The forests, covering just over 80 percent of
the biogeographic region, constitute the world’s
largest tropical forest and over half of the planet’s
remaining rainforests. About 60 percent of the
Amazon basin and forest lies in Brazil (NASA 2018;
Butler 2019a; RAISG 2019a).
The Amazon forest provides a range of ecosystem
services that are crucial to local populations and
society at large, including climate and water flow
regulation, water cycle mediation, pollination
and food provision, nutrient retention, pest

control, protection from storms and floods, and
soil erosion prevention. The forest accounts for
about 10 percent of the world’s terrestrial primary
productivity and harbors about 10 percent of the
world’s biodiversity.10 It absorbs 2.2 billion tonnes
of carbon dioxide (CO2) a year and stores about
10 percent of the world’s carbon (about 1.1 × 1,011
metric tonnes of carbon), critical for climate change
mitigation (Tian et al. 2000; Saatchi et al. 2007;
Field Museum 2013; McDonald 2019).11 The river
system produces about 20 percent of the world’s
freshwater discharge (Davidson et al. 2012).12 More
than 600 protected areas safeguard 1,984,569 sq.
km or 23.4 percent of the Amazon (RAISG 2019a).
The Amazon has been settled by humans for
at least 11,200 years, although some estimates
put the first human settlements in the Amazon
at 32,000 to 39,000 years ago (Roosevelt et al.
1996; WWF 2020). Today, the region is home to
44.9 million people (Table 2.1), including about
1.5 million indigenous peoples from 385 different
ethnic groups (RAISG 2019a) as well as many
Afro-descendants13 and other traditional people.
In 2010, when Brazil conducted its last census,
about 517,000 of the country’s 897,000 indigenous
peoples lived in the country’s formally recognized
indigenous territories (IBGE 2010). More than
100 tribes live with little or no contact with the
outside world.
Excluding Suriname, indigenous peoples hold about
2,369,000 sq. km of land, about 28 percent of the
Amazon basin (RAISG 2019a) (Table 2.1). Almost
80 percent of the indigenous lands (1,871,000 sq.
km) in the Amazon is legally recognized as such
under national laws. The indigenous lands in
Suriname have not been mapped with any great
precision (and no indigenous lands are titled) but
is estimated to cover 106,160 sq. km, about 65
percent of the country (ACT 2020). Including this
land, indigenous lands total about 2,475,000 sq.
km, more than 29 percent of the Amazon basin.
Almost half (47 percent) of the indigenous lands
in the Amazon (1,157,000 sq. km) is in Brazil.
About 70 percent of the Amazon in Suriname and
Venezuela is indigenous lands and more than 50
percent of the Amazon in Colombia and Ecuador
are indigenous lands.
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Forest Cover
In the early 2000s, after many years of high forest
loss, annual deforestation rates in the Amazon
declined.14 The drop was largely due to a nearly
80 percent reduction in the annual deforestation
rate in Brazil from 2004 to 201215 (Fearnside 2017;
Mongabay 2018; Turubanova et al. 2018; INPE
2020; GFW 2020a). The government increased law
enforcement, expanded protected areas, recognized
indigenous territories, and applied a suite of carrots
and sticks to rein in uncontrolled conversion
to agriculture, even while increasing cattle and
soybean production (Nepstad et al. 2014; Seymour
2018). Still, from 2010 to 2017, Brazil accounted for
76 percent of deforestation in the Amazon (Butler
2019b; GFW 2020a).

In Brazil, the government is rolling back policies
that reduced deforestation rates earlier this century
(Box 2.1).16 According to Brazil’s National Institute
for Space Research (Instituto Nacional de Pesquisas
Espaciais, INPE), 4,232 sq. km of forest cover was
lost from August 2018 to July 2019. That represents
a 74 percent increase from the same period a year
before (INPE 2020; Londoño and Casado 2020).
In 2019, Brazil accounted for over a third of global
primary forest loss (GFW 2020b; Weisse and
Goldman 2020).
In Colombia, nearly 4,250 sq. km of forest was lost
in 2017, a 46 percent jump from 2016, and more
than double the average rate of loss between 2001
and 2015 (Jong 2018; GFW 2020a). The loss of
forests in Colombia may be linked to the peace
agreement with the Revolutionary Armed Forces
of Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias
de Colombia, FARC), the country’s largest rebel
group (Box 2.2).17 A recent study focusing on the
Andes-Amazon Transition Belt (AATB) found that
during the post–peace agreement period (2017 to
2018), the area of forest disturbance increased by
50 percent (about 238,000 ha) across the AATB in
comparison with the four-year peace negotiation
stage (2013 to 2016). Forest disturbance also
spread deeper into the Amazon watershed and
increased in area by 187 percent within the AATB’s
protected areas (Murillo-Sandoval et al. 2020).

In recent years, however, deforestation rates have
again risen, especially in Brazil (GFW 2020a;
INPE 2020) (Figure 2.1). This is partly due to
the economic downturn in Latin America, which
has led many governments to focus on economic
growth sometimes at the expense of environmental
protection. In 2016, 2017, and 2019, forest fires
in the Amazon resulted in a significant uptick
in tree cover loss. In 2019, for example, Bolivia
experienced record-breaking tree cover loss, 80
percent greater than the next highest year on
record, due to fires in both primary forests and
in surrounding woodlands (nearly 12 percent of
the Chiquitano dry forest in eastern Bolivia was
burned)(GFW 2020b; Weisse and Goldman 2020).
Figure 2.1 |

Annual Forest Cover Loss in the Amazon

Hectares (millions)

5.0
4.5

French Guiana

4.0

Suriname

3.5

Guyana

3.0

Ecuador

2.5

Venezuela
Colombia

2.0

Peru

1.5

Bolivia

1.0

Brazil

0.5
0.0

2001

2002 2003 2004

2005 2006

2007 2008 2009

Source: Based on data from GFW 2020a, modified by WRI authors.

32

WRI.org

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

2017

2018

2019

BOX 2.1 | New Policies in Brazil
Since January 2019, the new government in Brazil has made
a number of changes to key environmental and indigenous
people agencies. It has cut the budgets and staff of Brazil’s
principal environmental agencies, including the Ministry
of the Environment—the Brazilian Institute of Environment
and Renewable Natural Resources (Instituto Brasileiro do
Meio Ambiente e dos Recursos Naturais Renováveis, IBAMA,
responsible for environmental protection) and the Chico Mendes
Institute for Biodiversity Conservation (Instituto Chico Mendes
de Conservação da Biodiversidade, ICMBio, responsible for
managing federal conservation areas). Enforcement measures
such as fines, warnings, and the seizure or destruction of illegal
equipment have been pulled back, which has hampered efforts
to fight illegal mining, logging, and ranching.
These changes have corresponded to a significant uptick in land
grabbing, illegal activities, fires, and deforestation in the Brazilian
Amazon.a The destruction of the forest on indigenous land has
also increased dramatically. In 2019, deforestation reached 115
indigenous lands with 42,679 ha destroyed between August 2018
and July 2019, an increase of 80 percent compared to the previous
year (ISA 2019). In response, the governments of Germany

(US$39 million) and Norway ($33.27 million) have suspended
their donations. The Amazon Fund is a REDD+ mechanism to
prevent, monitor, and combat deforestation, as well as to promote
preservation and sustainable use in the Brazilian Amazon.
Norway, the Amazon Fund’s largest donor, has given about $1.2
billion over the past decade.b
The new administration has also cut the budget and staff of
the National Indian Foundation (Fundação Nacional do Índio,
FUNAI), the government agency responsible for establishing and
implementing policies related to indigenous peoples.c In addition,
there have been several (unsuccessful) attempts to transfer
FUNAI from the Ministry of Justice to the much weaker Ministry
of the Family, and to hand the responsibility of demarcating
indigenous land to the Ministry of Agriculture. The changes by
the government have emboldened land grabbers and triggered
a sharp rise in incursions into indigenous land, which has
catalyzed and intensified rural confrontations.d Indigenous people
defending their land have been targeted, threatened, intimidated,
and murdered.e In 2019, of the 27 people who died from rural land
conflicts, 7 were indigenous leaders, compared to two indigenous
leaders in 2018. This is the highest toll in at least 11 years.f

Notes:
a
Boffey 2019; Branford and Borges 2019; Ferrante and Fearnside 2019; Piotrowski 2019
b
Boffey 2019
c
Periodista 2019; Branford 2019a
d
Branford 2019a; Londoño and Casado 2020
e
BBC 2019; Branford 2019a; HRW 2019
f
Figueiredo 2019

With new protection measures, however, Colombia
experienced a significant decrease in primary forest
loss in 2019 (a 35 percent drop from 2018), the first
decline since the rapid increase in loss after the
2016 peace agreement (GFW 2020b; Weisse and
Goldman 2020).
Since the 1970s, more than 1.4 million ha of
the Amazon forest have been cleared. Overall,
an estimated 15–17 percent of the original
Amazon forest has now been cut down and the
land converted to other uses, with some experts
putting the figure at 20 percent (Sonter et al.
2017; Piotrowski 2019; Viscidi and Ortiz 2019).
The Amazon forest generates about half of its own
rainfall by recycling moisture. Experts believe that

if 20–25 percent of the forest is lost (from the 1970s
total), the moisture cycle will be reduced to a point
where the basin will no longer support rainforest
(Piotrowski 2019; Viscidi and Ortiz 2019).18
In the last few decades, the pace of change in the
Amazon has accelerated. With surging global
demand for commodities such as beef, soybeans,
sugar, and palm oil, Amazonian governments
have scaled up private sector finance and
increased infrastructure spending, including on
roads, railways, and dams (Branford and Torres
2018b; Butler 2019b). Today, large quantities of
Amazonian commodities are exported to China,
Europe, the United States, and other countries.
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Land uses that replace forests in the Amazon vary
by country, and there is often a chain of events
rather than a single cause, such as when mining
roads give farmers and ranchers access to
previously inaccessible forest areas. Cattle ranching
is the leading land use replacing forests in the
Amazon, accounting for 65–70 percent of the forest
loss (UCS 2016; Curtis et al. 2018; Piotrowski 2019;
Viscidi and Ortiz 2019).19 Agriculture, including
subsistence, small-scale, and commercial farming,
principally for soybeans but also rice, corn, and
sugarcane, accounts for 25–30 percent of the land
use change. Selective logging commonly results in
degradation, not forest loss, although logging
accounts for 2–3 percent of forest loss.20
Deforestation is exacerbated by climate change,
which accelerates the spread of fires and pests
(Piotrowski 2019; Viscidi and Ortiz 2019).

BOX 2.2 | Peace and Deforestation
in Colombia
In Colombia, the 2016 peace agreement has opened up land,
including indigenous land in the Amazon, to multinational
interests such as mining and oil and mega-dam construction.
This area was previously controlled by the Revolutionary
Armed Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias
de Colombia, FARC), the country’s largest rebel group,
which had imposed limits on mining, logging, and other
development. The demobilization of the FARC left behind
a power vacuum. Other armed groups, including criminal
gangs, have moved in, leading to a spike in land grabbing
and deforestation from unregulated agriculture, mining, and
logging, and to an uptick in land conflicts and assassinations.
Absent the threat of the FARC, land values have skyrocketed
by as much as 300 percent in San Vicente del Caguán since
the peace deal was signed. The capital infusion has helped
improve the economy, which is based primarily on cattle
ranching for milk and cheese production, but has also created
a booming speculative market that rewards land grabbing.
Colonizers are also displacing indigenous groups from their
ancestral land.
Source: Volckhausen 2019.
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Mining in the Amazon
Mining in the Amazon is dominated by industrial
mining in the east, although mining for copper and
gold is expanding into the forest (D.H. Bebbington
et al. 2018a, 2018b) (Figure 2.2).21 Brazil is the
fifth largest mineral producer in the world with
about 8,400 mines in operation. Iron ore is Brazil’s
leading mineral export and China its biggest
market. China also finances much of the expansion
of mining22 and related investments in hydropower
and transportation. Vale S.A., Brazil’s mining
giant, operates mines across the Amazon (D.H.
Bebbington et al. 2018a, 2018b).

Figure 2.2 |

Large-scale mining blocks or concessions overlap
with many indigenous lands and many other
indigenous lands, are indirectly affected by
mining, from infrastructure (e.g., roads, rail lines,
and dams), new towns for workers, and other
associated developments. While all concessions that
overlap with indigenous lands in Brazil are, in the
absence of an enabling law, legally suspended or
canceled (but see below), many of the overlapping
concessions in the other Amazonian countries are
either under exploration or exploitation.

Large-Scale Mining Concessions and Illegal Mining in the Amazon Region

Sources: Data from RAISG 2018c, 2018d and Guyana Geology and Mines Commission 2016, modified by WRI and RAISG authors.
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In addition to industrial mining, ASM, especially
for gold, takes place throughout the Amazon. ASM
is defined as: “formal or informal mining operations
with predominantly simplified forms of exploration,
extraction, processing and transportation” (OECD
2016). Not all minerals are easily extracted by ASM.
As such, ASM is often focused on a smaller set of
minerals (e.g., gold and diamonds) than industrial
mining. Hot spots of ASM for gold in the Amazon
include the Guiana Shield, southern Peruvian
Amazon,23 northern Brazil, and the Colombian
Amazon (Alvarez-Berríos and Aide 2015). In these
hot spots, ASM is the principal driver of forest loss.
Today, more than 500,000 small-scale gold
miners are estimated to be active in the Amazon
(Table 2.2), and many more people provide ASM
services or are dependent family members of the
miners (D.H. Bebbington et al. 2018a, 2018b).
The expansion of ASM has been driven largely
by rising gold prices coupled with limited
livelihood opportunities (D.H. Bebbington et al.
2018a, 2018b).
Most ASM for gold in the Amazon is alluvial
mining—the mining of stream or riverbed deposits
for minerals—with some degree of mechanization
and collective organization. ASM is commonly

Table 2.2 |

COUNTRY

Illegal mining in the Amazon, principally ASM,
has been underway for decades but has grown
exponentially in recent years (RAISG 2018a).
Illegal mining includes miners operating without
legal mineral rights as well as miners or mining
companies with legal mineral rights but with
operations that are not in compliance with all
relevant laws or contracts. For the purpose of
this research, illegal mining is limited to miners
operating without legal mineral rights. Illegal
mining areas often overlap with large-scale
mining areas, including on indigenous territories
(Brown 2018a; RAISG 2018a), but it is also
prevalent in protected areas (Wagner 2016).
Despite government operations aimed at cracking
down (Box 2.3), efforts to stop illegal mining have
largely been unsuccessful.

Estimated Number of Small-Scale Gold Miners by Country and Areas Impacted
# OF SMALL-SCALE GOLD MINERS

AMAZON AREAS IMPACTED

Brazil

200,000

States of Acre, Pará (Tapajós River) Rondônia (Madeira River) & Roraima

Bolivia

100,000

Departments of Beni, Pando, (Norte) La Paz, (Norte) Santa Cruz

Colombia

182,000

Border area with Venezuela and Brazil

Ecuador

90,000

Province of Zamora-Chinchipe

Peru

60,000

Departments of Madre de Dios, Amazonas, Huánuco

Venezuela
Source: D.H. Bebbington et al. 2018a.
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low capital intensive, labor intensive, largely
informal, and often operates outside the law and
beyond government control (D.H. Bebbington et
al. 2018a, 2018b). But the operations can be large
and sophisticated, such as the illegal gold miners
(garimpeiros) in the Yanomami indigenous lands in
northern Brazil who are supplied by entrepreneurs
with dredges, earthmoving equipment, and
airplanes (see Case Studies; Branford 2019b).

WRI.org

n/a

States of Amazonas and Bolívar

There is a link between illegal gold mining and
organized crime. The ongoing war on drugs
coupled with the rising price of gold has encouraged
organized criminal groups to engage in gold mining.
Gold is also an easy way to launder drug money.
Illegal gold mining in the Amazon is commonly
undertaken by poor individuals (many from Andean
regions) as a poverty reduction strategy. These
miners are vulnerable to labor exploitation and
human trafficking by organized crime mafias and
cartels. That such mining is fragmented and hidden
from the law has facilitated the entry of criminal
organizations. It has proved so successful in Peru
and Colombia that the value of illegal gold exports
now exceeds the value of cocaine exports (Wagner
2016). Perhaps 90 percent of the gold mining in
the Madre de Dios region of southeastern Peru,
bordering Brazil, is illegal and run by organized
crime and “the logging mafia” (Wagner 2016;
Glenn 2019; Cimons 2019; Lombrana et al. 2019;
Pacatte 2019).

In 2016, it was estimated that about 28 percent
of gold mined in Peru, 30 percent in Bolivia, 77
percent in Ecuador, 80 percent in Colombia,
and 80–90 percent in Venezuela was produced
illegally (Wagner 2016). In 2018, RAISG identified
2,312 specific sites and 245 larger areas of illegal
prospecting or extraction of minerals such as
gold, diamonds, and coltan in six Amazonian
countries—Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador,
Peru, and Venezuela (RAISG 2018a). Most of the
illegal mining activities were in Venezuela. Illegal
mining was underway in 37 indigenous territories
(including 18 in Brazil) and was operating on the
border of and threatened another 78 indigenous
territories (including 64 in Peru). Illegal dredging
of rivers was underway within or on the border of
65 indigenous territories, including 30 in Colombia.
In another 90 indigenous territories, illegal mining
operations had occurred but were no longer active
(RAISG 2018a).

BOX 2.3 | Illegal Gold Mining in Peru
Despite years of police and military operations, strict mining laws,
and attempts to formalize the industry, illegal gold mining in the
Peruvian Amazon is at record levels. The Department of Madre de
Dios in the southeast is home to the large and rapidly expanding
“La Pampa” illegal gold mine. From 1999 to 2012, the extent of gold
mining in the region increased 400 percent.a
Today, this region has the highest forest loss and degradation
caused by gold mining in the Amazon.b Between 2009 and 2017,
deforestation caused by illegal gold mining increased by 240
percent.c Between 1985 and 2017, 95,750 ha were deforested
by gold mining, mostly illegal, in Madre de Dios. Much of the

recent gold mining deforestation is concentrated in reforestation
areas and the buffer zones of the Tambopata National Reserve
and Bahuaja Sonene National Park. It is also occurring near
or in several indigenous territories, including the Amarakaeri
Communal Reserve and the Kotsimba Native Community.d
In 2018, deforestation from illegal gold mining reached a record
9,280 ha, leading the government to declare a state of emergency
in the Madre de Dios region in February 2019.e The government
sent 1,500 police and military officers to the region in an effort
to stop illegal mining. Illegal gold mining, however, continues to
disrupt indigenous people and their lands.

Notes:
a
Asner et al. 2013
b
RAISG 2018a
c
CINCIA 2018
d
Finer and Mamani 2018
e
Neal and Roberts 2018; RAISG 2018a; Viscidi and Ortiz 2019
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DATA COLLECTION AND
ANALYSIS METHODS
The research examined mining on indigenous lands in the Amazon
with a focus on Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, Guyana, and
Peru. Data and information were collected by conducting literature
reviews; reviewing the relevant national laws; preparing six case
studies of indigenous experiences; and conducting a geospatial
analysis to examine forest cover change on indigenous lands
affected by mining across the Amazon and the six case study
sites. This report presents the data, analysis, and principal findings
of the research.
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Research Countries
The research for this report focused on collecting
data and information on six Amazonian countries—
Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, Guyana,
and Peru. The geospatial analysis focused on
the biogeographic boundary of the Amazon, or
Amazonian biome. Data on both legal and illegal
mining were available for Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia,
Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela (see below).

Mining occurs on indigenous lands in all six
countries, and government reforms with implications for mining on indigenous lands are underway in all research countries. Further, information
on the law and practice of mining on indigenous
lands, including spatial data on indigenous lands,
legal and illegal mining, and forest cover, is
available for the research countries.24

Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, Guyana, and
Peru were selected for multiple reasons.
Collectively, they hold 90 percent of the Amazon
basin and 93.4 percent of the Amazonian
population, including most of the indigenous
peoples in the region (Table 1.1 and Box 3.1). Brazil
has the second-largest forest in the world (behind
Russia), while Colombia, Peru, and Bolivia are
among the world’s top 10 countries with the most
forests. More than 90 percent of Guyana is forested,
among the highest percentages in the world.

At the same time, important differences in the
research countries allow for comparative analysis.
The legal framework of mining on indigenous lands,
rights of indigenous peoples over their lands and
the minerals contained within them, as well as the
authorities and obligations of miners operating
on indigenous lands differ in significant ways in
the research countries. Implementation and law
enforcement also vary across the six countries.

BOX 3.1 | Definitions
Indigenous Peoples: People with distinct social, cultural, or
economic characteristics, practicing in part or in full their
own customs or traditions. The term includes those who
are descended from people inhabiting a country or region
at the time of conquest, colonization, or the establishment
of modern boundaries. Whether a group of persons is
considered to be indigenous is based on self-identification
(ILO Convention 169). The rights of indigenous peoples
receive heightened protection under international law.
Governments have a responsibility to recognize the unique
relation that indigenous peoples have to their traditional or
ancestral lands.
Indigenous Land or Territories: Collectively held and governed
lands (and natural resources) of indigenous peoples. As with
other community land, some indigenous land may, with group
consent, be allocated for use by individuals and families.
Other indigenous land is managed as common property.
Source: Notess et al. 2018.
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The research focused on minerals and mining.
Geologists define a mineral as a substance that
is naturally occurring, inorganic, and solid with
a definite chemical composition and an ordered
internal structure (UA 2005). For the purpose of
this research, minerals include rocks, gravel, and
sand, but not oil or natural gas. Hydrocarbons
were excluded from this research because they
are regulated by a set of distinct laws, not the
mineral or mining laws, and current geospatial
data on oil and natural gas concessions are not
readily available. Moreover, while many indigenous peoples engage in mining, the extraction
of hydrocarbons is more complex and difficult for
them to engage in directly.25

Research Methods
Data were collected and analyzed from literature
reviews, geospatial analysis, legal reviews, and
case studies.
Literature reviews: The research involved
both a broad review of the literature on mining
on indigenous and community lands globally and
more focused reviews on the six research countries.
The reviews examined the academic and gray
literature in Spanish, English, and Portuguese
(e.g., government reports, NGO literature, and

international organization documents) and
were designed to better understand the state of
knowledge on the issue of mining on indigenous
lands. News articles in popular media outlets were
also reviewed to understand the current state of
affairs in the six research countries, including
any ongoing reforms and other developments
with implications for mining on indigenous lands
through April 2020.
There is a large and growing body of literature
on mining on indigenous and community
lands globally and in the Amazon specifically.
The literature review for this research was not
exhaustive. Rather, the review focused on the
most salient and the most recent (from the last 10
years) literature on mining on indigenous lands,
as well as on the interpretation of relevant laws
and regulations by local experts and international
scholars. Online and library searches were
conducted through Google and Google Scholar
using search words, including mining, indigenous
peoples/lands, Amazon, and other key words.
Sources were also identified from the reference
sections of relevant articles and other documents.
In addition to online and library searches, local

and country experts helped identify and access
additional literature for the reviews
(see Acknowledgments).
Geospatial analysis: The analysis of the extent
and impact of mining on indigenous lands and
forest cover in the Amazon was conducted using
spatial data and geographic information system
(GIS) analytical tools. The Amazon Geo-Referenced
Socio-Environmental Information Network
(Rede Amazônica de Informação Socioambiental
Georreferenciada, RAISG)26 supplied most of
the data and conducted much of the analysis.
The geographic extent of the analysis was the
biogeographic boundary of the Amazon (as defined
by RAISG), excluding French Guiana because of
the absence of critical data.27 The Amazon-wide
data were analyzed by country for the purpose
of comparing results across different national
contexts. The GIS analysis also included assessing
mining and forest cover change on the indigenous
lands in the six case studies.
To examine the relationship between indigenous
lands, mining, and forest cover, a spatial analysis
was performed where data sets were overlaid, and
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the area of overlap quantified and summarized by
country and by the indigenous lands of the six case
studies. The data on indigenous lands were sourced
from RAISG (RAISG does not collect spatial data
on Afro-descendant or other types of communities
that hold land in a collective manner). Because
each country uses different terminology to describe
their indigenous lands, RAISG organizes the data
on indigenous lands into categories based on their
legal status (Appendix A). Additional information
on each data set used in the analysis, including
source and relevant notes, is provided in Appendix
B. (Note: All data sets were not available for every
Amazonian country.)

concessions, including 11,088 active concessions
and 24,565 inactive concessions). Of these, 237
concessions are designated as being in exploration
and 33 are designated as in exploitation. It was not
possible to assess whether the 270 active mining
concessions that overlap with indigenous lands in
Brazil are operating. For the purpose of the GIS
analysis, these concessions are considered active, as
was designated in the data sourced from DNPM.

The data on legal, large-scale mining concessions
varied by source and were not consistent in their
level of detail in terms of identifying the status of
mining activities (RAISG holds concession data for
all Amazonian countries except French Guiana). For
example, the mining data for Brazil differentiated
between concessions that were “in exploration”
versus those that were “in exploitation,” while Peru
and other countries grouped these classifications
together as “in exploration or exploitation.”
There is no data on whether mining operations in
concessions that are in exploration or exploitation
cover the whole of the concession area or are
focused on certain sections of the concession.

RAISG collects and holds data on illegal mining in
six Amazonian countries—Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia,
Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela—and these data
were included in the GIS analysis (RAISG does not
collect data on illegal mining in Guyana, French
Guiana, or Suriname). For this research, a larger
data set was used than in RAISG’s 2018 survey
(RAISG 2018a), including data for Venezuela that
were updated in 2019. The methods for collecting
data on illegal mining activities varied by country,
including from reports by indigenous peoples,
news media, and satellite image analysis. Three
types of illegal mining areas were defined for the
analysis: extraction areas (polygons) were defined
by assessing satellite imagery and using knowledge
of regions where illegal mining is known to occur
(based on news reports and experts in the field);
extraction sites (points) of illegal mining activities
were identified using news reports or other local
information; and rivers affected by mining (lines
and polygons) were identified based on local reports
(RAISG 2018a).

To compensate for the variable information
across countries and data sets, the classes were
consolidated into categories of “active” or “inactive”
(Table 3.1). Three countries—Bolivia, Ecuador,
and Guyana—identified concessions as having “no
information” on their status.28
The concession data for Brazil—dated January
2018—were sourced from the National Department
of Mineral Production (Departamento Nacional de
Produção Mineral, DNPM), the Brazilian federal
agency which oversaw mining regulation and
inspection under the Ministry of Mines and Energy.
RAISG compiled and standardized the DNPM
mining concession data for Brazil (and the other
Amazonian countries). The official government
mining data for Brazil show that 270 active
mining concessions overlap with indigenous lands
in the Amazon (out of a total of 35,653 mining
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RAISG does not collect or hold data on legal ASM
in the Amazon so the GIS analysis for this report
does not examine the overlap of ASM on indigenous
lands or its link with deforestation.

The analysis of illegal mining for this report used
the biogeographic region of the Amazon, excluding
French Guiana and Suriname. The RAISG survey
in 2018 considered a larger Amazon region.
Further, the 2018 survey consolidated the various
indigenous lands that were not contiguous into
one territory (many indigenous territories consist
of several separate indigenous lands), while
this analysis counted every indigenous land
(polygon) separately.

To examine the links between mining (legal
concessions and illegal mining) on indigenous
lands and forest cover in the Amazon, a spatial
analysis was conducted that compares areas of
known mining activities with indigenous land
and forest cover change. Deforestation rates on
indigenous lands with active concessions were
calculated for the time period from 2000 to 2015
and compared with the deforestation rates on
indigenous lands without mining (i.e., the analysis
did not calculate deforestation rates on indigenous
lands with concessions that are labeled as inactive
or concessions that had no information on whether
they were active or inactive—see above).

The GIS analysis evaluates the association of
mining activities and forest cover change; it is not
possible to infer causation from this analysis. In
other words, one cannot assume that forest cover
loss, which has occurred within an area identified
as a site of legal or illegal mining, was caused by
mining or another action. This analysis seeks
to evaluate whether indigenous lands that have
mining concessions or illegal mining activities
within their boundaries tend to be more vulnerable
to forest loss in general, which may or may not be
related to mining operations. These findings are
thus a good starting point for further research that
can allow more causal inference.

In order to estimate forest cover change within
illegal mining areas, the point data were buffered
to a distance of 10 km and line (river) data were
buffered to a distance of 5 km. These distances
represent the average extent of impacts and
are based on the GIS analyst’s experience and
judgment. The forest cover data are sourced from
RAISG and cover three time periods: 2000–05,
2005–10, and 2010–15 (RAISG 2015). To estimate
the percentage of deforestation that occurred over
these time periods, a baseline forest cover data
representing the year 2000 was used as the point of
departure (also sourced from RAISG).

Legal reviews: The legal reviews focused on
Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, Guyana, and
Peru. Based on the literature reviews, four critical
issues were identified as central to understanding
the dynamics of mining on indigenous lands:

▪

▪

Comparison of the Mining Status, as
Defined in the Data Sets, with How the Data Were
Consolidated and Merged

Table 3.1 |

MINING STATUS, AS
DEFINED IN THE DATA SETS

CONSOLIDATED STATUS

In exploration

Active

In exploration or in exploitation

Active

In exploitation

Active

Potential/Open for bidding

Inactive

Under tender/under request

Inactive

No information

Unknown

Source: D.H. Bebbington et al. 2018a.

▪

▪

Ownership of mineral resources: Who owns
minerals in the research countries? What rights
do indigenous peoples have over the minerals
on and below their lands? What authorities do
miners have to enter and use indigenous lands
to exercise and realize their mineral rights?
Allocation of mineral rights: Can indigenous
peoples mine their lands for customary and
commercial purposes? Do indigenous peoples
have the right of first refusal to commercially
mine their lands? What rights do indigenous
peoples have when the government allocates
rights to minerals on and below the surface of
indigenous lands?
Consultation and consent: Do indigenous
peoples have the right of free, prior, and
informed consultation or consent? Must the
government consult or have the consent of
indigenous peoples before granting rights to
minerals on indigenous lands to third parties?
Must miners consult or have the consent of
indigenous peoples before conducting mining
operations on indigenous lands?
Protection of indigenous lands: Is mining
prohibited on indigenous or other lands?
Does the government have the responsibility
to monitor and oversee mining operations on
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indigenous lands? Are miners responsible for
damage to indigenous lands caused by their
operations? Must miners restore the land after
their operations?
To help ensure consistency in data collection
across the six research countries, a set of indicators
or questions was developed for each issue and
consistently applied in the legal reviews for each
research country (Appendix C).
The legal reviews focused on the laws that
govern indigenous lands and regulate mining
on indigenous lands in the research countries.
In some cases, the laws governing indigenous
lands also govern other types of collectively held
land tenure systems. Where there are separate
laws for different types of collectively held lands
such as indigenous lands, Afro-descendant lands,
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and other nonindigenous community lands, these
laws were also reviewed but principally to compare
them with the laws governing indigenous lands
(i.e., the legal reviews did not include a complete
analysis of the laws and regulations of mining on
nonindigenous lands).
The most relevant laws for review for each
research country were identified from government websites and country profiles at FAOLEX
database (Food and Agriculture Organization,
FAO), and from interviews with country experts
(see Acknowledgments). Relevant national
(or federal) laws enacted before April 2020,
including constitutions, statutes, regulations,
decrees, technical directives, and court rulings of
relevant cases, were reviewed to the extent they
were available (Appendix D). Two international
instruments and three pending bills in Brazil were

also reviewed. The legal reviews did not examine
subnational laws and regulations, government
policies, or political statements that are not
legally binding.

stakeholders (e.g., mining company officials,
ASM miners, and nonindigenous communities).
Future research could reach out to the full range
of stakeholders.

In most cases, the laws were read and reviewed in
their original, official language, although for Brazil’s
laws in Portuguese, good-quality (often official)
translations were used. Secondary sources (e.g.,
development and academic literature) and legal
commentaries were consulted if the law or court
ruling was ambiguous or not available. Government
and independent legal experts from the research
countries were also consulted to ensure the
interpretation of the law is consistent with local
understanding and how it is applied in the country
by governments, advocates, scholars, and other
stakeholders (see Acknowledgments). It was not
possible to get the viewpoints of the full set of

Case studies: To better understand the
implementation and enforcement of laws, and the
practice of mining on indigenous lands, case studies
were developed of six community experiences of
mining—or the threat of mining—on indigenous
lands. One case study was developed from each
research country. A list of potential case studies
was developed for each research country from the
literature reviews, Internet searches (especially
of national newspapers and other local media),
and from interviews with country experts (see
Acknowledgments). The case studies were carefully
selected to document a variety of strategies and
approaches used by indigenous peoples—some
effective, some not—to protect their lands from
mining or to mitigate the negative social and
environmental impacts of mining on their lands.
Information for the case studies was gathered from
two sources. Desk research was conducted to collect
and review the academic and gray literature as well
as news articles in the local and international media
on the specific community experience. As with
the literature reviews, online and library searches
were conducted using Google and Google Scholar
using search words, including mining, indigenous
people/lands, the community name, and other
key words. Sources were also identified from the
reference sections of relevant articles and other
documents. In addition, one or more government
and/or independent experts with knowledge of
the affected indigenous peoples was interviewed
in the research countries to complement the
information gathered from the literature (see
Acknowledgments).
To ensure consistency in the case studies across
countries and to assess law enforcement, each case
study addressed the same four issues—ownership
of mineral resources, allocation of mineral rights,
consultation and consent, and protection of
indigenous lands—and associated indicators/
questions for the legal reviews (although gaps in
the literature and understanding by the interviewed
experts prevented addressing every indicator/
question for each case study).
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DATA AND FINDINGS
This section presents the research findings in three parts. The first
part provides the Amazon basin–wide and national-level findings
of the geospatial analysis. The second part presents the findings
of the review of national laws, regulations, and court decisions.
The third part provides summaries of the six case studies from the
research countries. Each summary includes the findings of the
community-level geospatial analysis.
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GIS Analysis
Based on the geospatial analysis, in the Amazon
biogeographic region, legal, large-scale mining
concessions cover approximately 1.3 million sq. km
(excluding French Guiana) or nearly 19 percent of
the region (Figure 4.1).29 Nearly 45 percent of the
mining area (567,000 sq. km) is considered “active”
mining area (i.e., in exploration or extraction),
while much of the remaining portion is “inactive”
(i.e., the concessions are pending activity; see
Data Collection and Analysis Methods). Brazil
holds the largest proportion of active mining
concessions—more than 60 percent—in the Amazon
(Figure 4.1). When controlling for the size of
each country’s portion of the Amazon, however,
mining concessions in Venezuela cover the largest
proportion of the country’s Amazon at 28 percent,
followed by Guyana at 21 percent, Suriname at 18
percent, and Brazil at 8 percent (Figure 4.2).
Of the active mining concessions, approximately
57,000 sq. km, or more than 10 percent, overlap
directly with indigenous lands (Figure 4.3). Active
mining concessions overlap with indigenous lands
in all Amazonian countries. Many indigenous
lands are affected by multiple overlapping mining
concessions held by different mining companies.
For the illegal mining analysis, all six countries
in the analysis—Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia,
Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela—are affected by
illegal mining (Figures 4.3 and 4.4). (Note: The
illegal mining analysis included Venezuela instead
of Guyana.) Most of the illegal mining area is in
Peru and Bolivia, while Brazil and Venezuela have
the largest estimated number of illegal mining
extraction sites (Table 4.1). At least 30 rivers
are affected by illegal mining or act as routes for
the entry of machinery and inputs and the outlet
of minerals. Known areas or sites of illegal mining
operations overlap with at least 370 indigenous
lands, including 260 indigenous lands in Peru
(Table 4.2). Several distinct pieces of land can
make up one indigenous community’s territory
(see Data Collection and Analysis Methods).
Rivers affected by illegal mining are within or on
the border of 88 indigenous lands, including 32
indigenous lands in Peru and 29 in Colombia.
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Proportion of Active Mining Concessions
per Country in the Amazon Region Based on Total Area
of Mining Concessions (French Guiana Excluded Due to
Lack of Data)

Figure 4.1 |

Bolivia 0.4%
Brasil 60.8%
Venezuela 23.3%
Suriname 4.7%
Peru 1.7%
Guyana 7.6%
Ecuador 1.3%
Colombia 0.2%

Sources: Based on data from RAISG 2018d and Guyana Geology and Mines
Commission 2016, modified by WRI authors.

Figure 4.2 | Area of Active Mining Concessions
per Country as a Proportion of the Country’s Amazon
Biogeographic Area. (French Guiana Excluded Due to
Lack of Data)

30%
25%
20%
15%
10%
5%
0%

Venezuela Guyana Suriname Brasil

Ecuador

Perú

Bolivia Colombia

Sources: Based on data from RAISG 2018d and Guyana Geology and Mines
Commission 2016, modified by WRI authors.

Indigenous Lands, Large-Scale/Illegal Mining Overlapping with Indigenous Lands, and Deforestation
(2000–15) in the Amazon Region

Figure 4.3 |

Sources: Data from RAISG 2016, 2018c, 2018d, 2018e, 2019c, Guyana Lands and Surveys Commission 2018, and Guyana Geology and Mines Commission 2016, modified by WRI
and RAISG authors.

Industrial mining concessions and/or illegal mining
overlap with approximately 450,000 sq. km of
the 2.1 million sq. km of indigenous lands in the
Amazon—more than 20 percent—affecting 1,131
of the 3,653 (31 percent) indigenous lands in the
Amazon (excluding French Guiana and Suriname)
(Figure 4.3). Approximately 143,000 sq. km of
indigenous lands overlaps with active mining
concessions and known illegal mining areas, while
the majority—302,000 sq. km—of indigenous lands
overlap with concessions that are currently inactive

(Figure 4.5). The majority of the inactive mining
concessions that overlap with indigenous lands
in the Amazon region are in Brazil because of the
absence of an enabling law (although data from
the government of Brazil include 27 active mining
concessions that overlap with indigenous lands;
see Data Collection and Analysis Methods). Of the
143,000 sq. km of active concessions and illegal
mining areas that overlap with indigenous lands in
the Amazon, the vast majority occur in Venezuela,
followed by Brazil and Colombia (Figure 4.6).
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Indigenous Lands, Large-Scale/Illegal Mining Overlapping with Indigenous Lands, and Deforestation
(2000–15) in Peru

Figure 4.4 |

Sources: Data from RAISG 2016, 2018c, 2018d, 2018e, 2019c, modified by WRI and RAISG authors.

Table 4.1 |

Illegal Mining Extraction Areas, Extraction Sites, and Affected Rivers per Country
EXTRACTION AREAS

COUNTRY

AREA (HA)

NUMBER

EXTRACTION SITES

AFFECTED RIVERS

Bolivia

1,129,103

3

ND

7

Brazil

620,411

132

317

9

Colombia

ND

ND

ND

7

Ecuador

ND

ND

57

ND

2,535,742

64

23

7

34,696

1,637

103

ND

4,319,952

1,836

500

30

Peru
Venezuela
Total

Note: ND = No Data.
Sources: Data from RAISG 2018a, 2018c, modified by WRI authors.
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Indigenous Lands That Overlap with Illegal
Mining Areas, Sites, or Affected Rivers
Table 4.2 |

Area of Active Mining Concessions and
Illegal Mining Areas That Overlap with Indigenous Lands
by Country
Figure 4.6 |

NUMBER OF AFFECTED
INDIGENOUS TERRITORIES

Bolivia

16

Brazil

37

Colombia

29

Ecuador

9

Peru

260

Venezuela

19

TOTAL

Active legal and illegal mining
70
60
Area (thousand sq km)

COUNTRY

50
40
30
20

370

Note: Some communities hold multiple plots of land; as such, these numbers
represent the total number of affected lands.
Sources: Data from RAISG 2018a, 2018c, modified by WRI authors.

Area of Indigenous Lands in the Amazon
That Overlaps with Mining Activity, by Mining Type
Figure 4.5 |

10
0

Bolivia

Brazil

Colombia Ecuador Guyana

Peru

Venezuela

Note: Illegal mining data are not available for Guyana, and ASM data are not
available for all countries.
Sources: Based on data from RAISG 2018c, 2018d, 2019c, Guyana Lands and Surveys
Commission 2018, and Guyana Geology and Mines Commission 2016, modified by
WRI and RAISG authors.

350,000
300,000

Area (sq km)

250,000
200,000
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50,000
0

Active mining
concessions

Illegal mining

Inactive mining
concessions

Sources: Based on data from RAISG 2018c, 2018d, 2019c, Guyana Lands and Surveys
Commission 2018, and Guyana Geology and Mines Commission 2016, modified by
WRI authors.

Industrial mining concessions
and/or illegal mining overlap with
approximately 450,000 sq. km of
the 2.1 million sq. km of indigenous
lands in the Amazon—more than
20 percent—affecting 1,131 of the
3,653 (31 percent) indigenous
lands in the Amazon (excluding
French Guiana and Suriname)
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To examine the relationship between mining on
indigenous lands and forest cover, forest cover
change within indigenous lands where mining
(active concessions and illegal mining) is taking
place is compared with forest cover change within
indigenous lands with no known mining activities.30
Overall, indigenous lands across the Amazon that
experienced mining activities had a higher rate
of forest loss in the period 2000 to 2015 than
indigenous lands that did not experience mining.
In Bolivia, Ecuador, and Peru, the rate was at
least three times higher on indigenous lands that
experienced mining activities than on those without
mining (Figure 4.7). In Colombia and Venezuela,
the rate of forest cover loss was one to two times
higher on indigenous lands with mining than on
indigenous lands absent mining.
In Brazil, there was not a large discrepancy between
the rate of deforestation on indigenous lands with
active mining activities and indigenous lands

Figure 4.7 |

without mining. The deforestation rate from 2000
to 2015 on indigenous lands with mining was only
0.3 percent higher than the rate on indigenous
lands without mining. Overall, the deforestation
rate on indigenous lands with mining in Brazil
was lower than in the other countries. With
mining not legally possible on indigenous lands,
this may be due to the government labeling some
mining concessions as active when, in practice,
they are inactive.
In Guyana, the deforestation rate was 0.3 percent
higher from the time period 2000 to 2015 on
indigenous lands that did not experience any
mining than the rate on lands with mining. This
may be due to legal ASM and/or illegal mining
on indigenous lands which is widespread in the
country. The Guyana analysis only included active
mining concessions as RAISG does not have data
on ASM and illegal mining for the country (see Data
Collection and Analysis Methods).

Indigenous Lands, Large-Scale/Illegal Mining Overlapping with Indigenous Lands, and Deforestation (2000–15)

7.0%
6.0%
5.0%
4.0%
3.0%
2.0%
1.0%
0.0%

Brazil

Bolivia

Ecuador
Active legal and illegal mining

Sources: Data from RAISG 2016, 2018c, 2018d, 2018e, 2019c, modified by WRI and RAISG authors.
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Colombia
No mining

Peru

Venezuela

Legal Reviews
Multiple international instruments address or
have implications for mining on indigenous
lands. When ratified, these instruments are
recognized as part of the national legal system.
Among them are the Voluntary Guidelines on
the Responsible Governance of Tenure of Land,
Fisheries and Forests in the Context of National
Food Security (VGGTs); the International Finance
Corporation’s (IFC) Performance Standards; the
Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), especially
Goal 16;31 Regional Agreement on Access to
Information, Public Participation and Justice in
Environmental Matters in Latin America and the
Caribbean (Escazú Agreement);32 the International
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Racial Discrimination; and the Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against
Women (UN Women 2014).
Two international instruments are of particular
importance as they have helped shape domestic
legislation that governs mining on indigenous lands
in the six research countries—the International
Labor Organization’s Indigenous and Tribal
Peoples Convention, 1989 (ILO Convention 169)
and the United Nations Declaration on the Rights
of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP). Adopted in 1989,
ILO Convention 169 established international
standards on the rights of indigenous peoples (ILO
1989). Of the research countries, only Guyana has
not ratified ILO Convention 169, whereas the
others have adopted the standards in their own
legal system.33 The 2007 UNDRIP provides a
universal framework of minimum standards for
the survival, dignity, and well-being of indigenous
peoples (UN 2007). All six research countries have
adopted UNDRIP.
Under international law, the rights of indigenous peoples receive heightened protection.
Governments have a responsibility to recognize
the unique relation that indigenous peoples
have to their traditional or ancestral lands. In
some countries, especially countries in Latin
America, national laws have been enacted
specifically on the rights of indigenous peoples
which grant them special rights not provided to
nonindigenous people.34

Overall, indigenous lands across the
Amazon that experienced mining
activities had a higher rate of forest
loss in the period 2000 to 2015
than indigenous lands that did not
experience mining. In Bolivia, Ecuador,
and Peru, the rate was at least three
times higher on indigenous lands that
experienced mining activities than
those without mining. In Colombia
and Venezuela, the rate of forest cover
loss was one to two times higher on
indigenous lands with mining than on
indigenous lands absent mining.
Land rights. Under ILO Convention 169, selfidentification determines whether a group of people
is considered to be indigenous. The convention
establishes indigenous peoples’ rights of ownership
and possession of the lands they traditionally
occupy. Article 13(2) explains that the term “land”
includes the concept of “territory,” which covers
the total area that indigenous peoples occupy or
use. Moreover, it provides that, “[t]he rights of
the people concerned to the natural resources
pertaining to their lands shall be especially
safeguarded. These rights include the right of these
peoples to participate in the use, management and
conservation of these resources.”
Under UNDRIP, Article 26 states that indigenous
peoples have the right to own, use, develop, and
control the lands, territories, and natural resources
that they have traditionally owned, occupied,
used, or otherwise acquired. UNDRIP also calls
on governments to provide legal recognition and
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protection to these lands, territories, and resources,
and to respect the customs, traditions, and land
tenure systems of indigenous peoples.
The national laws in all six research countries
recognize indigenous land rights and customary
tenure systems. Domestic court decisions have also
stressed the importance of the right to territory. For
example, in 2016 (Decision Nº T-005/16, 2016),
the Constitutional Court of Colombia stated, “The
protection of collective property and ancestral
territory derives from the spiritual and ancestral
relationship that exists with the land . . . so that the
concept goes beyond a property title.”35 Moreover,
it noted that the Colombian National Constituent
Assembly had stated that without the right to
territory, the guarantees to cultural identity and
autonomy are simply a formality.36 Similarly, the
Peruvian Constitutional Tribunal recognized that
unlike the concept of land, territory has a political
vocation of self-government and autonomy that
conforms to the reality of indigenous peoples
(Dossier Nº 01126-2011-HC/TC, 2012).37
By law, the formalization of customary land rights
is not required for the rights to be legally
recognized, although, in practice, a land title
or certificate can help indigenous communities
better protect their rights against third parties.
National laws in the research countries establish
procedures for formalizing indigenous land rights.
Formalization is central to the integration of
customary land rights into official systems and
the establishment of legally recognized rights.
Formalization often involves the registration of
land rights into a government registry or cadastre
and the issuance of an official document by the
government to the indigenous community (e.g.,
land title or certificate).38 Indigenous land rights
are also formalized when the government
designates land for occupation and use by
indigenous peoples, such as an indigenous reserve.
In this case, the rights are documented not in a title
issued to the indigenous peoples, but in a public
legal instrument, such as a decree. Indigenous
reserves have been established in several research
countries, including Brazil and Colombia.39
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In the research countries, these procedures are
costly and time-consuming, can bring exposure
to unwanted investors, and can result in fees
and taxes. Moreover, not all customary land and
traditional rights can be formalized (see Colombia
and Guyana Case Studies; Notess et al. 2018). For
example, there are significant land use restrictions
in many indigenous reserves. Still, many indigenous
peoples seek to formalize their customary land
rights in the hopes of tenure security (Notess et
al. 2018). Official land documents can help them
defend their land from threats. They can convince
others of their legal rights, ensuring that their rights
will be recognized and respected. Land documents
can also be used as evidence of legal possession
in a court of law, where they commonly carry
more weight than oral testimony on customary
rights. Official land documents can also provide
indigenous peoples critical leverage in negotiations
with outside investors, improving the chance that
they receive a fair deal in sharing the benefits and
reducing the likelihood of conflicts that can arise
from bad deals (Knight 2012).
Formalization also brings specific advantages
regarding mining. In Colombia, for example,
indigenous reserves40 are a legal and socio-political
institution of a special nature, made up of one or
more indigenous peoples. For them to be legally
recognized as an autonomous entity protected by
indigenous jurisdiction with its own regulatory
system and able to govern and manage their land
and internal life, they need a collective property
title, which provides private property guarantees
(Article 21, Regulation on Titling of Indigenous
Peoples’ Lands, 1995). In Peru, Article 23 (c) of the
Mining Procedures Regulation provides that mining
companies must “obtain permission for the use of
land by prior agreement with the owner of the land
surface.” The companies are not legally obliged to
consider indigenous peoples who hold land only
under custom as “owners.” The assumption is that
without a title, mining companies cannot be certain
who owns the land. Moreover, if the title is not
registered in public records, it is not enforceable
against third parties. And, if the indigenous land
has not been mapped precisely, using GPS, it
will not appear on official government maps
(Gustavo A. Zambrano Chávez, personal
communication, 2020).

Peruvian national courts have also recognized
the right of indigenous peoples with a land title
to regulate entry into their land. In 2012, the
constitutional tribunal recognized that the Tres
Islas indigenous people have the right to control
the entry of third parties into their lands. While the
possession of a title was not the single determining
factor in the ruling, the court recognized it as one of
the conclusive elements supporting its decision (see
Peru Case Study).
The rights (Box 4.1) recognized through
formalization in the research country vary by
country, tenure regime, and/or type of title.
Indigenous peoples in the six research countries
enjoy some level of access, withdrawal/use,
management, exclusion, and alienation rights to
land and natural resources found there (Table 4.3).
Rarely, however, do indigenous peoples have full,
unfettered land rights. For example, the right to
withdrawal or use is often restricted to renewable
natural resources and only for domestic or
subsistence purposes (although it may apply to
acquire nonrenewable rights and commercial use
rights under procedures separate from land
formalization). In Ecuador, the constitution
recognizes the collective rights of indigenous
peoples to “participate in the use, usufruct,
administration, and conservation of renewable
natural resources found in their lands” (emphasis
added). Bolivia has a similar tenure regime; Bolivia
grants indigenous peoples the right to territorial
management and the exclusive use and exploitation
of renewable natural resources existing in their
lands regardless of the rights legitimately acquired
by third parties (Article 30.II 17, Constitution of
Bolivia, 2007). Also, as stated by Brazil’s National
Mining Agency (Agencia Nacional de Minería,
ANM), while indigenous peoples can enjoy “the
riches of the soil,” it does not give them the right
to carry out mineral exploration on their lands
without the consent of the corresponding
authority, nor to hinder its use by third parties
duly authorized by the National Congress (Legal
Opinion Nº 469/2015, 2015).
In all six research countries, indigenous peoples
enjoy some exclusion rights that allow them to
expel intruders, such as illegal miners or loggers,
from their territories (see the Tres Islas Case

BOX 4.1 | The Bundle of Land Rights
▪ Ostrom (1992)a identified five property rights that are
most relevant for the use of common-pool resources:
▪ Access: The right to enter a defined physical area and
enjoy non-subtractive benefits (obtained without being
extracted or removed from the environment).
▪ Withdrawal or Use: The right to obtain resource units or
products of a resource system.
▪ Management: The right to regulate internal use patterns
and transform the resource by making improvements.
▪ Exclusion: The right to determine who has access
rights and withdrawal rights and how those rights
are transferred.
▪ Alienation: The right to sell or lease management and
exclusion rights.
The Rights and Resources Initiativeb recognizes two
additional rights:
▪ Duration: The right to hold tenure rights for an
unlimited span of time (measures the permanence
of allocated rights).
▪ Due Process and Compensation: The right to due process
and compensation for government expropriation.
Notes:
a
Ostrom 1992
b
RRI 2012, 2014, 2015

Study in Peru). Indigenous peoples, however, do
not have the right to exclude third parties with
explicit government authorization to access their
lands, such as mining companies with legal rights
to exploit minerals on their lands. Such access,
however, may require community consultation,
community consent, or the establishment of an
easement (see below).
Indigenous peoples in the six research countries
also have limited alienation rights. By law,
indigenous lands are inalienable in Bolivia, Brazil,
and Colombia (in the case of indigenous reserves).
In these countries, the government or other entities
cannot take indigenous lands, and indigenous
peoples may not sell or otherwise transfer their
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titled land to another entity. Indigenous lands in
Peru and Ecuador was at one time inalienable but is
no longer so due to constitutional reforms. In
Guyana, titled indigenous lands are not exempt
from expropriation (Article 142, Constitution of
Guyana, 1980).

BOX 4.2 | Leasing and Selling Indigenous
Land in Peru
In Peru, the law empowers peasant and native communities
to lease and sell their lands, and, by law, indigenous people
can be identified and recognized as peasant or native
communities. An agreement of at least two-thirds of all the
community members is required to lease or sell community
land (Article 7, Law on the Right to Prior Consultation of
Indigenous Peoples, 2011, Article 11, Law of the Development
of Economic Activities in the Lands of the National Territory
and Peasant and Native Communities, 1995—repealed in 2008
by Legislative Decree N° 1064, but declared effective again
in 2009 by Law N° 29376). In practice, it is not uncommon
for indigenous communities to lease their land for the
development of economic activities. Less common is the sale
of indigenous land.

In Peru, indigenous peoples may sell their land,
although in Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador,
and Guyana they are prohibited from doing so.
Indigenous peoples in Colombia, Guyana, and Peru
may, however, lease some of their land to third
parties, including miners (Box 4.2). In Colombia,
individual members of indigenous reserves are not
allowed “to lease their lands by themselves” (Article
21, Regulation on Titling of Indigenous Peoples’
Lands, 1995), but they may do so jointly through
their traditional authorities (Jorge D. Sierra
Sanabria, personal communication, 2020).
The laws in Bolivia, Brazil, and Ecuador do not
explicitly allow indigenous peoples to lease their
collective lands.

Table 4.3 |

Formalized Land Rights in the Research Countries
WHAT IS THE BUNDLE OF RIGHTS OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLE?

INDICATORS

BOLIVIA

BRAZIL

COLOMBIA

ECUADOR

GUYANA

PERU

Do indigenous people have the right
to access?

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Do indigenous people have the right to
withdrawal or use?

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Do indigenous people have the right
to management?

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Do indigenous people have the right
to exclusion?

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Can they lease
their land?

No

No

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

Can they sell
their land?

No

No

No

No

No

No

Do indigenous
people have the
right to alienation?

Note: A score of “yes” means that indigenous people have at least some level of the right.
Sources: RRI 2012; Chloe Ginsburg, personal communication, 2020.
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In Peru, Article 23 (c) of Mining Procedures
Regulation and Article 1 of Regulation on
Easements for Mining Activities state that for
mining companies to perform exploration and
exploitation activities, they must obtain permission
for the use of land by prior agreement with the
landowner or the completion of the administrative
easement procedure. The law allows indigenous
peoples—organized as native or peasant
communities—to lease all or part of their land
if two-thirds of the members of the community are
in agreement (Article 7, Law of the Development
of Economic Activities on the Lands of the
National Territory and Peasant and Native
Communities, 1995).
In recent years, the Peruvian government
has ushered in reforms designed to promote
investments in mining projects. In 2015, for
example, the government issued Regulations for
Mining Procedures That Promote Investment
Projects, which reformed the consultation process.
The decree allowed miners to submit the minutes
of meetings of the community board of directors
through which the authorization of the use of
community land can be granted (Article 3.1.1.C.III).
It effectively shifted the authority to reach
agreement with miners from the community (twothirds of the members) to its leaders, weakening
the protection granted to the overall community.
The rule was challenged by indigenous and peasant
organizations in courts and, in 2019, Peru’s
Supreme Court of Justice declared the Regulations
for Mining Procedures That Promote Investment
Projects illegal (CooperAcción 2015; Red Muqui
2019; Wayka 2019).
Mineral rights: In Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador,
Guyana, and Peru, all mineral resources are the
property of the state, including the minerals
on and under indigenous lands (Table 4.4). In
Bolivia, minerals are the property of the Bolivian
people, but the government is responsible for
their administration—mineral resources are “the
property and direct, indivisible and imprescriptible
domain of the Bolivian people” (Article 2.I,
Constitution of Bolivia, 2007).41 In all six research
countries, the government has authority over
minerals and mining operations in the country,

including the authority to grant rights to third
parties for the exploration, exploitation, and
development of mineral resources.
In all research countries, indigenous peoples can
exploit minerals on their land for subsistence,
domestic, or customary purposes. In Brazil,
Colombia, and Guyana, indigenous peoples do
not need government authorization to do so.
In a 2013 ruling, the Supreme Federal Court of
Brazil established that indigenous peoples can
only mine their land without seeking government
permission as a way of cultural practice for
subsistence purposes, but not for commercial
purposes (Petition Nº 3388 ED/RR, 2013).42 In the
other three research countries—Bolivia, Ecuador,
and Peru—however, government authorization is
required for indigenous peoples to mine their land
for domestic purposes.
In Colombia, the law defines subsistence mining
as “the extraction and collection of river sands
and gravels destined for the construction of clays,
precious metals, and precious and semiprecious
stones by manual means and tools, without the
use of any type of mechanized equipment or
machinery for its start-up.” (Article 2.2.5.1.5.3,
Decree of the Administrative Sector of Mines,
2015). A mining contract is not required for such
uses, but the indigenous people must register this
activity with the local government. Indigenous
peoples in Colombia, however, need a mining
concession to mine for commercial purposes. In
Guyana, indigenous peoples enjoy a “traditional
mining privilege,” which allows them to conduct
noncommercial (subsistence) mining (of any
mineral) without a permit from the government
(Article 2, Amerindian Act, 2006). Artisanal mining
on indigenous lands only requires the consent
of the village council. All mining not covered by
the traditional mining privilege (e.g., commercial
mining), however, requires a permit issued by the
government (Section 52, Amerindian Act, 2006).
By law, commercial mining can take place on
indigenous lands in Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador,
Guyana, and Peru, but requires government
authorization. In Brazil, the 1988 Federal
Constitution allows for mining on indigenous
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lands but calls for enabling legislation, which
has not been passed by the legislature, to first
be enacted (Boxes 4.3 and 4.4). National laws
in these five countries establish procedures for
the acquisition of mineral rights for commercial
exploration and exploitation granted by the
government mining authority often in coordination
with the environmental agency. For example, in
Peru, the Geological, Mining, and Metallurgical
Institute (Instituto Geológico, Minero, y
Metalúrgico, INGEMMET), attached to the Ministry
of Energy and Mines, is responsible for granting
mining concessions to explore and exploit minerals
over a determined area. A mining concession alone,
however, does not authorize the miner to carry
out mining activities as additional requirements
must be met. Among these are an environmental
certification issued by the environmental authority43
and permission of the landowner for the use of
land or authorization from the government (i.e.,
easement) (Mining Procedures Regulation, 1992).

Table 4.4 |

Similarly, in Colombia, mining concession contracts
grant the holder the right to explore and exploit
mineral resources, but the start of exploitation
operations also requires an environmental license
issued by the environmental authority (Mining
Code, 2001). In Ecuador, mining concessions grant
the holder only the right to explore minerals. A
separate contract and corresponding environmental
licenses are required for mining exploitation.
In Colombia and Guyana, national law explicitly
provides for indigenous peoples to conduct mining
activities. In Bolivia, Ecuador, and Peru the law is
silent on this matter but does not explicitly prohibit
or restrict indigenous peoples from applying
for mineral rights. In Bolivia, Ecuador, Guyana,
and Peru, indigenous peoples must meet the
same requirements as other parties applying for
commercial mineral rights to mine their land.

Rights of Indigenous People to Mineral Resources in the Research Countries

INDICATORS

RIGHTS OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLE TO MINERAL RESOURCES
BOLIVIA

BRAZIL

COLOMBIA

ECUADOR

GUYANA

PERU

Are mineral resources the property
of the state?

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Do indigenous people need government
authorization to mine their land for
subsistence purposes?

Yes

No

No

Yes

No

Yes

Do indigenous people need government
authorization to mine their land for
commercial purposes?

Yes

N/A

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Do indigenous people have the right
of first refusal to exploit minerals on
their land?

No

No*

Yes

No

No

No

Do indigenous people have simplified
conditions to acquire mineral rights for
commercial exploitation on their land?

No

No**

Yes

No

No

No

Notes: * However, Bill 191/2020 (and also Bill 1610/1996) proposes rules for the right of first refusal.
** However, Bill 191/2020 (also, Bill 1610/1996) proposes conditions to mining exploitation by indigenous people. They are not exactly simplified conditions given that
simplifications are only applied for noncommercial proposes. Conditions for commercial mining exploitation are the same for indigenous and nonindigenous people.
Sources: RRI 2012; Chloe Ginsburg, personal communication, 2020.
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In Colombia, however, indigenous peoples have
simplified procedures to acquire the rights to
commercially mine their land.
In Colombia, the law provides indigenous peoples
the right of first refusal to exploit minerals on
their lands for commercial purposes. As such,
indigenous peoples must first refuse their right
to exploit mineral resources on their lands before
the government can grant the mineral rights to
a third party (Box 4.5). The law does not provide
indigenous peoples this right in the other five
research countries. The Colombian Mining Code

states that “indigenous peoples and groups
will have priority to obtain concessions by the
mining authority on mining deposits located in
an indigenous mining zone” (Article 124, Mining
Code, 2001). The legislation also grants this right
to Afro-Colombian peoples (Article 133, Mining
Code, 2001). Under the right, indigenous peoples
can only extract minerals from areas on their
lands that the government has delineated. Such
indigenous mining zones are areas that “comply
with the special provisions on protection and
participation of indigenous peoples and groups
settled in these territories” (Article 122, Mining

BOX 4.3 | Mining Concessions on Indigenous Land in Brazil
While commercial mining on indigenous land is not allowed by
Brazil’s 1988 Federal Constitution before an enabling federal law
is enacted, the National Mining Agency (Agência Nacional de
Mineração, ANM), the Brazilian federal agency, which oversaw
mining regulation and inspection under the Ministry of Mines and
Energy, has registered mining applications and granted mining
permits, even on demarcated indigenous land. (In December
2018, the ANM replaced the National Department of Mineral
Production [Departamento Nacional de Produção Mineral,
DNPM]). In the past 10 years, the ANM has registered 656 mining
proposals that include segments of indigenous territories (André
Lima, personal communication, 2020).a
Recent legal opinions by the general attorneys of the federal
government and the ANM state that all mining concessions
granted by the DNPM after October 5, 1988 (the date of the
constitution), on and within 10 km of indigenous land—whether
formalized or held only under custom—are null and all new
mining applications should be rejected (Legal Opinion Nº
469/2015, 2015; Legal Opinion Nº 01/2017, 2017). Government data,
however, show 270 active mining concessions that overlap with
indigenous land, including 237 concessions in exploration and 33
in exploitation. Of these 270 mining concessions, 198 are dated
1988 or later. The opinions are silent on the mining concessions
that were granted on indigenous land prior to the new
constitution. Seventy-two of the 270 mining concessions have
a date before 1988; 75 concessions when including the three
concessions dated 1988. The DNPM data only provide a year, not
a specific month or day, associated with the concessions.*

In the past, mining activities that encroached on indigenous
land were suspended, but now many mining applications and
permits are neither rejected nor authorized by the ANM (André
Lima, personal communication, 2020). The ANM sometimes
upholds permits granted before the demarcation of indigenous
territories or before the 1988 Federal Constitution. Some of these
permits are being challenged in court. In a recent challenge from
the Federal Prosecutor’s Office in Pará, the ANM said it does not
consider the absence of relevant legal regulations to exclude the
possibility of leaving such mining applications pending. In August
2019, however, the Federal Supreme Court in Amazonas ruled that
the rights of indigenous people should prevail whether the land
they have permanently occupied has been officially demarcated
or not, and ordered that the ANM cancel or revoke any permit
for extraction or development activities on indigenous land,
including mining. It is unclear if the ANM will revoke all mining
applications that overlap with indigenous land in other states.
* Of the 270 mining concessions, 164 predate the registration date
of the indigenous territory. The remaining 106 concessions date
after the registration date of the indigenous land and overlap with
48 registered indigenous territories with some lands having more
than one overlapping concession.

Notes:
a
Agência Pública et al. 2020.
Source: WRI authors.
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Code, 2001).44 As such, the right is contingent on
the indigenous peoples being formally recognized
by the government as indigenous and their lands
formally identified but not necessarily titled.
In Colombia, before the National Development
Plan (2018–2022) Law (Law 1955 of 2019) was
passed in May 2019, any party interested in mining,
including indigenous peoples, had to meet the

same qualifications and requirements. The lack
of technical expertise and financial resources of
indigenous peoples hindered, delayed, or prevented
them from being granted mineral rights (Jorge
D. Sierra Sanabria, personal communication,
2020). Colombia’s new law changes this.
Article 326 of the National Development Plan
(2018–2022) Law (Law 1955 of 2019) provides
that the government will establish differentiated

BOX 4.4 | A Bill to Open Indigenous Land to Mining in Brazil
Based on the 1988 Federal Constitution of Brazil, mining is
allowed on indigenous land only under conditions that must
be established by law, which has not happened (Constitution,
Article 176.1 and 231.3, 1988). Since 1995, however, the Brazilian
government has tried to approve a law allowing mining (and
other economic activities) on these lands. The attempts have so
far been unsuccessful.
In 1995, Bill 1610/1996 to open indigenous land to mining and
other commercial development was proposed by a senator from
the state of Roraima and approved by the Senate in 1996. Several
public hearings took place and a special commission to evaluate
the bill was installed and dissolved several times. The bill was
not passed into law and no progress has been made since 1996
(André Lima, personal communication, 2020).
In early 2020, a new bill—Bill 191/2020—was introduced to open
indigenous land to mining, other extractive industries, and
infrastructure. Bill 191/2020 defines the specific conditions for
allowing mining on this land. Prior technical studies, hearings of
affected indigenous peoples, and authorization from the National
Congress are required for mining to be carried out on indigenous
land. The bill also provides for the participation of affected
indigenous peoples in the economic benefits of mining, granting
them 50 percent of the revenue that is given to states and local
governments for the exploitation of minerals. Compensation
for indigenous communities affected by restrictions on the
use of their lands is proposed in the bill (André Lima, personal
communication, 2020).
Further, the bill provides indigenous people the right of first
refusal as is the case in Colombia. It establishes a period of 180
days for affected indigenous communities to express interest
Notes:
a
Agência Pública et al. 2020.
b
Clavery and Matoso 2020; Londoño and Casado 2020.
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in carrying out low-scale mining directly or in partnership
with nonindigenous people. If the indigenous people are not
interested in doing so, they can express their opinion on the
consent (or not) of mining activities by nonindigenous people.
The bill is unclear whether this right involves a veto power for
indigenous people to mining. In addition, FUNAI can restrict or
prohibit mining activities in areas where it can affect isolated
indigenous people (André Lima, personal communication, 2020).
Bill 191/20 also foresees the possibility of indigenous people
conducting other commercial activities on their land, such as
agriculture, livestock, timber extraction, and tourism. Approval
from the National Congress would be needed to allow for
hydroelectric plant constructions, as well as oil and gas
exploration on indigenous land.
Since the new administration came into office in 2019, the
number of mining applications on indigenous land in the Amazon
has increased by 91 percent. This is the first year since 2013 that
such requests have increased. The Kayapó Indigenous Territory
has been targeted with the most requests, followed by the Sawré
Muybu Indigenous Territory of the Munduruku people. Both
territories are in the state of Pará.a
Bill 191/20 has been challenged by indigenous groups and
environmental organizations and is unpopular with the public
(Agência Pública et al. 2020). Further, leaders in the National
Congress have signaled that they are not in a hurry to move
forward on his bill.b

requirements for the granting of mining concession
contracts to indigenous peoples and AfroColombian communities. Similarly, the Ministry
of Environment and Sustainable Development will
establish the “differentiated terms of reference
for the preparation of the environmental impact
study required for the environmental licensing of
these mining projects” (emphasis added as this will
likely not reduce the safeguards). The differentiated
procedures have yet to be established.

When a mining concession is approved for
indigenous peoples, the Colombian government
grants collective mineral rights to the indigenous
community; mineral rights are not granted to
individual members of the indigenous community
(Articles 124, 125, and 133, Mining Code, 2001).
Moreover, the National Development Plan (2018–
2022) Law (Law 1955 of 2019) states that once a
mining concession is granted to “ethnic peoples”
the government will provide them comprehensive

BOX 4.5 | The Exercise of the Right of First Refusal by Indigenous People in Colombia
By the right of first refusal, the mining authority can preferentially
grant indigenous people mining concessions in indigenous
mining zones. The indigenous people do not need a land title to
exercise this right, although the Ministry of Interior must certify
that they are the holders or possessors of the indigenous mining
zone established by the National Mining Agency (Agencia
Nacional de Minería, ANM). If these requirements are not met,
indigenous people can still request a mining concession opting
for the regular procedure used by others to acquire commercial
mineral rights.
Upon receiving a concession application from a third party to
mine an indigenous mining zone, the ANM, through the Ministry
of Interior, must inform the concerned indigenous people of the
application within five days. The indigenous people have 30 days
to decide whether they want to exercise their right of first refusal.
If they do not respond in this period of time, the ANM will issue
them a letter asking for a response and the indigenous people
will have another 30 days to inform the ANM of their decision. If
the indigenous people do not respond after the second month, it
is determined that the indigenous people will not exercise their
right of first refusal.

If indigenous people are interested in exercising their right of
first refusal, they will need to comply with the requirements for
mining concessions established by law. These requirements
include submitting a notice of intent to the corresponding local
government, department, and the environmental authority
where the requested area is located; a description of the
requested mining area; an indication of the mineral or minerals
to be mined; an indication of the terms of reference and
mining guides that will be applied in the exploration works
and an estimate of the economic investment that will be
made; submission of a map of the requested mining area; a
commitment to carry out the technical exploration work, strictly
subject to the environmental guidelines issued by the competent
authority (Articles 217, 272, Mining Code, 2001). Indigenous people
can also request assistance from the ANM if need be (Articles 271,
275, Mining Code, 2001, Procedure for Exercising the Right of First
Refusal, 2013).

Source: WRI authors.
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Consultation and consent rights: National
laws in all six research countries establish social
and environmental safeguards designed to protect
the rights of indigenous peoples and conserve
indigenous lands and natural resources, although
the specifics vary by country.

technical support and their mining activities
will be subject to differentiated monitoring.
These specific requirements have yet to be
established. If the indigenous peoples exercise
their rights of first refusal but cannot meet the
requirements to be granted a mining concession
on their lands, the government may grant the
mineral rights to a third party.
Of note, the law allows indigenous peoples
in Colombia to transfer part of their mining
concession to third parties, with certain limits
to avoid indiscriminate transfers. Currently,
indigenous peoples can transfer up to 30 percent
of their mining concession area to third parties for
exploration and exploitation purposes (Jorge D.
Sierra Sanabria, personal communication, 2020).
New rules and limitations may be established
in enabling regulations under the National
Development Plan (2018–2022) Law (Law 1955 of
2019) that would modify the amount of concession
area that may be transferred.
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Consultation. National laws in Bolivia, Brazil,
Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru require the
government to consult indigenous peoples
whenever there are legislative or administrative
measures or decisions that may affect them
directly (Table 4.5). This right of consultation
is consistent with ILO Convention 169, which
calls for governments to “consult the peoples
concerned, through appropriate procedures and
in particular through their representative
institutions, whenever consideration is being
given to legislative or administrative measures
which may affect them directly” (Article 6, ILO
Convention 169). In Guyana, the law does not
specifically require community consultation for
all legislative and administrative measures that
may affect indigenous peoples directly, although
community consultation is mandated to establish
a protected area over non-titled indigenous lands
[Section 58(2), Amerindian Act, 2006, Section
28(1)(f), Protected Areas Act, 2011].
A good-faith intercultural dialogue that ensures
indigenous peoples participate in decision-making
processes and the adoption of measures respectful
of their collective rights is pivotal for a positive
outcome (OPAN 2019). ILO Convention 169 states
that “consultations carried out in application of this
convention shall be undertaken, in good faith and
in a form appropriate to the circumstances, with
the objective of achieving agreement or consent
to the proposed measures.” In Bolivia, Brazil,
Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru the law provides that
the objective of a consultation process is to reach
an agreement or consent between the community
and third party on mining or another consulted
measure. To be clear, however, the Constitutional
Court of Peru ruled in 2010 that the exercise of
the right of prior consultation does not imply
that indigenous peoples have a “veto power” over
natural resource management decisions made by
the government that might affect them (Dossier Nº
0022-2009-PI/TC, 2010).

Table 4.5 |

The Awarding and Exercise of Mineral Rights on Indigenous Land in the Research Countries

INDICATORS

AWARDING AND EXERCISING MINERAL RIGHTS
BOLIVIA

BRAZIL

COLOMBIA

ECUADOR

GUYANA

PERU

Do national laws recognize the right to consultation in favor
of indigenous people?

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes*

Yes

Do national laws recognize the right to consent in favor of
indigenous people?

No

No

No

No

Yes**

No

Has the state incorporated ILO Convention 169 into its
national legal system?

No

Yes

Yes

No

No

Yes

Does the law require indigenous people to be formally
recognized as indigenous people to be consulted?

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Does the law explicitly require indigenous people to have a
land title to be consulted?

No

No

No

No

No***

No

Does the law allow the government to establish an easement
on indigenous land for mining purposes?

No

N/A

Yes

No

Yes

No

Does the law allow the government to expropriate indigenous
land?

No

No

No

No

Yes

No

Notes: * The right to consultation does not adhere to ILO Convention 169’s standards. Consultation is required to establish a protected area over non-titled indigenous land.
** The right to consent does not adhere to ILO Convention 169’s standards. While the law requires the consent of two-thirds of indigenous people for ASM, medium, and large
operations, the government can override the refusal of consent and allow mining on indigenous land if it is considered in the public interest.
*** A land title is required for the right to consent.
Source: WRI authors.

Of the six research countries, Bolivia,45 Brazil,
Colombia, and Peru have ratified and incorporated
ILO Convention 169 in their legal system through
specific national legislation. Among other rights in
the convention, these laws make clear that a free,
prior, and informed consultation process provides
access to information, participation, and dialogue
between the government, miners, and indigenous
peoples regarding any measures that may directly
affect the people or their lands.

decision or State authorization that may affect
the environment must be consulted with the
community, which will be informed widely and in
a timely manner.” To underscore that consultation
is not consent, “[t]he State will value the opinion of
the community.” However, in case of community
opposition, “the execution or not of the project
will be adopted by duly motivated resolution of the
corresponding authority” (Article 398, Constitution
of Ecuador, 2008).

Ecuador has also ratified ILO Convention 169 but
has not passed specific legislation on the range
of rights in the convention. The Constitution
of Ecuador does, however, establish the right
of indigenous peoples to “free prior informed
consultation, within a reasonable time, on plans
and programs of prospection, exploitation and
commercialization of non-renewable resources
that are in their lands and that may affect them
environmentally or culturally” (Article 57.7,
Constitution of Ecuador, 2008). In addition, “any

National and provincial courts in Ecuador have
recognized the right to free, prior, and informed
consultation. In 2018, the Provincial Court of
Sucumbíos, a province in northeast Ecuador, ruled
that several mining projects violated the right of
prior consultation of the Cofán indigenous people
of Sinangoe. The court also reaffirmed their rights
to water, a healthy environment, and the right of
nature.46 It ordered that the mining concessions
already in operation and those currently in the
process of being granted be canceled, affecting
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some 324 square kilometers. The court also ordered
the reparation and/or remediation of the areas
affected by mining (Cardona 2019). In April 2019,
in Puyo, the capital of Pastaza province, the court
found that the Ecuadorian government did not
afford the Waorani indigenous people free, prior,
and informed consultation before opening their
lands to potential oil exploration. The three-judge
panel ordered that the Waorani’s lands could not be
included in an oil auction (Riederer 2019).
Moreover, in 2012, the Inter-American Commission
on Human Rights (IACHR) determined that the
government of Ecuador had failed to implement
the right to prior consultation according to
international standards in the case of the Kichwa
indigenous people of Sarayaku in the Amazon
(Case of the Kichwa Indigenous People of Sarayaku
v. Ecuador). For more than 20 years, the Kichwa
had been fighting to defend their lands from oil
activities. The IACHR ruled that the government
violated, among other rights, the Kichwa’s right
to consultation.47 Specifically, it found that in the
1990s, the state granted a permit to a private oil
company to carry out exploration and exploitation
activities in Kichwa territory without consulting
them. With the permit, the oil company began its
exploration phase, even introducing explosives in
several places in indigenous lands.48 The IACHR
ordered the government to pass a regulation on
the right to prior consultation of indigenous
peoples (which has not been developed) and
ordered the oil company to halt all oil activities
on the Kichwa’s lands.
In Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru,
indigenous peoples must be formally recognized
by the government as indigenous to enjoy the right
of consultation, although they are not required to
have a title to their lands (see below for Guyana).
In Colombia, the law explicitly provides that
free, prior, and informed consultation must be
carried out with indigenous peoples whether their
lands are titled or not. Prior consultation must be
carried out when a project, work, or activity will
be developed on titled indigenous lands and “in
areas not titled and inhabited on a regular and
permanent basis” by indigenous peoples or AfroColombians (Article 2, Law that Approves the ILO

64

WRI.org

Convention 169). In 2011, the Constitutional Court
of Colombia confirmed that prior consultation must
be conducted before mining exploration activities
are carried out (Decision Nº T-129/11, 2011).
The national laws in Bolivia, Brazil, Ecuador, and
Peru are silent on whether indigenous peoples must
have a title to enjoy their consultation rights, but
based on ILO Convention 169 (which the states
have ratified), indigenous lands or territories
“cover the total environment of the areas which
the peoples concerned occupy or otherwise use.”
In Ecuador, in October 2018, the Provincial
Court of Sucumbíos established that the right to
consultation of the Cofan de Sinangoe indigenous
people was violated when the government granted
32,000 hectares in mining concessions in the area
of the headwaters of the Aguarico River, where
the Cofanes and Chingual Rivers meet, without
consultation. The court ruled in favor of Cofan de
Sinangoe community even though they did not
have a title to their lands (REPAM 2018; Mongabay
2019). In Ecuador, decisions of provisional courts
are nationally binding.
In Bolivia, Law 1257 that approved ILO Convention
169 and Articles 30 (Item 15) and 403 of the
constitution in conjunction with Article 207 of the
Mining Law guarantee the right to free, prior, and
informed consultation for indigenous peoples,
intercultural people, and Afro-Bolivian people.
Prior consultation must be conducted when a
mining contract for exploitation is likely to directly
affect their lands. Prospecting and exploration do
not require prior consultation. Indigenous peoples
(as well as intercultural people and Afro-Bolivian
people), however, must have a government-issued
certificate that confirms them as members of a
recognized indigenous group to in order exercise
their right to prior consultation (Article 30,
Regulation of Granting and Extinction of Mining
Rights, 2015).
Consent. For indigenous peoples, the claims of
sovereignty over their traditional lands and selfdetermination includes the right to provide (or
withhold) their free, prior, and informed consent
(FPIC) to activities that may impact them (Hunter
et al. 2015). At the international level, the right of

FPIC is recognized under UNDRIP Article 19, which
affirms that “States shall consult and cooperate in
good faith with the indigenous peoples concerned
through their own representative institutions
in order to obtain their free, prior and informed
consent before adopting and implementing
legislative or administrative measures that may
affect them,” and Article 32, which adds that
“prior to the approval of any project affecting
indigenous lands or territories and other resources,
particularly in connection with the development,
utilization or exploitation of mineral, water or
other resources.” ILO Convention 169 provides
for FPIC, but only when relocation of indigenous
peoples is considered necessary as an exceptional
measure. Relocation shall take place even if consent
cannot be obtained, but only if appropriate legal
procedures that provide for indigenous peoples’
effective representation are followed (Article 16,
ILO Convention 169, 1989).
While no research country recognizes FPIC as
provided in UNDRIP, the law in Guyana provides
for a limited right of consent. By law, indigenous
peoples must be recognized by the government
as indigenous, and they must have a land title to

exercise the right of consent. In Guyana, miners,
including ASM and large-scale operators, interested
in mining indigenous titled lands must “obtain the
consent of at least two-thirds of those present and
entitled to vote at a Village general meeting” before
beginning operations (Article 48[g], Amerindian
Act, 2006). This right applies to all mining (nonpetroleum) and forestry on indigenous titled lands
from 2006 onwards, when the Amerindian Act
was passed. For large-scale mining, however, the
minister of indigenous peoples’ affairs and the
minister of natural resources can override refusal of
consent and allow mining on indigenous lands if it
is considered in the public interest. This authority
to override a refusal of consent is not consistent
with UNDRIP.
Easements. When mining on indigenous lands,
miners often seek the use of some additional
indigenous land to conduct their operations. Land
may be needed for the mine site, as well as for
offices, housing, and storage facilities for mining
equipment and material. In Colombia and Guyana,
the government may establish an easement on
indigenous lands to enable miners to develop their
exploration and exploitation activities. Colombia’s
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national laws provide that infrastructure of national
interest can only be developed with prior agreement
of affected community authorities, issuance of
an environmental license, and establishment of
compensation measures, if needed (Article 23,
Regulation on Titling of Indigenous Peoples’
Lands, 1995). By law, mining is an activity of public
utility and social interest, allowing government to
expropriate certain lands, although not indigenous
lands. The government may, however, establish an
easement, including on indigenous lands, for the
period of mineral exploitation.

granted and land is needed for facilities and other
mining operation. Authorization of the landowner
is not required for the government to establish
an easement for mining (Articles 100 and 103 of
Mining Law, 2009, Rules for the Establishment
of Mining Easements, 2015; Borja Calisto 2019).
National courts, however, have stated that
easements cannot be established on all types of
lands. A court decision from 2010 made clear that
easement rules apply only to lands that are not
considered indigenous (Decision Nº 001-10-SINCC, 2010).

In Bolivia, Brazil, and Peru, the law prohibits
the government from establishing an easement
on indigenous lands (Table 4.5). In Peru, the
law provides that mining easements cannot be
established on lands in possession or property
of the peasant and native peoples; lands and
territories of indigenous or native peoples; reserves
for indigenous or native peoples in a situation of
isolation or initial contact; and protected natural
areas (Article 4.2, Regulation of the Investment
Promotion Law for Economic Growth and
Sustainable Development, 2016).

Benefits. While there are costs for indigenous
peoples when mining activities take place on their
lands, there are also potential benefits. When
indigenous peoples mine their land, the benefits
could include a new occupation and form of
livelihood as well as a new source of income for
the indigenous miners and the community. The
revenue can be used, for example, to pay school
fees, purchase household goods, build a health
dispensary, purchase solar panels for electricity,
or establish a potable water system. When
external actors mine indigenous lands, benefits
to indigenous peoples may include employment
for community members, a share of the mining
revenue, and improvement of community services,
such as a primary school or new road.

In Ecuador, national regulations provide that the
government may establish easements for mining
purposes after the mining concessions have been
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National laws in all six research countries mandate
some form of benefit sharing with indigenous
peoples when third parties mine their land.
In Colombia, the law provides—among other
benefits—that miners operating on indigenous
lands should involve the community in its works
and train its members (Article 128, Mining
Code, 2001). In Peru, national laws require the
miner to make a prior commitment through a
sworn declaration to, among other matters, give
preference to hiring local personnel to carry out
mining activities and provide training that may
be required (Article 17.1.i.e, Mining Procedures
Regulation, 1992).
In Guyana, the law provides that after indigenous
peoples give their consent to mining on their land,
the miner and community should prepare and sign
a written agreement on negotiated mining company
commitments, such as offer of employment to
residents at market rates and purchase of all
competitively priced food and materials from the
village. Additional requirements may include a
protocol that regulates the behavior of the miners
and other employees, including restrictions on
the consumption of alcohol, a waste disposal plan,
a mechanism to assess and pay compensation,
a health program, and an employee education
program (Article 49, Amerindian Act, 2006).
If no agreement is reached, the minister of
indigenous peoples’ affairs will enter into an
agreement with the mining company on behalf
of the affected indigenous people (Article 50,
Amerindian Act, 2006).
In some countries, regulations explicitly provide
that indigenous peoples must benefit economically
from mining projects on their land. In Ecuador, the
Mining Law states that “60% of the royalty of the
mining projects [is] to be allocated for productive
projects and sustainable local development” and
that “when necessary, 50% of this percentage to
[be allocated for] the entities of government of the
indigenous peoples.” These resources are to be
distributed prioritizing the needs of the indigenous
peoples who are directly affected by the mining
activity (Article 93, Mining Law, 2009).

Protection. Mining is inherently damaging to
the environment. It brings risks to health and
local well-being. To mitigate the damage and risks,
national laws in all six research countries require
ASM miners, including indigenous peoples, and
mining companies to minimize the impacts of
their operations on the environment and natural
resources, whether mining on indigenous lands
or other lands. Such safeguards are often codified
in laws governing minerals and mining, the
environment and natural resources, and indigenous
peoples’ rights and lands. The laws in the research
countries address a range of critical environmental
issues and establish minimum environmental
standards. Some environmental issues, however,
are not addressed in law, and some minimum
standards do not rise to the level of international
law or norms.
While many indigenous peoples do not mine their
land for commercial purposes and do not want
external actors to mine their land, some indigenous
peoples are engaged in mining as an economic
activity (see Guyana Case Study). Such mining
could be ASM conducted by the indigenous peoples
or in partnership with external actors through, for
example, a partnership with a mining company.
In Guyana, the Amerindian Act provides that when
mining activities take place on indigenous lands,
miners must take all reasonable steps to avoid
damaging the environment, polluting surface and
groundwater, damaging or disrupting the flora
and fauna, and interfering with local agriculture
(Article 49, Amerindian Act, 2006). In Bolivia, the
law states that miners must conduct their mining
activities in ways that prevent environmental
pollution and control for the generation of waste,
dust, and noise (Article 95, Environmental
Regulation for Mining Activities, 1997). In Peru,
miners must “comply with the environmental
legislation applicable to its operations, the
obligations derived from environmental studies,
licenses, authorizations and permits approved
by the competent authorities, as well as any
other commitment” (Article 18.a, Regulation of
Protection and Environmental Management for
Exploitation Activities, 2014).
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In all six research countries, Environmental
Impact Assessments (EIA) are required of projects
that may significantly affect the environment,
including large-scale mining operations. EIAs
are the process of examining the anticipated
environmental effects of a proposed project
(Ireland EPA 2020). They are designed to identify,
prevent, correct, minimize, and mitigate the mining
project’s potential risks and impacts and, if that
is not possible, to compensate for the damage
caused. EIAs help the mining entity, government,
and public understand the potential impacts of
mining operations. The associated environmental
management plan helps ensure that the mining
projects will be conducted in accordance with
environmental safeguards and without causing
avoidable negative environmental impacts.

lakes, rivers, slopes and reservoirs.” The restrictions
will be subject to Environmental Studies with a
multisectoral approach (Article 93 III, Mining Law).

The magnitude of the environmental impacts from
mining operations determines whether an EIA
must be prepared. In Peru, a detailed EIA report
is required for mining activities with significant
negative environmental impacts, while a less
detailed EIA report is needed for moderate negative
environmental impacts (Article 4, Regulation of
Protection and Environmental Management for
Exploitation Activities, 2014). Mining operations
with minimal environmental impacts only need an
Environmental Impact Declaration (Declaración
de Impacto Ambiental, DIA) (Articles 45, 46,
Environmental Protection Regulations for Mining
Exploration Activities, 2017). Detailed EIAs are
approved by the environmental authority, while the
semi-detailed EIAs and DIAs are approved by the
mining authority.

In all six research countries, governments are
by law responsible for monitoring and overseeing
mining companies to ensure their operations
are conducted in accordance with the law, that
they are meeting their social and environmental
commitments, and that they mitigate and
compensate for any environmental damage or
other losses caused by their activities. In Bolivia,
for example, municipal governments are
responsible for controlling and monitoring
the environmental impact of mining activities
(Article 3, Environmental Regulation for Mining
Activities, 1997).

In all six research countries, mining is prohibited
on certain lands. In Ecuador, for example, the
extraction of nonrenewable resources (e.g.,
minerals, oil, and natural gas) is forbidden in
protected areas and areas declared “intangible”
(“untouchable”), which may include some
indigenous lands. Exceptions can be made at the
request of the president with prior declaration
of national interest by the National Assembly. If
deemed appropriate, the National Assembly can call
a public consultation on this matter (Article 407,
Constitution of Ecuador, 2008). In Bolivia, mining
is prohibited “in the vicinity of basin headwaters,
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In Colombia, mining exploration and exploitation
activities may not be carried out in areas delimited
for the protection of the environment or renewable
natural resources, such as national natural parks,
regional parks, protected forest reserve areas,
and wetlands (Article 34, Mining Code, 2001). In
Bolivia, national laws do not identify any specific
areas where mining is prohibited, but decrees
have established protected areas with such
prohibitions. To protect their lands from mining,
some indigenous peoples have had the government
declare their land a protected area (see Colombia
Case Study).

In all research countries, miners are—by national
law or concession agreement—also responsible for
monitoring their operations to avoid environmental
damage. In Peru, miners are required to
monitor and control their operations to verify
compliance with their commitments and with the
corresponding minimum environmental standards
established in law (Article 18.b, Regulation of
Protection and Environmental Management for
Exploitation Activities, 2014).
In all six research countries, the government
has the authority to arrest, detain, and punish
miners for operating illegally. In Brazil, the
National Mining Agency (Agencia Nacional de
Minería, ANM) has the authority for “seizure and
auctioning of mineral substances and equipment

found or coming from illegal mining.” (Article 13.V
creates the ANM, 2017). The Brazilian Institute of
Environment and Renewable Natural Resources
(Instituto Brasileiro do Meio Ambiente e dos
Recursos Naturais Renováveis, IBAMA), the
Federal Police, and FUNAI have the power to act
in cases of illegal mining within indigenous lands,
with the power to seize material and suspend
activities in addition to imposing fines on the
companies or people involved. Given that mining
is not currently allowed on indigenous lands,
conducting exploration and exploitation of mineral
resources in that land can be punished with a sixmonth to one-year detention and a fine (Article 55,
Environmental Crimes Law, 1998).
In Ecuador, the Mining Law provides that “illegal
exploitation or clandestine trade of mineral
substances, qualified by the administrative
authority, will be sanctioned with the confiscation
of the machinery, equipment and products subject
to illegality and the collection of a value equivalent
to the total of minerals extracted illegally, without
prejudice to criminal actions arising from these
infractions. Sanctions will be applied to all
mining subjects” (Article 57, Mining Law, 2009).
Environmental impacts and damages to ecosystems
and biodiversity as a result of illegal exploitation or
invasions are considered aggravating factors when
sanctions are determined (Article 57.7, Constitution
of Ecuador, 2008).

Finally, Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru are
members of the Andean Community (Comunidad
Andina, CAN), an intergovernmental organization
created to promote the expansion of markets and
guarantee effective economic development in the
region. (Venezuela is a former full member and
Brazil is an associate member). In 2012, CAN
adopted the Policy to Combat Illegal Mining
(Andean Decision Nº 774, 2012). The policy calls
for the forfeiture or seizure of goods, machinery
and their parts, and equipment and supplies used
for the development of illegal mining, as well as
the destruction, immobilization, uselessness or
demolition of goods, machinery, equipment and
supplies, when their confiscation or transfer is
not viable.

When mining activities damage the environment,
including on indigenous lands, the government
in all six research countries has the authority
to impose fines on the miner and mandate
compensating measures for the affected indigenous
peoples. In Ecuador, the law establishes that
indigenous peoples will “receive compensation for
the social, cultural and environmental damages
caused to them” (Article 57.7, Constitution of
Ecuador, 2008). In Guyana, the law provides that
mining operations shall pay “fair and reasonable
compensation” for damages “to the holder of any
right, title or interest in or over that parcel of
land in accordance with his right, title or interest”
(Section 84, Mining Law).
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CASE STUDIES
This section provides brief summaries of the six case studies of
mining on indigenous lands in the research countries. Each case
study summary includes the findings of literature reviews, and
a geospatial analysis of mining and forest cover change on the
indigenous lands.
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Bolivia: Isiboro Sécure Indigenous
Territory and National Park
This case study highlights the importance of
strategic alliances among different indigenous
peoples to effect change. In Bolivia, the Mojeño,
Yuracaré, and Chimán indigenous peoples joined
efforts to effectively press the government to
suspend the construction of a road that would cause
environmental damage and open their lands to
unwelcome development, including mining. The
construction of the road remains on hold.

BOX 5.1 | Overview and Principal
Findings: Isiboro Sécure Indigenous
Territory and National Park
▪ In May 2011, the Bolivian government approved financing
by the Brazilian National Bank for Economic and Social
Development (Banco Nacional de Desenvolvimento
Econômico e Social, BNDES) for the construction of
the Villa Tunari–San Ignacio de Moxos Highway through
the Isiboro Sécure Indigenous Territory and National
Park (Tipnis).
▪ The Mojeño, Yuracaré, and Chimán indigenous peoples of
Tipnis participated in several marches and protests. Their
efforts paid off when, in October 2011, Tipnis was, by law,
declared an “untouchable” area halting the construction
of the road and stopping all industrial development,
including mining.
▪ In April 2013, Bolivia’s president announced that the road
would continue to be on hold for a three-year period until
extreme poverty in Tipnis was eliminated.
▪ In August 2017, a new law was passed that annulled
the “intangibility” status of Tipnis and reopened the
possibility of the road being built. Given the ongoing
controversies over the road, however, the government
again decided to put the project on hold.
▪ Nearly 3,800 hectares of forest cover in the indigenous
lands, roughly 0.8 percent of its total area, were
lost between 2000 and 2015. This contrasts sharply
with the significant forest loss immediately outside
Tipnis, especially on the southern border of the
indigenous lands.
Sources: WRI authors.
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The Isiboro Sécure Indigenous Territory and
National Park, also referred to as Tipnis, is
located between Chapare Province (Cochabamba
Department) and Moxos Province (Beni
Department) in central Bolivia’s Amazon region.
Tipnis was established as a national park in 1965
(Law Decree Nº 07401) and covered 1,091,656 ha.49
The national park is one of the most biologically
diverse areas in the world and is home to the
Mojeño, Yuracaré, and Chimán indigenous peoples.
In 1990, Tipnis was also formally recognized by
decree as an indigenous territory (SERNAP 2020).
As a national park, the land and natural resources
must be used and managed in ways that are
consistent with the conservation objectives of the
protected area.
In August and September 1990, indigenous
peoples from Beni Department in the northeast
(Bolivia’s second-largest department) marched
from Trinidad, the capital of Beni, to La Paz,
Bolivia’s capital. The “March for the Territory
and Dignity” aimed to make the government
aware of the needs of the indigenous peoples in
lowland Bolivia. Indigenous peoples from Tipnis
and those from other parts of the country joined
the march. The march was a seminal moment for
elevating indigenous issues in the country and led
to several changes.50 Following the march, Tipnis
was expanded to incorporate the entire lands of the
Mojeño, Yuracaré, and Chimán indigenous peoples
(Supreme Decree Nº 22610). Then in 1997, Tipnis
was legally established as an indigenous reserve
that recognizes the land as the collective property
of the indigenous peoples (Community Land of
Origin) (SERNAP 2020). Through the Regulation
of Supreme Decree Nº 22610, Tipnis was declared
an inalienable, imprescriptible, unattachable, and
indivisible area.
On May 7, 2011, however, the Bolivian government
approved a project with funds from the Brazilian
National Bank for Economic and Social
Development (Banco Nacional de Desenvolvimento
Econômico e Social, BNDES) for the construction
of the Villa Tunari–San Ignacio de Moxos Highway
(Law Nº 112).51 The 360-km road would connect

the Departments of Cochabamba and Beni and be
constructed in three sections. The second section
of the road would cross Tipnis and divide the
national park and indigenous territory in two
(Achtenburg 2017).52
According to the government, the road would
integrate the country’s two regional centers and
improve the lives of the people living there by
bringing development to this remote part of the
Bolivian Amazon. The main indigenous bodies
and trade union organizations in western Bolivia
supported the road, saying it would benefit the
integration of the country and help fight poverty.
The road, however, was opposed by many lowland
Amazonian indigenous peoples, including those
living in Tipnis. They denounced the road,
arguing it would destroy the Tipnis ecosystem and
open it up to mining, logging, and other natural
resource exploitation. Their position recognized
the established synergies between infrastructure
and extractive resources. In their effort to stop the
construction of the road through their lands, the
Tipnis indigenous people were taking a preemptive
measure to protect their lands from mining,
logging, and other unwelcome developments. In
2011, the Bolivian Institute for Strategic Research
(Fundación para la Investigación Estratégica en
Bolivia, PIEB) found that the road would increase
access to the territory for illegal loggers, farmers,
and others, accelerating deforestation. Specifically,
PIEB found that the construction of the road would
cause deforestation of 64 percent of Tipnis within
15 years (PIEB 2011; Tipnis Bolivia 2012, 2019;
Collyns 2017).
On August 15, 2011, Tipnis’ indigenous people
joined another march of more than 500 mostly
indigenous people from Trinidad to La Paz
demanding that the government halt the
construction of the second section of the road.
The march and other collective actions opposing
the road were organized by the Confederation
of Indigenous Peoples of the Bolivian East
(Confederación de Pueblos Indígenas del Oriente
Boliviano, CIDOB), as well as other NGOs, former
senior government officials, opposition politicians

from the region, and other concerned citizens
(Delgado 2017). During the march, other social
sectors of the eastern region that traditionally
shied away from the indigenous movement also
expressed their opposition to the road (Canelas
and Errejón 2012).
The government sought to promote dialogue,
but opposition to the road construction grew
and the protests turned violent. More than 100
indigenous people were attacked and beaten by
the police. These beatings came to be known as the
“Chaparina Massacre.” Toward the end of October
2011, the government reached an agreement with
representatives of indigenous communities. A
new law was enacted which declared Tipnis an
“intangible” (untouchable) area. This designation
meant that settlements and de facto occupations
of persons from outside the indigenous territory
were prohibited in the area (Law Nº 180). Mining,
industrial agriculture, and other developments
were also prohibited. Further, the new law
established that the Villa Tunari–San Ignacio
de Moxos Highway and any other proposed
roads, could not cross Tipnis. As a result, road
construction was suspended.
In April 2013, in the run-up to the 2014 presidential
election, the president announced that the road
would continue to be on hold for an estimated
three-year period until extreme poverty in Tipnis
was eliminated. But in August 2017, a new law was
passed that annulled the “intangibility” status of
Tipnis and again opened the possibility for the road
to be built (Law 969). According to the government,
the primary beneficiaries of the new law would be
the Tipnis indigenous people, whose basic service
and infrastructure needs could not be met if the
area remained “intangible.” Indigenous Tipnis
leaders, environmental activists, and allied civil
society organizations, however, argued that only
a few indigenous people living near the proposed
road would benefit from the services. Most
indigenous people lived in remote river villages,
located “two days by water or three days by trek”
from the proposed road (Achtenburg 2017; Telma
2017a, 2017b).
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Figure 5.1 | Deforestation (2000–15) and Legal and Illegal Mining Areas in the Vicinity of the Isiboro Sécure Indigenous

Territory and National Park (Tipnis)

Sources: Data from RAISG 2016, 2018c, 2018d, 2018e, 2019c, modified by WRI and RAISG authors.

The government stated that it had reached out to
69 Tipnis indigenous villages and that 58 villages
consulted with them over the road. It claimed that
57 of the 58 consulted villages asked it to repeal
Law Nº 180, and that 55 of the villages supported
the construction of the road (Opinión 2017). The
consultation process, however, has been widely
criticized by opponents of the road and by national
and international observers. Even the government’s
human rights ombudsman concluded that the
process failed to allow for free and informed
consultation (FIDH and APDHB 2013). Given the
controversies, the government decided again to put
the project on hold.
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In the indigenous lands, nearly 3,800 ha of forest
cover was lost from 2000 to 2015, roughly 0.8
percent of its total area, with the vast majority of
the loss occurring along the territory’s southern
border (Figure 5.1). Other parts of the territory saw
little forest loss. Legal and illegal mining is taking
place near Tipnis lands, especially on its western
border. There has been considerable forest loss
immediately outside Tipnis from 2000 to 2015,
especially on its southern border. This forest loss
appears to be linked to agriculture and/or logging.
The forest loss just outside Tipnis is not just an
indication of the pressure on the indigenous land
and national park but of the effectiveness of the
measures used by the indigenous people to protect
their lands from these pressures of deforestation.

Brazil: Yanomami Park
This case study highlights the extent of illegal
mining in some indigenous lands in the Amazon.
Despite considerable efforts by the Yanomami
and Ye’kwana indigenous peoples, which have
put their lives at risk, illegal mining is widespread
on their lands. To date, government efforts have
also failed to halt illegal miners from entering
and conducting operations in the Yanomami
territory. In recent years, the number of illegal
miners has increased, and the operations have
become more sophisticated.
The Yanomami are the largest indigenous group
in South America, living in northern Brazil and
southern Venezuela (Plummer 2015; Survival
International 2019, 2020).53 In Brazil, the
Yanomami, together with the Ye’kwana indigenous
people, live on 9,665,000 ha of land in the states of
Roraima and Amazonas with a perimeter of 3,370
km (Decree of May 25, 1992), an area that is twice
the size of Switzerland (Figure 5.2). The Yanomami
territory extends into Venezuela, and the
Yanomami and Ye’kwana peoples have been caught
in the middle of escalating tensions between Brazil
and Venezuela.54 Approximately 35,000 Yanomami
and Ye’kwana live in around 250 to 300 villages,
some of which are uncontacted55 and are
particularly vulnerable to the impacts of mining
and other developments.
A gold rush in the late 1980s and early 1990s
brought approximately 40,000 illegal miners
(garimpeiros) onto Yanomami lands. This influx
of miners led to an increase in conflict and violence,
the spread of diseases such as malaria, and
poisonings from the use of mercury in gold mining.
These and other factors led to a 20 percent decline
in the Brazilian Yanomami population (Survival
International 2020).
On May 25, 1992, following national and
international campaigns denouncing the illegal
miners, the government of Brazil demarcated the
Yanomami lands as Yanomami Park (Decree of May
25, 1992).56 Many illegal miners and other outsiders
were evicted from the territory by the army,
police, and FUNAI. In 1993, however, a group of
illegal miners entered the village of Haximú in the

BOX 5.2 | Overview and Principal
Findings: Yanomami Indigenous Land
▪ Mining is not legally possible on indigenous lands in
Brazil. However, there are today perhaps 20,000 illegal
miners operating on Yanomami lands.
▪ The Yanomami and their supporters have led national
campaigns, called for international media attention, and
received support from NGOs, but these efforts have not
halted illegal mining on their lands.
▪ The government is responsible for monitoring and
overseeing mining but, to date, has not curtailed illegal
mining on Yanomami lands.
▪ Inactive mining concessions and illegal mining areas
overlap with about 55 percent of the indigenous lands.
▪ Over the 15-year period from 2000 to 2015 about
7,000 ha of forest cover were lost in the Yanomami
lands, a significant amount although a relatively small
percentage (0.07 percent) of the large Yanomami
territory. While some of this loss may be linked to
agricultural or forestry activities, much of the forest loss
is likely associated with the illegal mining operations.
▪ Outside the Yanomami territory, there was significant
forest loss between 2000 and 2015, especially to the east
but also on the southern border.
Sources: WRI authors.

Yanomami territory and murdered 16 Yanomami.
The police arrested several people, and the
Brazilian courts found five miners guilty of genocide
(FUNAI 2019; Survival International 2020).
To protect the Yanomami territory from illegal
miners, the army established four monitoring
bases—Base of Ethno-environmental Protection
(Bases de Proteção Etnoambiental, BAPE)—on site
and along the territory's largest rivers, the Mucajaí
and Uraricoera, the main entrances to the territory
(ISA 2019). It also posted warning signs along the
territory boundary.
The bases discouraged some illegal miners from
entering the territory. Thousands of illegal miners,
however, continued operating in the Yanomami
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territory, cutting down forests, polluting rivers, and
putting indigenous lives at risk (Branford 2019b).
Between 2008 and 2012, the Yanomami as well as
local and international organizations continued to
protest the illegal invasion of their lands by gold
miners and request the government to evict the
miners (Survival International 2008, 2010, 2012).
Illegal mining was underway in many parts of
the Yanomami’s lands, and inactive large-scale
mining concessions overlapped with much of the
Yanomami territory. Today, there are perhaps
534 mining concessions that overlap with the
Yanomami’s lands (ISA 2019) although no mining
concession is labeled as active by the government.
The mining concessions and illegal mining areas
overlap with about 55 percent of the indigenous
lands (Figure 5.2). Over the 15-year period from
2000 to 2015 about 7,000 ha of forest cover was
lost in the Yanomami territory, a significant amount
although a relatively small percentage (0.07
percent) of the large Yanomami territory. While
some of this loss may be linked to agricultural or
logging activities, much of the forest loss is likely
associated with the illegal mining operations.
Outside the Yanomami territory, there was
significant forest loss between 2000 and 2015,
especially to the east but also on the southern
border (Figure 5.2).
By the end of 2018, three of the four monitoring
bases were closed. The government attributed
these closures to budget constraints. The closures
resulted in another influx of illegal miners (ISA
2019). Today, according to Yanomami leader
Davi Kopenawa, about 20,000 illegal gold miners
work three open-pit gold mines in the Yanomami
territory (Branford 2019b; Survival International
2019). Many of the illegal miners are not typical
ASM operations but rather well-financed,
sophisticated operators. These miners are backed
by entrepreneurs who pay them, give them shares
of production, and equip them with dredges, heavy
earth-moving equipment, as well as airplanes to
bring supplies in and take the gold out. The miners
have built three airstrips and have even set up a
village in the Yanomami territory (Branford 2019b).
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Between 2017 and 2019, another 1,174 ha of forest
were lost due to gold mining in the Yanomami
territory, with deforestation reaching about 500 ha
in 2019 (Finer and Mamani 2020). And between
October 2018 and March 2020, a total of 1,926 ha
of forest was degraded by illegal mining (ISA 2020).
In a recent survey, forest loss in the Yanomami
territory ranked tenth among all indigenous lands
in Brazil (ISA 2019). The miners are polluting the
rivers with mercury and silt, eroding the riverbanks,
cutting down the forest, scaring away the animals
that the Yanomami hunt, and destroying fish
stocks. They are also inciting indigenous women
into prostitution and spreading diseases. Recently,
the government expelled the missionaries and
medical teams that were providing services to
the Yanomami. The presence of the miners in
the Yanomami territory has also again increased
conflicts (Branford 2019b).
Despite the Yanomami’s pleas to stop the
exploitation of their lands, the government has
not expelled the illegal miners from their territory
(Branford 2019b). FUNAI’s budget has been cut,
making it difficult from a human and financial
resource perspective to stop illegal mining in the
Yanomami territory and, more generally, to enforce
the range of laws designed to safeguard indigenous
peoples and protect indigenous lands.
On July 3, 2020, however, the Regional Federal
Court for the First Region (Tribunal Regional
Federal da 1ª Região, TRF1), one of the most
powerful judicial bodies in Brazil, ruled that the
government’s ministries of defense, justice, and
environment must draw up within five days a
comprehensive emergency plan to stop the
spread of COVID-19 into the Yanomami Park and
remove the 20,000 invading miners. The judge
further decreed that the administration must
effectively monitor the park’s boundaries once
the miners are evicted. The emergency measures
must be implemented within a 10-day period
following the announcement of the plan (Branford
2020). It is unclear whether the plan has been
developed and implemented.

Figure 5.2 | Map of the Yanomami Park Showing Areas of Legal and Illegal Mining and Deforestation

between 2000 and 2015

Sources: Data from RAISG 2016, 2018c, 2018d, 2018e, 2019c, modified by WRI and RAISG authors.

In May 2019, in compliance with national court
mandates and acknowledging that illegal mining
has damaged the region’s ecosystem as well as the
life and integrity of the Yanomami, Yek’wana, and
isolated peoples who live in the Yanomami Park,
FUNAI announced the reopening of the monitoring
bases in 2020 (it was not possible to confirm
whether the bases have been actually reactivated).
The bases are considered a first step to stopping
illegal mining in the Yanomami territory—a way
of blocking river access for illegal gold mining.
Additional actions by the army, Federal Police,

Roraima Public Security Secretariat, IBAMA, and
the Federal Prosecutor’s Office would likely be
needed to halt illegal mining in the Yanomami
territory (FUNAI 2019; Pontes 2019).

Colombia: Yaigojé Apaporis National
Natural Park
This case study shows the extreme measures that
some indigenous peoples will take to protect their
lands from mining. The Yaigojé Apaporis Reserve
was a formally recognized indigenous territory, but
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when a mining company requested a concession on
the indigenous lands, the Yaigojé Apaporis people
requested the government establish the reserve as
a national natural park where mining is prohibited.
In doing so, the indigenous people forfeited some of
their land use and management rights.
The original Yaigojé Apaporis Reserve is located in
the lower Apaporis River basin in the Departments
of Amazonas and Vaupés in southern Colombia.
The reserve was declared an indigenous territory
in 1988 and encompassed 518,320 ha (Resolution
035 of 1988). Ten years later, in 1998, the then
Colombian Institute of Agrarian Reform (Instituto
Colombiano de la Reforma Agraria, INCORA)
doubled the size of the reserve to 1,020,320 ha
(Resolution 006 of May 11, 1998).

Based on Decree 1088 of 1993, the Yaigojé Apaporis
indigenous people are governed by two traditional
authorities—the Association of Indigenous Captains
of Yaigojé–Apaporis (ACIYA) and the Association
of Indigenous Captains of Yaigojé Apaporis Vaupés
(ACIYAVA).57 The ACIYA and ACIYAVA represent
the 19 indigenous communities—about 1,600
people—that live in the reserve. The community
members are from several ethnic groups, including
Tanimuca, Letuama, Macuna, Yauna, Yujup,
Cabillari, Gente de Día, Tuyuca, Majiña, and Gente
de Leña.
In 2007, Cosigo requested a gold mining concession
from the Colombian government in the La Libertad
mountain range within the Yaigojé Apaporis
Reserve. Yuisi, a waterfall—among the most sacred
sites for the indigenous peoples of the region—is
within the proposed concession area.

BOX 5.3 | Overview and Principal Findings: Yaigojé Apaporis National Natural Park
▪ By law, mining is not allowed in national natural parks in
Colombia.
▪ In 2007, Cosigo Resources Ltd. (hereafter Cosigo), a Canadian
mining company, sought a gold mining concession within
the Yaigojé Apaporis Reserve.
▪ In response, the Yaigojé Apaporis indigenous people asked
the government to declare their lands a national natural
park. In 2009, the Yaigojé Apaporis National Natural Park was
established.
▪ Two days after the national natural park was established,
the government’s Department of Mining Services granted a
mining concession to Cosigo inside the park. The concession
was quickly terminated after the National Parks Unit
demanded its cancellation in compliance with the law.
▪ Several lawsuits by Cosigo followed and, in 2015, the
Constitutional Court of Colombia ordered the suspension of
all mining exploration and exploitation activities in the park.
Source: WRI authors.
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▪ There has been limited forest loss in the Yaigojé Apaporis
National Natural Park before and after the park was
established. In the 15-year period from 2000 to 2015, the
nearly 1.06-million-ha park lost 4,200 ha of forest cover, less
than 0.4 percent of its total area. Following the creation of
the park in 2009, deforestation dropped in the period 2010 to
2015 from the previous 10 years.
▪ This contrasts sharply with deforestation outside the
Yaigojé Apaporis National Natural Park. One active mining
concession on the eastern boundary of the park shows
some deforestation. There is also significant deforestation
near the northern and southern borders of the park, with
some deforestation on the southern border linked to illegal
mining along a river. Other rivers north and south of the park
are also affected by deforestation.

National law in Colombia allows the government
to grant mining concessions on indigenous lands,
including indigenous reserves, although it prohibits
mining in national parks.58 In response to Cosigo’s
request for a concession on their lands, ACIYA
leaders, on March 17, 2008, requested that the
Colombian Ministry of Environment establish the
Yaigojé Apaporis Reserve as a national natural
park. The government supported this request.
Changing the status of the Yaigojé Apaporis
Reserve and its forests to a national natural park
would strengthen the protection and conservation
of the land and eliminate, at least legally, the threat
of mining.
The first steps in creating a park include
informational meetings between the Special
Administrative Unit of the National Natural
Parks System (Unidad Administrativa Especial
del Sistema de Parques Nacionales Naturales,
UAESPNN) (hereinafter, National Parks Unit) and
the ACIYA to discuss the ramifications of creating
such a protected area, followed by negotiations and
the signing of an agreement59 between the parties
to establish a system of co-management. The
parties agreed the park would have a Special
Management Regime (Constitutional Court of
Colombia 2014) consisting of a set of rules and
procedures to coordinate implementation and
monitoring of the use, control, and administration
of the land and natural resources between the
National Parks Unit and the ACIYA. It was also
agreed that the management of the park would be
based on traditional knowledge and understanding
of the forest.
While most of the indigenous peoples living in the
Yaigojé Apaporis Reserve agreed to the creation of a
national natural park, the indigenous communities
of Taraira opposed its creation. The Taraira
communities argued that the establishment of the
park would curtail some of their land rights and
park personnel would have some authority over
how their land is used and managed (Decision Nº
T-384A/14; Revista Amazonas 2016). For example,
the use of minerals and other natural resources
in the park for commercial purposes would be
prohibited, limiting the economic and livelihood
opportunities of the indigenous peoples (Article

34, Mining Law, 2014). In order to protect the
rights, culture, integrity, and autonomy of the
communities, the National Parks Unit and the
ACIYA developed a proposal for a consultation
process involving the 19 indigenous communities
living in the reserve.60 In July 2009, consultations
were conducted with 12 out of the 19 indigenous
communities and, based on the discussions, it was
decided to create the park.61
After the National Mining Agency (Colombian
Agencia Nacional de Minería, ANM)62 confirmed
that there were no mining concessions within the
reserve, the Yaigojé Apaporis National Natural
Park was legally recognized (Revista Investigare
2013) and formally created on October 27, 2009
(Resolution No. 2079 of 2009).63 The park was
extended to 1,055,740 ha (Parques Nacionales
Naturales de Colombia 2020) to include the entire
area of the indigenous lands.
Two days after the park was created, however, ANM
granted a mining concession to Cosigo inside the
park (Figure 5.3).64 The concession was quickly
terminated after the National Parks Unit demanded
its cancellation in compliance with the law.65 In
response, Cosigo sued the government alleging
breach of contract. ACIYAVA, on behalf of the
Taraira communities, also sued the government
over the creation of the Yaigojé Apaporis National
Natural Park, alleging the lack of prior information
and consultation, and that the park affected the
autonomy of the indigenous peoples.
In 2015, the constitutional court ruled that the
consultation process requirements had, in fact,
been met and thus no rights were violated.66 The
court also ordered the suspension of all mining
exploration and exploitation activity linked to any
type of mining title granted in the park. Following
the court ruling, the Taraira communities joined
the other communities in support of the park.67 In
August 2015, however, Cosigo filed for arbitration
at the United Nations Commission on International
Trade Law (UNCITRAL), a subsidiary body of
the United Nations General Assembly (UNCTAD
2020). The matter is still pending.
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There has been limited forest loss in the Yaigojé
Apaporis National Natural Park before and after the
park was established. In the 15-year period from
2000 to 2015, the nearly 1.06-million-ha park lost
4,200 ha of forest cover, which equates to less than
0.4 percent of its total area (Figure 5.4). Following
the creation of the park in 2009, deforestation
dropped in the 2010–15 period from the previous
10 years (Figure 5.4).
This contrasts sharply with the deforestation
outside the park. Most of the eastern boundary of
the Yaigojé Apaporis National Natural Park is also

the international border between Colombia and
Brazil. One active mining concession in Colombia
on the eastern boundary of the park along the
border with Brazil shows some deforestation.
There is also significant deforestation near the
northern and southern borders of the park, with
some deforestation on the southern border linked
to illegal mining along a river (Figure 5.3). Other
rivers north and south of the park are also affected
by deforestation. On the Brazilian side, the border
region is blanketed in inactive mining concessions
with little deforestation.

Map of the Yaigoje Apaporis National Natural Park Showing Areas of Deforestation between 2000 and 2015
and Legal and Illegal Mining Areas
Figure 5.3 |

Sources: Data from RAISG 2016, 2018c, 2018d, 2018e, 2019c, modified by WRI and RAISG authors.
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Area of Deforestation for Each Five-Year
Increment from 2000 to 2015 within the Yaigojé Apaporis
National Natural Park
Figure 5.4 |

▪ In March 2012, the government of Ecuador granted
several mining concessions to a Chinese mining
company, EcuaCorriente S.A. (ECSA), that overlapped
with peasant farmer and Shuar indigenous lands.
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BOX 5.4 | Overview and Principal
Findings: Shuar Indigenous Lands
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Sources: Based on data from RAISG 2016, 2018c, 2018d, 2018e, 2019c, modified by
WRI authors.

Ecuador: Shuar Indigenous Lands
This case study highlights the importance of
indigenous people being formally recognized by the
government as indigenous and holding a title to
their customary lands, even if formalization is not
required for legal recognition. It also provides an
example of a government establishing an easement
on indigenous lands for industrial mining purposes,
and the adverse impacts easements can have on
indigenous people and other local communities.
Mirador is the first large-scale mining project in
Ecuador (RAISG 2019b). Despite local resistance,
on March 5, 2012, the government signed a mining
exploitation contract with EcuaCorriente S.A.
(hereinafter ECSA), a Chinese company (Spurrier
2012). The company was granted several concession
areas in the Amazon, in the Cordillera del Cóndor,
parish of Tundayme (El Pangui Canton, ZamoraChinchipe Province). This is a particularly sensitive
area due to the high frequency of earthquakes, rich
biodiversity, and high level of endemism.
It is also the land of the Shuar indigenous people
(Investigación Acción Psicosocial et al. 2015). The
Shuar are one of the largest indigenous peoples
in the Amazon, with between 35,000 and 40,000

▪ In February 2018, the Amazon Community of Social
Action Cordillera del Cóndor Mirador (Comunidad
Amazónica de Acción Social Cordillera del Cóndor
Mirador, CASCOMI), an organization established by those
affected by the mining, sued ECSA arguing that the
mine was developed on ancestral lands and that the
evictions were conducted violently and without prior
and informed consultation.
▪ Lower courts ruled in favor of ECSA and the government
on the grounds that CASCOMI did not represent
indigenous peoples since it also included nonindigenous
farmers. A final appeal is currently being prepared
for the Constitutional Court of Ecuador, the country’s
highest court, and before the United Nations Committee
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR).
▪ The indigenous lands that overlap with the Mirador
concessions—the Tundayme and Area Del Proyecto
De Desarrollo land—are composed of many separate
plots of land that collectively total more than 12,000
ha. Overall, the Tundayme and Area Del Proyecto De
Desarrollo lands lost about 260 ha of forest cover over
the 15-year period from 2000 to 2015, about 2 percent
of the total area. Much of the forest loss occurred in
the concessions.
▪ Forest loss increased nearly twofold from the period
2005 to 2010 to the period 2010 to 2015. This corresponds
to the time the Mirador project was approved and
operations began.
Sources: WRI authors.

people living mainly in the southeastern provinces
of Ecuador (Carvalho 2019). Today, they hold many
separate plots of land, including several that now
overlap with ESCA concessions (Van Teijlingen et
al. 2017).
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on the needed land. The easements—justified for
a “public utility” purpose—allowed the mining
company to occupy and “temporarily” use the land
for its operations. Since 2013, 47 mining easements
have been established.69 As a result, ECSA is now
“the largest landowner in Tundayme” (SánchezVázquez 2016).
Forced evictions from the mining easements
started in May 2014 in the town of San Marcos in
the parish of Tundayme70 and continued through
December 2016. Private ECSA security personnel,
together with the police and military, facilitated the
evictions. These initial evictions directly affected
116 Shuar and Mestizo peoples (32 families) living
in Tundayme and Güisme parishes (REPAM
2019b).

Mirador is planned as an open-pit copper mine that
will extend to 115 ha. There will be two waste dump
sites of 75 ha and 47.9 ha, and two tailings facilities
of approximately 56.6 ha and 312 ha in size. The
processing plant will eventually occupy an area of
20 ha (Chicaiza 2010). The parish of Tundayme has
an estimated 3.18 million tons of copper reserves,
along with 3.39 million ounces of gold and 27.11
million ounces of silver. Mirador began producing
copper on July 18, 2019 (Llangari 2019).
Various social and environmental problems have
plagued Mirador from the start of the project. A
main issue is the forced evictions of Tundayme
residents, including many indigenous people. In
addition to the concession area, ECSA needed
additional land to facilitate operations, including
land that was held and used by Mestizo peasant
families and Shuar families and communities.68
Many peasant families refused to sell their land to
ECSA either because they did not want to leave, the
price ECSA offered was too low, or ECSA did not
agree to relocate the families elsewhere. Similarly,
the indigenous people resisted making their land
available to the mining company. In response,
and despite court rulings against easements on
indigenous lands (see Legal Review), the company
requested the government’s Agencia de Regulación
y Control Minero (Mining Regulation and Control
Agency, ARCOM) to establish mining easements
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Affected and concerned peasant families and Shuar
indigenous people formed the Condor Mirador
Association (Asociación Condor Mirador, ACM)
to address the land conflicts and advocate for the
collective rights of those affected by the mining
operations. Later, to strengthen its efforts, the
association was registered with the government
as CASCOMI (Warnaars 2012; SánchezVázquez 2016). In August 2014, the government
formally recognized CASCOMI as an indigenous
organization. The Tundayme residents noted
that even though the mine was in early stages of
development and operation, its impact was already
visible. The region’s mountains were being carved
up, forests were being lost, and rivers were already
contaminated and discolored by runoff from
the mine.
The indigenous lands that overlap with the Mirador
concessions—the Tundayme and Area Del Proyecto
De Desarrollo lands—are composed of many
separate plots of land that collectively total more
than 12,000 ha (Figure 5.5). Overall, the Tundayme
and Area Del Proyecto De Desarrollo lands lost
about 260 ha of forest cover over the 15-year
period from 2000 to 2015, which equates to about
2 percent of the total area. Much of the forest loss
occurred in the concessions. Forest loss increased
nearly twofold from the 2005–10 period to the
2010–15 period (Figure 5.5). This corresponds to
the time the Mirador project was approved and
operations began.

Area of Deforestation (total ha) for
Each Five-Year Period between 2000 and 2015 within
the Tundayme and Area Del Proyecto De Desarrollo
Indigenous Territories That Intersect with the Mirador
Mining Concession

Figure 5.5 |
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Sources: Data from RAISG 2016, 2018c, 2018d, 2018e, 2019c, modified by WRI authors.

In June 2015, CASCOMI requested the national
court to issue an injunction to stop the evictions as
a precautionary measure to protect the indigenous
peoples from losing their lands. The request,
however, was denied on the grounds that there
was neither urgency nor irreparable damage to the
territory. Shortly thereafter, in September 2015,
another 16 communities were evicted from their
homes by the national police force and ECSA’s
security personnel. Residents who refused to leave
were physically, sometimes violently, removed.
Houses and other property were damaged or
destroyed in the process. The communities were
not relocated, and in some cases their belongings
were not returned to them. In December 2015,
another 10 communities in the Via del Cóndor, in
the parish of Tundayme, were evicted in a similar
manner. On May 13, 2016, eight families of the
Shuar community, Yanua Kim, were evicted from
their land by ECSA’s security personnel who used
heavy machinery to destroy crops and clear the
land. Later, when the rains came, the homes of the
evicted families were flooded.

In February 2018, CASCOMI sued ECSA and the
government, arguing that Mirador was developed
on ancestral land, the evictions were conducted
violently and without prior and informed
consultation, and the compensation for the land
lost as a result of the easements was fixed and not
negotiated with ARCOM. The law does not require
ARCOM to negotiate the amount of compensation,
although it does require ARCOM to carry out a
conciliation hearing between the miner and the
property owner to reach an agreement on the
establishment of easements (including the price).
The lawsuit was supported by the Panamazonic
Ecclesial Network (Red Eclesial PanAmazónica,
REPAM) and the Regional Advisory Foundation for
Human Rights (Fundación Regional de Asesoría
de Derechos Humanos, INREDH). Lower courts
ruled in favor of ECSA and the government on
the grounds that CASCOMI did not represent an
indigenous community (despite being recognized
by the government as an indigenous organization
in 2014). The courts also argued that there was
no collective title that demarcated indigenous
lands in Tundayme and, therefore, the community
did not have the right to prior consultation.
The decision was based on a report ordered by
the judicial authority to clarify the nature of
CASCOMI. That report noted that while CASCOMI
included indigenous peoples, it was not an
indigenous organization because it also included
nonindigenous peasant families.71
CASCOMI appealed the decision, but in June
2018 the court again ruled in favor of ECSA
and the government. A final appeal is currently
being prepared before the Constitutional Court
of Ecuador, the country’s highest court, as well
as before the United Nations Committee on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR).
To create international pressure on ECSA and the
government, indigenous leaders have also discussed
the case at the Inter-American Commission on
Human Rights (IACHR) in Washington, DC, and
at the United Nations in Geneva when it reviewed
China’s human rights record.
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Map of Indigenous Territories, Mining Concessions and Areas of Deforestation between 2000 and 2015. The
Mirador Mining Concessions Are Outlined in Black

Figure 5.6 |

Sources: Data from RAISG 2016, 2018c, 2018d, 2018e, 2019c, modified by WRI and RAISG authors.

Guyana: Patamona Indigenous Lands
This case study highlights the fact that some
indigenous peoples in the Amazon mine their land
for commercial purposes. Indigenous mining
operations must meet the same social and
environmental safeguards as all other miners. In
this case in Guyana, indigenous mining operations
are conducted with the approval of traditional
leaders, meet the interests of the community, and
allow for indigenous people to capture important
mining benefits.
Mahdia is a gold and diamond mining town of
just over 4,000 people in the Potaro-Siparuni
region in Guyana, approximately 200 km from
Georgetown, the nation’s capital. The town has
a history of mining beginning in the late 1800s.
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Near Mahdia lies Campbelltown, the customary
lands of the Patamona indigenous people, which
was established in 1940. The lands, however,
have been occupied by the Patamona indigenous
people for a much longer time. Campbelltown is a
recognized Amerindian village and home to about
1,000 Patamona people. The Patamona people of
Campbelltown received a land title in 2006 and the
land was demarcated in 2008. The land title covers
a significantly smaller area than the Patamona
people traditionally used and had requested from
the government. Today, the Patamona people
still hunt, fish, and gather materials in an area
exceeding the boundaries of the existing title
(Atkinson et al. 2018).

BOX 5.5 | Overview and Principal
Findings: Patamona Indigenous Lands
▪ Many residents of Campbelltown, who are primarily
Patamona indigenous people, mine their land. The
indigenous miners have been encouraged by their
leaders to find innovative ways to reduce the impact of
mining (e.g., El Dorado Initiative on responsible mining),
while also increasing production and profits.
▪ Like other Patamona villages in Guyana, Campbelltown
has requested an extension of its 2006 land title arguing
that the title does not include the full extent of its
customary lands. The view among coastlander miners
(miners from the coast of Guyana) and dredge owners,
however, is that the Patamona indigenous people are
applying for an extension to gain control of additional
mining tracts.
▪ In the nearly 6,000-ha Patamona lands, 96 ha of forest
cover was lost over the 15-year period from 2000 to 2015,
about 1.6 percent of the area with the most recent time
period (2010 to 2015) showing the greatest net loss.
▪ Some deforestation has occurred on the Patamona
indigenous lands outside the three mining concessions.
This forest loss is likely linked to the artisanal and smallscale miners operating on the land with the permission
of the village council.
Sources: WRI authors.

Mining is the principal source of income for
Campbelltown villagers who either have their own
operations on their indigenous land or work for
mining operators in nearby Mahdia (Hilson and
Laing 2017; Atkinson et al. 2018). There are three
mining concessions in Campbelltown’s titled land72
and many active mining concessions surround
the titled land (Figure 5.7). The Campbelltown
indigenous people were not consulted about the
mining concessions and did not give their consent—
the three mining concessions on Campbelltown
land predated the Amerindian Act of 2006 and the
land title from 2006. Many of the artisanal and
small-scale miners working on the land, however,
are operating with permission from the village
council and pay royalties to the council (Atkinson
et al. 2018).

Over the past two decades, Guyana has experienced
an unprecedented rise in gold production driven by
small and medium-scale mining activity financed
by people from the coast (hereafter coastlanders).
Between 1995 and 2015, declared gold production
increased by almost 500 percent, rising from
91,451 ounces per year to 451,490 ounces. While
indigenous peoples in Campbelltown and elsewhere
in Guyana’s interior are engaged in gold mining,
many indigenous peoples in Guyana do not mine
their land and do not want their land mined by
third parties. As gold mining expands into the
interior, conflicts have increased and escalated
between indigenous peoples and coastlanders over
control of indigenous lands with gold deposits
(Hilson and Laing 2017). Gold mining operations
by coastlanders often damage important cultural
sites and destroy the local environment. Guyana’s
draft REDD+ strategy identifies mining as the main
driver of deforestation (Severino et al. 2019). The
indigenous peoples argue that while coastlanders
have benefited from mining their land, they have
not significantly contributed to local development.73
Guyana’s gold mining economy is controlled by “a
small group of wealthy elites with strong political
connections” (Hilson and Laing 2017). As such,
the few indigenous peoples in Guyana who do
wish to mine their land often struggle to secure
mining claims and extract the gold. Many of the
interested indigenous peoples lack the information
and political connections needed to obtain a mining
license as well as the capital to acquire the mining
equipment and supplies (Hilson and Laing 2017).
Guyana’s Amerindian Act of 2006 governs the
recognition and protection of the collective land
rights of indigenous peoples, including the rights
of indigenous villages over lands titled to them by
the government. The act also provides indigenous
peoples—who are both recognized by the
government as being indigenous and have a land
title—the right of consent with respect to mining
(non-petroleum) and forestry. These provisions of
the act are, however, unevenly applied or enforced
by the government.
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Map of the Campbelltown Indigenous Land Showing Areas of Legal Mining Concessions and Deforestation
between 2000 and 2015

Figure 5.7 |

Sources: Data from RAISG 2016, Guyana Lands and Surveys Commission 2018, and Guyana Geology and Mines Commission 2016, modified by WRI and RAISG authors.

Across Guyana, indigenous peoples have used the
act—often unsuccessfully—to title the full extent
of their customary lands. While the Amerindian
Act recognizes indigenous village lands, it does
not provide for collective titles over the larger
indigenous territories. For various reasons,
including poor surveying, many existing indigenous
land titles do not include all customary village lands
(Cameron Ellis, personal communication, 2020).
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As a result, many indigenous communities—
motivated by a wide range of cultural, social,
environmental, and economic factors—have
requested extensions to their currently titled lands
(Joshua Lichtenstein, personal communication,
2020). The view among coastlander miners and
dredge owners working in nearby Mahdia, however,
is that some indigenous people in Campbelltown

While mining, by its very nature, is environmentally
damaging, Campbelltown’s indigenous miners have
shown some willingness to practice mining in a way
“that has minimum impact on the environment
and is safe for people” (Guyana Times 2018). The
indigenous miners have been encouraged by their
leaders and other residents to find innovative
ways to reduce the impact of mining, while also
increasing production and profits. In September
2018, for example, Campbelltown’s leaders,
miners, and other residents met with a group
of organizations implementing the El Dorado—
Responsible Mining for Guyana Initiative.74 Among
other measures, the initiative seeks to reduce the
impact of exploitation on forests and fresh water,
eliminate the use of mercury from artisanal and
small-scale gold mining, and rehabilitate mining
sites (GEF 2017). More, however, needs to be done
to ensure that small and medium-scale mining is
less damaging to the environment and sustainable
in the long run (Severino et al. 2019).

Area of Deforestation for Each Five–Year
Period Between 2000 and 2015 Within Campbelltown’s
Titled Village
Figure 5.8 |
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Overall, in the nearly 6,000-ha Patamona lands,
96 ha of forest cover were lost over the 15-year
period from 2000 to 2015, which equates to 1.6
percent of the total area (Figure 5.7). The village
lands experienced forest cover loss prior to the
Amerindian Act of 2006 and then no loss between
2005 and 2010 (Figure 5.8). Forest was again lost,
however, in the most recent time period of 2010 to
2015. In the 15-year period, a significant amount
of forest was lost in two of the three concessions in
the indigenous lands as well as in other parts of the
indigenous lands. Many artisanal and small-scale
miners operate on the lands with the permission of
the village council (see above), although RAISG did
not have data on legal ASM or illegal mining for the
GIS analysis. Some deforestation in the indigenous
lands, but outside the three mining concessions,
is likely linked to the ASM although it may also be
due to other activities, such as farming. Outside
the indigenous lands, but especially in the mining
concessions east of the indigenous lands, there is
significant forest loss in the time period from 2000
to 2015 (Figure 5.8).
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Peru: Shipibo and Ese’Eja
Indigenous Lands
This case study provides the experience of the Tres
Islas community, mainly Shipibo and Ese’Eja
indigenous peoples, which effectively used local and
national courts as well as the Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) to protect
its lands from mining. In Peru, the courts are
increasingly engaging in the complexities of
indigenous affairs, including customary land tenure
systems. A growing number of courts now recognize
the unique forms of indigenous social organization
with regard to their lands and traditional land uses.
The Tres Islas community of mainly Shipibo and
Ese’Eja indigenous peoples lives in the sub-basin
of the Madre de Dios River, Tambopata Province,
Department of Madre de Dios. The community
consists of approximately 103 families of Ese’Eja,
Shipibo, as well as Asháninka75 indigenous peoples
who depend on the plants, fruits, animals, and
wood from the forest, and the fish from the river.
On June 24, 1994, the Ministry of Agriculture
issued the Tres Islas community a land title (Nº
538) to 31,423 ha and 71 square meters of land.76
In issuing the title, the government formally
recognized the land as the territory “occupied
permanently” by the Tres Islas community.
In the early 2000s, the government of Peru
granted more than 100 mining concessions and
several logging concessions on Tres Islas’ territory
without informing or consulting the community.
By early 2010, these mining and logging operations
had significantly damaged the environment and
resulted in the loss of vegetation, fish, birds, and
other wildlife. Community members also developed
health problems from the high concentrations
of mercury in the soil and water, and from the
increased occurrence of prostitution (Movimiento
Regional por la Tierra 2017).

BOX 5.6 | Overview and Principal
Findings: Shipibo and Ese’Eja
Indigenous Lands
▪ In the early 2000s, the government of Peru granted
more than 100 mining concessions and several logging
concessions on Tres Islas lands without informing or
consulting the Tres Islas indigenous community, which
is made up principally of Shipibo and Ese’Eja
indigenous peoples.
▪ In response, the Tres Islas community assembly decided
in August 2010 to construct a booth and wooden gate to
control access to its lands. The booth was manned by
members of the community.
▪ Two transport companies sued the Tres Islas community
demanding free transit into their lands. The court ruled
in favor of the companies and ordered the removal of the
booth and gate.
▪ The Tres Islas community appealed the decision and
took the matter to the Peruvian Constitutional Tribunal.
In September 2012, the tribunal ruled that the Tres Islas
community had the right to control the entry of third
parties into its lands. The community reestablished
the booth and gate and resumed controlling access
to its lands.
▪ Thereafter, the Tres Islas community sued the regional
government of Madre de Dios in the regional Court of
Justice over the mining concessions granted without a
prior consultation process. In March 2019, the Superior
Courts of Justice of Peru declared the 127 mining
concessions on the Tres Islas lands, including eight
concessions that were in the process of being granted,
to be null and void, and ordered all activities resulting
from them to be halted.
▪ In total, 93 percent of the deforestation that occurred
on the Tres Islas lands during the 15-year time period
from 2000 to 2015 occurred in the portion of the lands
that overlapped with legal and illegal mining areas.
Deforestation drastically declined between 2010 and
2015, coinciding with the community regaining control of
access to its lands.
Sources: WRI authors.
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Map of the Tres Islas Territory Showing Areas of Legal and Illegal Mining and Deforestation
between 2000 and 2015

Figure 5.9 |

Sources: Data from RAISG 2016, 2018c, 2018d, 2018e, 2019c, modified by WRI and RAISG authors.

To address these challenges, the Tres Islas
community assembly decided in August 2010 to
construct a booth and wooden gate to control access
to its territory. The booth was manned by members
of the community. In response, two transport
companies, Los Mineros S.A.C. and Los Pioneros
S.CR.L., sued the Tres Islas community requesting
free transit into their lands. The court ruled in
favor of the transport companies and ordered the
removal of the booth and gate (Clínica Jurídica de
Acciones de Interés Público 2012, Enfoque Derecho
2015, Environmental Justice Atlas 2018).

The Tres Islas indigenous people appealed the
decision and took the matter to the Peruvian
Constitutional Tribunal. In September 2012, the
tribunal confirmed that the Tres Islas community
had the right to control the entry of third parties
into its territory as an expression of its right to
property and communal autonomy. It determined
that the transport companies did not have an
easement right nor any other title to pass through
the Tres Islas’ lands. The tribunal recognized that
while the freedom of transit is a fundamental
right, this right is subject to certain limits, such
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At the time, the Tres Islas lands were affected not
just by legal large-scale mining operations but also
considerable illegal mining (Figure 5.9). In total,
93 percent of the deforestation that occurred on
the Tres Islas lands during the 15-year time period
from 2000 to 2015 occurred in the portion of the
territory that overlapped with illegal and legal
mining areas. Deforestation, however, drastically
declined between 2010 and 2015, coinciding with
the community regaining control of access to its
territory (Figure 5.10).

Area of Deforestation per Five-Year
Period (2000–15) inside Overlapping Mining Concession
Areas in the Indigenous Land versus the Rest of the
Indigenous Land

Figure 5.10 |
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as not invading land without the consent of the
landholders. While the possession of a land title
by the Tres Islas indigenous people was not the
single determining factor in the ruling, the court
recognized it as one of the conclusive elements
supporting its decision. Following the tribunal’s
decision, the community quickly reestablished the
booth and gate and resumed controlling access to
its lands.
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Sources: Based on data from RAISG 2016, 2018c, 2018d, 2018e, 2019c, modified by
WRI authors 2018, and Guyana Geology and Mines Commission 2016, modified by
WRI authors.
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Because of persistent health risks and death threats
to community members from outsiders, in March
2016, the Tres Islas community filed a request for
an injunction to halt all mining on its lands—a
precautionary measure to protect the indigenous
people—before the Inter-American Commission
on Human Rights (IACHR). In September 2017,
IACHR granted the request, noting that the absence
of medical attention and the lack of protection for
threatened community members jeopardized their
rights to life and personal integrity.
Encouraged by these rulings, the Tres Islas
community sued the regional government of Madre
de Dios before the regional Court of Justice over
the mining concessions granted without a prior
consultation process.77 In March 2019, the Superior
Court of Justice of Madre de Dios recognized the
community’s rights to prior consultation, territorial
property, autonomy, life and physical integrity,
health, environment, and water (IIDS 2019a,

2019b, La República 2019, SERVINDI 2019). It
declared the 127 mining concessions on the Tres
Islas’ lands (including eight concessions that were
in the process of being granted) to be null and
void, and ordered all activities resulting from them
to be halted (Figure 5.9). (Figure 5.9, which uses
mining data from June 2019, shows that at least
some of the concessions were still active three
months after the court ruling). To compensate for
the damage caused to the Tres Islas community
and its environment by the mining operations, the
superior court of justice also ordered the regional
government of Madre de Dios to implement various
protection measures, including decontaminating
water, air, and soil; providing a clean supply of
drinking water; and reforesting the affected areas
(Dossier Nº 00675-2017-0-2701-JM-CI-01, 2019).
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RECOMMENDATIONS
Based on the research findings, five recommendations are
presented to empower indigenous peoples to take charge of their
own development and to ensure mining on indigenous lands
delivers positive social and economic outcomes while not causing
irreparable damage to the environment. The recommendations
target four audiences: indigenous peoples and their representative
bodies and supporters, government agencies responsible for
mining and for supporting indigenous people, miners and mining
companies, and the broader human rights and forest conservation
communities. The challenges and opportunities in the Amazon are
not unique. As a result, these recommendations likely also apply
to other countries around the world where mining is occurring on
indigenous or community lands.

Undermining Rights: Indigenous Lands and Mining in the Amazon

93

As the global demand for minerals rises and prices
soar, governments of Amazonian countries are
placing mineral exploitation at the center of their
economic development plans and putting in place
incentive packages for mining investments. Now,
with the novel coronavirus pandemic shutting
down many sectors of the economy, governments
are allowing large-scale mining to continue
operating and encouraging expansion in Peru and
other Amazonian countries. Mining, both legal
and illegal, as well as associated infrastructure
development (e.g., roads, railways, and dams) and
other supportive investments are moving deeper
into the Amazon to exploit the world-class reserves.
These developments, coupled with the expansion
of agriculture, cattle production, and other
economic pressures, threaten indigenous lands
and the people who hold and depend on the lands
and natural resources for their livelihoods and
well-being. In Brazil, which holds 60 percent of
the forest and indigenous peoples in the Amazon,
commercial mining on indigenous lands is not
permitted, but the government is moving ahead
with a bill that would open indigenous lands to
mining and other developments.
The research findings provide compelling
evidence of the following:

▪

▪

▪
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The laws governing minerals and mining by
third parties on indigenous lands provide
indigenous peoples with some rights over their
lands and the minerals on and below it. Overall,
however, they put indigenous peoples at a legal
disadvantage with miners. Legal miners have
important authorities to enter onto and use
indigenous lands to realize their mineral rights,
while indigenous peoples lack critical rights
that would help them better protect their lands.
Many indigenous peoples in the Amazon do
not want commercial mining by third parties
on their lands and have deployed a range of
measures such as protests and litigation—some
successful, others less so—to keep miners off
their lands.
All mining, whether ASM or industrial mining,
on indigenous lands is linked to environmental
damages, including the loss of forests and

associated ecosystem services. Indigenous
lands absent mining have significantly lower
deforestation rates than indigenous lands
with mining.
As a result, the expansion of mining in the Amazon
must be carefully considered and, if sanctioned,
well planned and monitored. Efforts are needed
to sufficiently empower indigenous peoples to
take charge of their own development, protect
indigenous lands and safeguard local livelihoods
from the significant and adverse social and
environmental impacts of mining, provide that
miners are respectful of indigenous peoples and
mining operations are conducted in responsible
ways, and ensure national laws and directives are
well implemented and enforced.
The research findings have implications for
indigenous peoples confronted with mining as
well as for governments, development assistance
agencies, miners and mining companies, NGOs,
and other civil society organizations. Five
recommendations are provided that recognize
the challenges confronting indigenous peoples
in the Amazon and that build on the laws and
experiences in the six research countries. The
broader literature on mining makes clear that
the challenges and opportunities in the Amazon
are not unique (A.J. Bebbington et al. 2018; D.H.
Bebbington 2018a, 2018b; Alden Wily 2018). As
a result, these recommendations likely also apply
to other countries around the world where mining
is occurring on indigenous or community lands,
threatening people and local environments.
While the research focused on minerals, the
findings may also have implications for oil and
natural gas developments and perhaps the
extraction of other natural resources. Like mining,
the footprint of oil and natural gas extraction
commonly does not reach the geographic scale
of agriculture and livestock, but the effects of
these activities can be felt in ways that are just as
problematic, such as the infrastructure developed
for oil extraction opening up land for farming and
ranching (A. Bebbington et al. 2018; RAISG 2018b).

The five recommendations are:

Provide strong legal rights to
indigenous peoples:
While the national laws in the research countries
include provisions designed to empower indigenous
peoples and safeguard indigenous lands for
indigenous peoples, they do not establish the
strong legal protections needed for indigenous
peoples to manage and use their lands and forests
for their own development purposes. This is the
case for indigenous peoples holding land under
customary tenure arrangements and those with
formal land rights (e.g., land titles or those living
on lands designed by government for their use).78
This finding is consistent with the legal protections
afforded indigenous lands in cultures around the
world (Alden Wily 2018). As a result, indigenous
peoples in the research countries and elsewhere are
at a legal disadvantage compared to miners with
formal rights to minerals on indigenous lands.
Stronger rights would further empower indigenous
peoples and help them to sustainably manage their
lands and protect their forests and other natural
resources. Tenure security creates critical incentives
for indigenous peoples to make land-related
investments in their lands and forests by providing
them with high expectations of rights over the
returns. Governments must enact legislation that
better protects indigenous peoples and their lands,
CSOs must press their governments to make these
reforms, development agencies should use their
support to ensure effective implementation, and
mining companies should respect the new laws
and build partnerships with indigenous peoples to
ensure they benefit in meaningful ways.
The research identified four sets of rights critical
for indigenous peoples to secure and protect their
lands—land rights; mineral rights; the right of
free, prior, and informed consent; and the right of
first refusal.

Land rights:
Like all citizens, indigenous peoples need strong,
secure land rights to effectively protect, use, and
manage their lands. Governments should review
and, if necessary, reform national laws to ensure

indigenous peoples have the rights and authorities
they need to take charge of their own
development. National laws in the research
countries recognize indigenous lands and
customary tenure systems, although such legal
recognition alone does not always translate into
tenure security. Indigenous peoples in the research
countries have rights to access and occupy their
lands, but their management, withdrawal/use,
exclusion, and alienation rights are often limited.
In many cases, they cannot exclude all unwelcome
people from entering and using their lands, cannot
lease their lands to third parties, and cannot
withdraw minerals or other natural resources for
commercial purposes without receiving a separate
government authorization.
Moreover, in many countries, these rights are
conditioned—sometimes in law, and often in
practice—on indigenous peoples being formally
recognized as such by the government and/or
on them having formal land rights (i.e., holding
a land title or other official land document).
Such conditions, along with other benefits, have
encouraged many indigenous peoples to become
formally recognized as indigenous and to formalize
their customary land rights (“double lock” their
land rights) (Alden Wily 2017). Many indigenous
peoples, however, need outside assistance
to navigate and complete the formalization
procedures. Government definitions of indigenous
people are often unclear and open to interpretation.
Land formalization procedures are commonly
complex, costly, and do not recognize all customary
rights and land (Notess et al. 2018). Governments
should streamline the formalization procedures and
provide indigenous peoples with the assistance they
need to complete the processes.
The values and customs of many Amazonian
indigenous peoples align with and support
sustainable land management and forest
conservation. Limiting land rights can protect
communities vulnerable to political and
economic interests from exploitative and
corrupting relationships with external actors.
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But limiting land rights also means limiting
economic options and opportunities for
indigenous peoples. Finding the right balance is
key to empowering indigenous peoples.
Governments should couple laws that recognize
strong land rights for indigenous peoples with
incentive packages that promote and support
sustainable land use and forest conservation.
For example, payment for ecosystem services
(PES) schemes that reward indigenous peoples
who conserve forests and protect biodiversity can
further encourage sustainable forest management
(de Koning et al. 2011). Such incentive packages
can also protect against changing customs and
external political and economic pressure, increase
tenure security, and reduce conflict (Jones et al.
2020). Recognizing significant land rights for
indigenous peoples is fairer, more equitable, and
more consistent with laws governing most private
property tenure systems.

Mineral rights:
Indigenous peoples are empowered when they have
more rights and greater control over the minerals
(and other natural resources) on and below the
surface of their lands. In all research countries,
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minerals (along with oil, natural gas, and other
high-value natural resources79) are under the
control of the government, which has the authority
to grant mineral rights to outside miners, mining
companies, or other entities. Indigenous peoples
in the research countries have only limited rights
over the minerals on their lands. For example, they
may use minerals for subsistence, domestic, or
customary purposes without government approval
in Brazil, Colombia, and Guyana, but authorization
is required to mine even for domestic purposes in
Bolivia, Ecuador, and Peru. Commercial mining
by indigenous peoples on their lands requires a
separate authorization from the government in all
research countries, except Brazil, where commercial
mining on indigenous lands is currently prohibited.
Governments should reform laws to recognize more
rights for indigenous peoples over the minerals on
their lands whether the lands are formalized or held
under customary tenure arrangements. Doing so
would give them greater control over their lands
and minerals and help ensure they have a voice
in decisions regarding mineral developments on
their lands. It would also empower them in their
negotiations with miners or mining companies
operating on their lands and help ensure they
receive a fair share of resulting benefits (see below).

National laws in all six research countries establish
procedures for the acquisition of mineral rights
for commercial exploration and exploitation,
but only in Colombia does the law provide for
differentiated, simplified procedures for indigenous
peoples to acquire rights to commercially mine
their land. In Colombia, the law also mandates
that the government provide indigenous peoples
comprehensive technical assistance to exercise
their mineral rights, including support to mitigate
the environmental risks. While many indigenous
peoples in the Colombian Amazon do not currently
want to commercially mine their land, this law
provides an important economic opportunity
should they want or need to engage in mining in the
future. Indeed, given the important role of ASM in
rural livelihoods, licensing procedures should be
made more accessible to rural people as part of the
governments’ efforts to curtail illegal mining.
In the other five research countries—Bolivia, Brazil,
Ecuador, Guyana, and Peru—indigenous peoples
must meet the same requirements as other parties
applying for commercial mineral rights. The lack
of technical expertise and financial resources of
indigenous peoples, however, hinders, delays, or
prevents them from being granted such mineral
rights. Other countries should follow Colombia’s
effort to address these entry barriers and establish
streamlined procedures for indigenous peoples to
commercially mine their land. The laws should also
require that the government provide them with the
technical assistance needed to ensure indigenous
commercial mining is undertaken with minimum
social and environmental impacts.

Right of free, prior, and informed consent:
Governments should recognize the right of free,
prior, and informed consent (FPIC), not just
consultation, for indigenous peoples regarding
mining and other developments that may affect
them or their lands. FPIC is a collective right
embedded in the right to self-determination. It
helps ensure indigenous peoples are consulted and
participate in decision-making on all development
matters that affect them. FPIC is central to
indigenous peoples protecting their forests from
the harmful effects of mining as well as other
extractive industries, agrobusiness, ranching,
and infrastructure developments. The right of

FPIC is particularly important for indigenous
peoples who do not have strong, secure rights
over their lands and the minerals on their lands.
Without FPIC, indigenous peoples are subject to
developments that may threaten their well-being
and their forest homes.
All six research countries have adopted the United
Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous
Peoples (UNDRIP), which calls for the right
of FPIC. Governments should enact enabling
national legislation to domestic UNDRIP and FPIC,
specifically. Indigenous peoples in Guyana have,
by law, a limited right of FPIC, but those in Bolivia,
Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru only have the
right to consultation. The government of Guyana
should strengthen its FPIC law by, for example,
recognizing FPIC of indigenous peoples who hold
lands under customary tenure arrangements and
for all developments, not just mining and forestry.
Amazonian governments should build on Guyana’s
example and enact legislation that recognizes the
right of FPIC to indigenous peoples as well as Afrodescendants and other communities that hold land
in a collective manner. The right of FPIC should
not be limited to just a few types of developments,
and governments should only have the authority to
override refusal of consent to developments that are
in the narrowly defined national or public interest
(e.g., in countries around the world, economic
development projects, such as mining, are not
recognized as a genuine public interest) (Veit et al.
2008; Tagliarino 2016, 2017).

Right of first refusal:
Given the interest of some indigenous peoples to
commercially mine their land (see Guyana Case
Study), governments should recognize the right
of first refusal to exploit minerals for commercial
purposes. With this right, indigenous peoples must
first refuse their right to exploit minerals on their
lands before the government can grant the mineral
rights to a third party. In Colombia, national law
recognizes the right of first refusal for indigenous
peoples and Afro-descendants. The law does not
recognize this right for indigenous peoples in
the other five research countries. In Brazil, Bill
191/2020, which would open indigenous lands to
mining and other developments, would provide this
right to indigenous peoples (Box 4.4). The right of
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first refusal is particularly important for indigenous
peoples who do not have strong, secure rights to
their lands or the minerals on their lands or the
right of FPIC.
The government of Colombia should consider
reforming its laws to strengthen the right of first
refusal for indigenous peoples to be more impactful.
Other governments should follow Colombia’s
example in recognizing the right. The right of first
refusal should be recognized for all communities,
not just indigenous peoples, that hold land in a
collective manner and whether this land is titled or
held only under customary tenure arrangements.
Moreover, in exercising their right of first refusal,
indigenous peoples and other communities should
have the option of either directly engaging in
commercial mining or establishing a partnership
or joint venture with a third party. In Colombia,
the law allows indigenous peoples to transfer part
of their mining concession to third parties, with
certain limits, and mandates the government to
provide them with technical support to ensure the
mining meets established social and environmental
safeguards. Governments, NGOs, and development
organizations can help indigenous peoples build
the skills and capacities they need to mine safely
and mitigate environmental damage. They can also
support indigenous peoples in their negotiations
with external miners or mining companies to
ensure fair benefit-sharing agreements (see below).

Establish strong environmental safeguards:
National laws in all research countries provide for
the protection of forests and the environment and
require miners and mining companies to minimize
their environmental impact, whether mining
on indigenous lands or other lands. National
laws prohibit mining on certain sensitive lands,
require compensation for damages to property,
and mandate that land is restored when mining
operations are concluded. Environmental Impact
Assessments (EIA) are required to ensure that
mining projects will be conducted in accordance
with environmental safeguards and without
causing avoidable damage to the environment.
These environmental safeguards are often codified
in national environmental protection laws as
well as mining regulations and indigenous rights
legislation. While some national environmental
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safeguards meet international standards, others,
however, fall short and must be strengthened to
provide the level of protection needed to
adequately safeguard forests and their critical
ecosystem services, including carbon sequestration.
Stronger environmental laws coupled with
effective enforcement (see below) will help ensure
the forest homes of indigenous peoples in the
Amazon are protected.
All mining brings risks to the environment and to
the health and well-being of affected populations.
The process of extracting minerals from the ground,
by ASM or industrial mining, is by its very nature
damaging to the environment. In the Amazon,
large-scale strip mining results in the loss of natural
vegetation and critical ecosystem services, including
carbon sequestration and biodiversity, while ASM
often involves the dredging of rivers, poisoning of
water from the use of mercury, and loss of fisheries.
The GIS analysis conducted for this report finds
that indigenous lands not affected by mining have
lower deforestation rates than indigenous lands
with mining. These findings are consistent with
other research that shows deforestation rates on
tenure-secure indigenous lands in the Amazon
are significantly lower than on similar lands not
managed by indigenous peoples (Ding et al. 2016;
Blackman et al. 2017; Blackman and Veit 2018).
The links between mining and deforestation
must be recognized by governments and their
development partners (e.g., Global Environmental
Facility and Green Climate Fund) and integrated
into their analysis and projects on forest
conservation and climate mitigation (e.g., REDD+).
National finance and mining ministries together
with the World Bank, other international financial
institutions and instruments, and private finance
for mining projects must also consider how their
investments are contributing to forest loss, climate
change, and resulting rural hardships. Better
connections are needed between ministries, forest
departments, and government agencies responsible
for indigenous affairs to address
policy incoherence, and more cooperation is
needed to ensure national sustainable development
goals are achieved.

To mitigate these risks, mining, whether conducted
by mining companies or indigenous peoples, must
recognize and adhere to minimum social and
environmental safeguards. Major mining disasters,
such as the Mariana and Brumadinho tailings dam
collapses in Brazil, and their lasting impact on local
populations and the environment, make clear that
mining companies must invest more in protecting
the environment and local populations. In all
six research countries, governments are by law
responsible for monitoring and overseeing mining
companies to ensure their operations are conducted
in accordance with the law and the conditions
in their licenses or concession agreements, that
they are meeting their social and environmental
commitments, and that they mitigate and
compensate for any environmental damage or
other loss caused by their activities. When mining
activities damage the environment on indigenous
lands, the government in all six research countries
has the authority to arrest and detain illegal miners,
impose fines, and mandate compensation for the
affected indigenous peoples.
New mining technologies are being developed
and adopted by mining companies that minimize
the footprint of extraction and throughout the
value chain (e.g., processing, transportation,
production, and sale of mineral products),80 and
that promise better social and environmental
outcomes (Mayorga Alba 2009; World Bank
2017b). These include: advanced airborne gravity
gradiometer and 3D imaging technology that
make mineral exploration less destructive to the
environment; more efficient shaft and tunnel
boring machines that increase worker safety and
reduce the environmental footprint; automated
robotic technologies that improve worker safety;
microorganisms that recover minerals, such as
copper, from tailings; electric vehicles that reduce
emissions and temper climate change; and remote
operating and monitoring centers that improve
worker safety and reduce environmental impacts
(Mining Technology 2014).
To ensure mining operations do not irreparably
damage the environment and the nation’s valuable
mineral resources provide the promised benefits
of local and national development, governments
must also be more selective in the allocation of

mineral rights and mining concessions. Companies
with strong track records in mining operations that
meet or exceed national and international social
and environmental standards, that make use of the
latest technologies, and that engage communities
and protect forests should be prioritized. Proposal
vetting processes should not just focus on the public
revenue generated or how quickly the mine can
begin production. Broader selection criteria can
create incentives for companies to adopt mining
practices and technologies that are less damaging to
the environment and more supportive of indigenous
peoples and other affected communities.

Build indigenous capacity:
As the threats to their lands, livelihoods, and wellbeing escalate and become more complex, many
indigenous peoples realize they lack the expertise,
contacts, and resources needed to effectively
address the challenges and mitigate the risks.
Governments and their development partners can
provide training and critical technical and financial
resources for indigenous peoples to develop new
skills and capacities to better protect their lands
and themselves. These include skills to effectively
negotiate with mining companies, monitor their
lands for illegal activities, and better protect
themselves and their community from harm.
When indigenous lands are mined by third parties,
negotiated agreements between indigenous
peoples and the miners play a critical role in
setting the conditions under which that mining
occurs (O’Faircheallaigh 2018). Conditions must
be established on the use of indigenous lands,
compensation for any loss from or damage to
property caused by mining operations, and for
benefits-sharing arrangements (see below).
Communities “must have the ability to negotiate on
fair terms with government and private companies
. . . [and] must be able to benefit equitably from
extractive processes” (UNDP 2012). A company
will typically have its own internal legal team and
even outside counsel to negotiate an agreement.
Indigenous peoples and other local communities,
on the other hand, are often at a disadvantage
given their unfamiliarity with mining, limited
awareness of their legal rights, and lack of financial
resources to represent themselves or hire adequate
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legal representation or independent outside
experts (O’Faircheallaigh 2008; Ruwhiu and
Carter 2016; Carlos Zambrano-Torrelio, personal
communication, 2020). With this imbalance in
experience and negotiating skills, social issues and
conflicts within the community and with miners
often arise and can become violent.
Governments, NGOs, and development assistance
agencies should step up to help build indigenous
capacity to better negotiate with mining companies
and support independent counsel for indigenous
peoples in these processes. Such independent
counsel could come from public interest law NGOs
or private law firms. Ombudsman offices within the
government (e.g., Defensoría del Pueblo in Peru,
Colombia, and other Latin American countries)
can provide independent oversight or mediate
these negotiations.
When mining takes place on indigenous lands it is
important for indigenous peoples to have the skills
and capacity to monitor for compliance of the
mining agreements and to detect any illegal
activities. In the absence of adequate government
support, some indigenous peoples have organized
their own patrols to monitor their lands, evict
intruders, and confiscate their equipment (Veit
2018). While such actions can be effective, they also
expose indigenous peoples to new risks, including
violent attacks. All citizens, including indigenous
peoples, have certain rights to protect themselves
and their property. In the research countries,
indigenous peoples have the right to evict illegal
operators and unauthorized actors from their lands.
National laws, however, do not give them the
authority to capture, retain, judge, or punish illegal
operators; confiscate equipment; or take possession
of any minerals extracted by the illegal operators.
Governments must step up to take charge of their
policing roles and responsibilities, including
protecting indigenous peoples and their lands
from illegal mining operations. Indigenous peoples
and their supporters can help governments by
monitoring their lands for illegal operators,
reporting incidents of unauthorized activities,
supporting (and, in some circumstances,
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BOX 6.1 | Monitoring of Indigenous Land
One example of new monitoring technology is Global
Forest Watch (GFW), an online platform that provides near
real-time information about where and how forests are
changing in addition to tools for monitoring forests.a Several
international NGOs provide training for indigenous people
and other local communities on how to use GFW as well as
a new mobile app called Forest Watcher, which provides
offline access to GFW’s forest cover change data and other
contextual data (e.g., forest cover data and fire alerts).b These
tools allow deforestation to be easily located and reported.
Indigenous people in the Amazon using Forest Watcher have
successfully identified and halted illegal mining and other
activities on their land. Some indigenous groups have used
the app to collect information as evidence in a court of law to
prosecute wrongdoers.c
Notes:
a
GFW 2020b
b
GFW 2020c
c
Weisse and Nogueron 2017; Ionova 2019

participating) in government patrols, and providing
evidence for the prosecution of offenders in a court
of law.
To support government operations, indigenous
peoples can build skills in collecting data on
illegal activities that meet the legal burden of
proof. Indigenous organizations and NGOs can
raise awareness on the law or rules of evidence81
and provide training on tools and techniques for
collecting information that meets the standard
of evidence. At the same time, local and national
government agencies and courts of law must
accept such information from indigenous peoples
in their investigative and sanctioning processes.
There are precedents for governments to officially
recognize indigenous monitoring efforts and
the data generated, as well as partnerships for
joint monitoring efforts, including patrols. In
Peru, Law, Environment and Natural Resources
(Derecho, Ambiente y Recursos Naturales, DAR),
a national NGO, is developing a legal framework
on the use of information collected by indigenous
peoples as legal evidence in a court of law (DAR
2020). Governments should also establish clear,

BOX 6.2 | Protecting Land Defenders
When indigenous people in the Amazon stand up for their
rights, intimidation and violence can ensue. In many places
around the world, land and environmental defenders
face diverse and growing threats, including surveillance
and stigmatization (being labeled as “anti-development,”
“anti-state,” “traitors,” “terrorists,” or “criminals”), harassment,
criminalization of their efforts, false criminal charges and
civil actions, and acts of physical violence, including
torture and murder. Threats to land and environmental
defender organizations include burdensome registration
and government reporting requirements, Strategic Lawsuits
Against Public Participation (SLAPP) suits, restrictions on
funding, and other regressive laws and regulations.
There is an urgent need to achieve more rigorous protections
for all defenders, but especially indigenous people given
their unique vulnerabilities. All governments have the
obligation and the authority needed to protect defenders.
While many acknowledge the threats to defenders, few have
prioritized actions that have significantly reduced those
threats or improved the protection of land and environmental
defenders. Attacks continue to be underreported, and there
are high levels of impunity for those responsible. This is
particularly alarming for indigenous people in the Amazon
given the consistently high incidence of harassment and
murders in Latin America.
Source: WRI authors.

accessible procedures for indigenous peoples to
make complaints or appeal decisions, and for them
to request and receive relevant government and
company information.
Indigenous peoples would benefit from training
on ways to safely monitor their lands for illegal
activities. In recent years, new technologies have
been developed and made available to quickly and
precisely map indigenous lands, and to monitor
large areas in real or near-real time, including
using data from unmanned aerial vehicles/
drones and satellites (Box 6.1). Deploying such
technologies to monitor indigenous lands can
be safer than manned patrols as they eliminate
the possibility of direct confrontation with illegal
miners or other violators. All monitoring should

be coordinated with local police forces, which
have the authority to apprehend violators and
confiscate their equipment.
As the risks to them and their communities
increase, indigenous peoples are taking more
precautions to carry out their activism and
campaigning safely and effectively, and to defend
themselves from harassment and physical attacks.
This is particularly important for indigenous
women as they become ever more active in
protecting their lands from mining (Mujeres
Defensoras 2018; Brown 2018b). Many land and
environmental defenders, however, would likely
benefit from gaining a better understanding of
their legal rights, training on risk assessment
information systems, learning how to better
recognize threats and minimize risks, building
capacity in new approaches to deescalating
confrontational situations, and building skills
in self-defense techniques. Indigenous activists
should also have access to emergency funds,
contact information for legal counsels, and NGOs
that can provide urgent assistance and other
support resources and protection mechanisms.
Governments must establish an enabling
environment that strengthens safeguards and
reduces risks to indigenous defenders, adopt
mechanisms to better monitor conflicts and attacks
against defenders in near-real time, empower
institutions responsible for protecting defenders,
increase access to justice for indigenous activists,
and ensure the people responsible for threats
and attacks are held accountable for their actions
(ProDESC 2019; Scheidel et al. 2020) (Box 6.2).

Ensure responsible mining:
All mining in the Amazon, whether by indigenous
peoples, large mining companies, or ASM miners,
should be responsible mining—mining that is safe,
fair, and mitigates social and environmental risks.
Governments must provide stronger oversight of
mining operations and better enforce applicable
laws, but miners and mining companies must also
become better corporate citizens and take more
responsibility in meeting social and environmental
safeguards. Companies can no longer operate
without social legitimacy, skirt the law and cause

Undermining Rights: Indigenous Lands and Mining in the Amazon

101

major environmental devastation, and simply
leave when an area is exhausted of economically
viable minerals. New, stronger national laws and
regulations are needed to ensure miners and
mining companies operate safely and with the least
social and environmental harm.
Some mining companies and mining associations
have established social and environmental
standards (Box 6.3), made voluntary commitments
to responsible mining, and established corporate
policies or guidelines that align with the
commitments. Several mining standards exist for
large-scale mining and ASM. Mining companydeveloped standards include the Mining Principles

of the International Council on Mining and Metals
(ICMM 2020b) and the Responsible Gold Mining
Principles of the World Gold Council (WGC 2019)
as well as WGC’s Conflict-Free Gold Standard
(WGC 2012). Other responsible mining standards
have been developed by mining associations such
as the Artisanal Gold Council and the Mining
Association of Canada.
Some mining companies are protecting forests and
biodiversity by staying out of national protected
areas and identifying no-go areas for mining on
indigenous and other lands, such as ecologically
sensitive areas (e.g., headwaters and primary intact
forests) and sacred places (Miranda et al. 2003).

BOX 6.3 | International Council on Mining and Metals (ICMM)
ICMM is an international organization dedicated to a safe, fair
and sustainable mining and metals industry. ICMM brings
together 27 of the world's leading mining and metals companies
and 36 regional and commodities associations to address
the core sustainable development challenges faced by the
industry. It serves “as a catalyst for change; enhancing mining’s
contribution to society.” ICMM strengthens environmental and
social performance. Participating companies include Alcoa, Anglo
American, Anglo Gold Ashanti, Barrick, BHP, Codelco, FreeportMcMoRan, JX Nippon Mining & Metals, Minera San Cristóbal,
Newmont Mining and Goldcorp, Rio Tinto, and Vale.
ICMM’s 10 Mining Principles define the good practice
environmental, social, and governance requirements of company
members. These principles are:
▪ Ethical Business. Apply ethical business practices and
sound systems of corporate governance and transparency to
support sustainable development.
▪ Decision-making. Integrate sustainable development in
corporate strategy and decision-making processes.
▪ Human Rights. Respect human rights and the interests,
cultures, customs and values of employees and communities
affected by our activities.
▪ Risk Management. Implement effective risk-management
strategies and systems based on sound science, and which
account for stakeholder perceptions of risk.
Source: Based on data from ICMM 2020b, modified by WRI authors.
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▪ Health and Safety. Pursue continual improvement in the
health and safety performance with the ultimate goal of zero
harm.
▪ Environmental Performance. Pursue continual improvement
in environmental performance issues, such as water
stewardship, energy use, and climate change.
▪ Conservation of Biodiversity. Contribute to the conservation
of biodiversity and integrated approaches to land-use
planning.
▪ Responsible Production. Facilitate and support the
knowledge base and systems for responsible design, use,
reuse, recycling, and disposal of products containing metals
and minerals.
▪ Social Performance. Pursue continual improvement
in social performance and contribute to the social,
economic and institutional development of host countries
and communities.
▪ Stakeholder Engagement. Proactively engage key
stakeholders on sustainable development challenges and
opportunities in an open and transparent manner. Effectively
report and independently verify progress and performance.

Companies are also making progress on restoring
and reforesting their mining sites when operations
have concluded. In Brazil, the multinational
corporation Vale has been a pioneer in reforestation
with natural tree species (Funk 2015; Pires
et al. 2017). In recent years, some companies
have also worked more closely with indigenous
peoples and other communities affected by their
operations in an effort to win their support. Leading
mining companies are also increasing their CSR
investments, focusing on local initiatives designed
to address the social, economic, and environmental
impacts of their mining.
As indigenous peoples and other local communities
learn of their rights, take actions to protect their
lands, and press miners to perform better, more
mining companies recognize the growing risks to
their reputation and bottom line. Risk assessors
working for mining companies and their investors
are increasingly concerned about land conflicts
and are factoring associated risks into their
assessments. National and global information
hubs, such as Tierras Indígenas in Paraguay
(Tierras Indígenas 2020) and LandMark: The
Global Platform of Indigenous and Community
Lands (LandMark 2020), provide precise
boundaries of indigenous and community lands
(formalized and customarily held lands) and other
critical information, and are now commonly used
by risk assessors.
The industry-developed standards and the
voluntary commitments made by ASM miners
and large multinational mining companies are to
be applauded and encouraged. There is, however,
growing evidence that voluntary approaches do
not always lead to responsible mining as many
companies fail to meet their commitments (WEF
2016). At the same time, the effectiveness of
company CSR initiatives in mining (and in oil
and natural gas) is being questioned (Sharma and
Bhatnagar 2014). Over time, the aspects of these
voluntary approaches that meet international
standards should be incorporated into national laws
and regulations. Companies that make voluntary
commitments (e.g., engage in comprehensive
community consultation processes and establish
no-go areas) may be at a competitive disadvantage
with those that do not. Enacting legislation
requiring all companies to meet the same social

and environmental standards can level the playing
field for companies that are voluntarily following
good practices.
Certainly, more efforts are needed to ensure all
mining is responsible mining. In particular, more
needs to be done with regard to transparency
and sharing of company information with
stakeholders, company engagement in meaningful
consultations with affected indigenous peoples
and local communities, and benefit-sharing
arrangements with those negatively impacted by
mining operations. For example, mining and other
companies do not always provide communities with
information on the full extent of the environmental
impacts of their operations. Too many companies
abridge the requisite community consultation
processes by convening just a single meeting or
acquiring a token approval from a community
leader (Notess et al. 2018). And women continue to
face systemic discrimination in all phases of mining
projects and in accessing their economic benefits
(Hinton et al. 2003; Oxfam 2017).
Companies must also increase their support to
indigenous peoples and other communities and
negotiate fairer agreements that provide benefitsharing packages that address community interests
and aspirations and strengthen local capacity
for self-determined development. Indigenous
peoples should insist on formal agreements and
governments should mandate them (Dalupan 2015;
Loutit et al. 2016).82 Such community-company
benefit-sharing agreements should include both
financial and nonfinancial benefits. For revenue
sharing, indigenous peoples and communities
could demand fixed, predictable payments
(although these may not change if the company’s
profits increase); royalties based on the volume
of production or outputs; revenue streams based
on company profits; or an equity share in the
mine, which is more risky and dependent on the
market.83 Nonfinancial benefits could include local
employment opportunities, commitments to source
goods and services from local providers, support
services, and training in transferable skills (e.g.,
business and management skills that equip the
community to continue its economic development
if the mine fails, becomes less productive, or closes)
(Dalupan 2015; Loutit et al. 2016).
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Ensure effective implementation
and law enforcement:
To protect indigenous peoples, their lands, and
their livelihoods, Amazonian governments must
strengthen the public institutions that have critical
roles in advancing indigenous matters. These
include government agencies and departments
responsible for establishing and implementing
indigenous policies; for mapping, demarcating, and
documenting indigenous lands; and for preventing
invasions of indigenous territories by unauthorized
outsiders. FUNAI in Brazil, the Ministry of
Culture in Peru, and other national government
agencies in the Amazonian countries with such
responsibilities must be empowered—politically,
legally, and practically—with sufficient human and
financial resources to effectively discharge their
roles and duties (Zambrano Chávez 2020). Actions
that weaken these agencies by cutting budgets or
rolling back their authorities threaten to further
marginalize indigenous peoples and could lead to
more conflict.

miners do not always mitigate the environmental
impacts of their operations, indigenous peoples are
not always fairly compensated for their losses, and
many are forcibly evicted from their lands and not
adequately resettled elsewhere.

Amazonian governments must also strengthen their
oversight of mining on indigenous lands. Mining
operations must conform with the law and meet the
provisions of licensing and concession agreements.
Illegal operations must be halted, and illegal
occupants must be removed. Government efforts
should not be limited to capturing and prosecuting
illegal miners on indigenous lands but also include
the individuals who hire, finance, or otherwise
facilitate the illegal miners. Those who sell and
profit from the illicit trade in gold, diamonds,
and other minerals must also be identified and
prosecuted. Such operations require coordination
across national borders and partnering with
relevant international police bodies, such as
the International Criminal Police Organization
(INTERPOL) and the International Criminal
Court (ICC).

Indigenous lands in the Amazon are often remote
from local police and government agencies. The
effective delivery of public services in rural regions
may require more resources and involve more
public servants than in urban settings (Gribble and
Preston 1993; OECD 2010), but such investments
are essential to the well-being of rural populations
and help ensure indigenous peoples and other local
communities are not neglected or marginalized.
Local police and other important government
agencies must be empowered, properly resourced,
and motivated to ensure they meet their roles and
responsibilities. This may require local government
agencies to hire additional staff, provide local
officers with more training, and invest in new tools
and technologies for monitoring and overseeing
mining on indigenous lands (see above).

The research provides clear evidence (see Case
Studies) that while national laws establish some
social and environmental safeguards, they are
not always implemented by miners or effectively
enforced by governments. Illegal mining is
widespread, the right of consultation is often
violated by governments and mining companies,
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While national social and environmental
safeguards must be strengthened to meet
international standards, effective implementation
and enforcement of the existing laws would help
protect indigenous peoples and their lands from
the most harmful effects of mining. In the absence
of effective law enforcement, indigenous peoples
and their forest homes suffer. The research shows
that forest losses on indigenous lands with mining
are considerably greater than on indigenous lands
without mining (see GIS Analysis). With the loss
or degradation of forests, indigenous peoples lose
their livelihood, which has adverse impacts on their
well-being.

Today, in many places, however, local government
agencies responsible for monitoring mining,
protecting forests, and supporting indigenous
peoples are ill-equipped to ensure local and
national laws are effectively implemented and
enforced. Rather than build local capacity to
improve performance, the budgets of crucial
agencies in some countries have been slashed

and senior staff furloughed or let go. Such
actions further weaken agency capacity to ensure
compliance with mining regulations, while
emboldening those involved in illegal actions.
In addition to improving law enforcement,
Amazonian governments—and consumer country
governments—can address the demand of gold
and other minerals that are illegally mined by
establishing certification systems. Such schemes
can promote actions by miners that protect forests
and respect indigenous peoples. The efforts could
build on the successes of initiatives designed to
ensure other goods and products are responsibly
sourced, such as conflict-free diamonds, certified
wood and paper products from responsibly
managed forests, and responsible soy production.
Governments can work with public and
independent organizations to identify an
appropriate existing set of standards or establish
a new set for responsible mining in the Amazon
and build a chain of custody certification process.
In addition to the standards developed by mining
companies and mining associations (Box 6.3),
independent standards include the Fairmined
Standard (Version 2.0) of the Alliance for
Responsible Mining (for ASM) (ARM 2014), the
Standard for Responsible Mining (IRMA-STD-001)
of the Initiative for Responsible Mining Assurance
(IRMA 2018), the Environmental Management
System Standard, ISO 14001, of the International
Organization for Standardization (ISO 2015), and
the Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Supply
Chains of Minerals from Conflict-Affected and
High-Risk Areas of the Organisation for Economic
Co-operation and Development (OECD 2013).

Consumer country governments can support the
successful implementation of responsible sourcing
certification schemes (Eslava 2018). They can
implement an outreach and information campaign
designed to educate consumers on the value of
purchasing certified minerals or products that use
them. They can encourage responsible mineral
sourcing through their public procurement rules
by requiring bids to contain certified minerals
or through preferential bid evaluation. They can
require publicly traded downstream companies
to report whether they source certified minerals
in their country’s securities and exchange
commission. Consumer country governments can
also support downstream companies, especially
small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs),
which face implementation challenges, including
understanding exact requirements, costs, lack
of cooperation from suppliers, and reporting
(Eslava 2018).

The system would track certified minerals through
the extraction, processing, transformation,
manufacturing, and distribution procedures.
Independent auditors would then be in a position
to assess production and issue certificates to
mining operations that comply with the agreedupon standards.
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APPENDICES
Appendix A. Categories of Indigenous Lands in
the Amazon Based on Their Legal Status.
Table A1 | Types of Indigenous Lands Included in the Spatial Analysis per Country (Classified According to Legal Status)

AREAS OF TRADITIONAL
OCCUPATION AND USE:
OFFICIALLY RECOGNIZED

AREAS OF TRADITIONAL OCCUPATION
AND USE: NOT OFFICIALLY RECOGNIZED,
IN PROCESS OF BEING DEMARCATED, OR
WITHOUT STATUS INFORMATION

OFFICIALLY RECOGNIZED
INDIGENOUS RESERVATIONS OR
‘INTANGIBLE ZONES’

PROPOSED
INDIGENOUS
RESERVATIONS

Bolivia

Indigenous territory
(Territorio Indigena
Originario Campesino,
registered)

Request for registration or in process of
registration

N/A

N/A

Brazil

Indigenous lands
(identified, declared, or
homologated)

No data

N/A

N/A

Colombia

Indigenous reservation
(decreed)

No data

N/A

N/A

Ecuador

Community lands
(registered or decreed)

Request for registration or in process of
registration

Zone set aside for voluntarily
isolated indigenous people

Guyana

Amerindian lands
(decreed)

No data

N/A

N/A

French
Guiana

Area of collective use
right for the benefit of
local communities

No data

N/A

N/A

Peru

Native communities
(demarcated and
registered); peasant
communities

Native community in process of
registration

Indigenous reservation for
isolated indigenous people

Proposed
indigenous
reservation

Suriname

No data

Without status information

N/A

N/A

Venezuela

Indigenous lands
(demarcated community)

Areas of traditional use without
demarcation or self-demarcated territory

N/A

N/A

COUNTRY

N/A = the category is not applicable to the country.
Source: Based on data from RAISG 2019a, modified by WRI authors.
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Appendix B. Data Sets Used in the
Spatial Analysis.
Table B1 | Description of Geospatial Data Sets Used in the Spatial Analysis (Including Geographic Coverage, Source,

and Notes)

DATA SET

GEOGRAPHIC
COVERAGE

CREATOR AND
DATE OF DATA

NOTES

SOURCE

Indigenous
lands

Bolivia, Brazil,
Colombia,
Ecuador,
French Guiana,
Peru, Suriname,
Venezuela

RAISG, 2019

RAISG compiles data from multiple sources
that vary per country; see https://www3.
socioambiental.org/geo/RAISGMapaOnline/
for complete details. Lands were categorized
according to their legal recognition status (i.e.,
acknowledged by government/titled vs. not
acknowledged by government/held under
customary tenure).

Red Amazónica de Información
Socioambiental Georeferenciada
(RAISG). 2019c. Indigenous
territories data, compiled from
various sources. Available at:
https://www3.socioambiental.
org/geo/RAISGMapaOnline/.

Indigenous
lands

Guyana

Guyana Lands
and Surveys
Commission,
2018

Areas of
illegal mining

Bolivia, Brazil,
Colombia,
Ecuador, Peru,
Venezuela

RAISG, 2018

Data were available in different geospatial
formats (polygon, point, or line) that varied
by country. No data were available for French
Guiana, Guyana, or Suriname.

RAISG. 2018c. Illegal mining
data, compiled from various
sources. Available at: https://
www3.socioambiental.org/geo/
RAISGMapaOnline/.

Legal mining
concessions

Bolivia, Brazil,
Colombia,
Ecuador, Peru,
Suriname,
Venezuela

RAISG, 2018

Data are compiled from multiple sources
that vary per country; see https://www3.
socioambiental.org/geo/RAISGMapaOnline/
for complete details. Data were categorized
by status (i.e., exploration, exploitation,
under tender, open for bidding, suspended,
or cancelled) where available. No data were
available for French Guiana.

RAISG. 2018d. Mining
concessions data, compiled
from various sources.
Available at: https://www3.
socioambiental.org/geo/
RAISGMapaOnline/.

Legal mining
concessions

Guyana

Guyana Geology
and Mines
Commission,
2016

Medium-scale mineral licenses

Guyana Geology and Mines
Commission. 2016. Mediumscale mineral licenses data.

Guyana Lands and
Surveys Commission. 2018.
Amerindian Lands.
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DATA SET

GEOGRAPHIC
COVERAGE

CREATOR AND
DATE OF DATA

NOTES

SOURCE

Deforestation:
2000–05,
2005–10,
2010–15

All countries

RAISG, 2016

Satellite-derived deforestation data are
representative of tree cover loss across three
time intervals: 2000–05, 2005–10, and 2010–15.

RAISG. 2016. Deforestation
in the Amazon: 2000–2015.
Available at: https://www3.
socioambiental.org/geo/
RAISGMapaOnline/.

National
natural
protected
areas

All countries

RAISG, 2018

RAISG organizations compiled data from
multiple sources, as follows:
Bolivia (FAN): SERNAP 2015; Brazil (ISA): digitized
by ISA 2019, from official documents, based
on IBGE/DSG/MMA, 1:100,000; Colombia (FGA):
National Registry of Protected Areas 2017;
Ecuador (EcoCiencia): MAE 2018; STAGE 2018;
sustainable development program of the Yasuni
Biosphere Reserve and GIZ 2014; French Guiana
(DEAL): DEAL 2007; Guyana (collaboration
of Roxroy K. Bollers, GIS/IT Coordinator/
Iwokrama International Center for Rain Forest
Conservation and Development): Iwokrama
2012; Peru (IBC): Ministry of Environment
(MINAM)–National Service of Natural Areas
Protected by the State (SERNANP) 2018;
Suriname (ACT Suriname): World Database
Protected Areas (WDPA) 2006;
Venezuela (IVIC and Provita): Rodríguez, Jon
Paul, Sergio Zambrano-Martínez, Maria A.
Oliveira-Miranda, Rodrigo Lazo (2014); Digital
Representation of Protected Natural Areas
of Venezuela, IVIC and Total Venezuela S.A;
Provita 2015, on the revision of Decrees 1,233
(Extraordinary Official Gazette 4,250/1991), 2,987
(Extraordinary Official Gazette 2417/1979).

RAISG. 2018e. National
Natural Protected Areas data,
compiled from various sources.
Available at: https://www3.
socioambiental.org/geo/
RAISGMapaOnline/.

Sources: Based on data from RAISG 2016, 2018, 2019, Guyana Lands and Surveys Commission 2018, and Guyana Geology and Mines Commission 2016, modified by WRI authors.
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Appendix C. Indicators and Questions for the
Legal Reviews
Ownership
1.

Does the law define minerals?
a. If so, how (e.g., sand, gravel, stones, gold, gemstones, etc.)?

5. Do mineral rights prevail over customary/titled indigenous/community land rights when they overlap?
a. Can the government acquire customary or titled indigenous/
community lands in a compulsory manner (eminent domain) for
mining purposes?

b. What minerals are allowed to be extracted by law?
2. Does the law define indigenous people or/and indigenous land? If
so, how is it defined?

b. Are indigenous peoples/communities obligated to lease or
otherwise let miners use their customary or titled lands for
mining purposes?

3. Does the law define communities and community land? If so, how
is it defined?
4. Does the law allocate ownership over minerals?

c. Does the law demand compensation to be paid in favor of
indigenous peoples/communities for the acquisition/use of
their lands?

a. Who owns the country’s minerals?
i.

State

i.

ii. Landowner
iii. Indigenous peoples/communities
iv. Public resources held in trust by the government for
the people
5. Does the law recognize indigenous/community land and customary
tenure arrangements?

6. Can the government establish concession blocks and allocate
rights to minerals on/under customarily or titled indigenous/community lands?
7. Are there any conditions or restrictions placed when mining on
indigenous/community lands?

a. Does it recognize lands/natural resource rights?

a. Must miners have the approval of indigenous peoples/
communities to exercise their mineral rights on indigenous/
community lands?

b. Must customary rights be formally registered and documented
with the government to be recognized?

b. Must miners have to pay indigenous peoples/communities to
exercise their mineral rights on indigenous/community lands?

c. What is the bundle of rights with different types of legal
recognition/titles (e.g., withdrawal, management, exclusion,
alienation, and access rights)?

c. Must miners have to pay the government to exercise their
mineral rights on indigenous/community lands?

d. What rights does the state retain over indigenous/
community lands?

d. If so, is there any legal provision that states how this amount
should be distributed to indigenous peoples/communities?

Allocation
1.

e. Are indigenous peoples/communities legally entitled to any
benefits from mining on their customary or titled lands (e.g.,
corporate social responsibility [building of schools, medical
centers, etc.], share of profits, co-ownership of operations, etc.)?

Does the law recognize rights over minerals in favor of indigenous
peoples/communities on or under their customarily held/titled
lands?

2. Are the indigenous peoples/communities eligible to acquire mineral
rights for subsistence and/or commercial purposes?
3. Do indigenous peoples/communities have the right of first refusal to
exploit minerals on/under their customary or titled lands when the
government makes them available for extraction?
4. Is there any established procedure to acquire mineral rights
for all interested parties (including indigenous peoples/
communities)?
a. Which mechanisms are used by the government to regulate/
govern minerals and their extraction/use (e.g., industrial concessions, licenses, etc.)?

How is it calculated (e.g., government appraisal, market
rate, etc.)?

Information, consultation, and consent
1.

Must the government inform and/or consult indigenous peoples/
communities on the requests for allocating mineral rights on their
customary or titled lands?
a. Must the government/mining company engage indigenous
peoples/communities in negotiating the mining concession
agreement, contract, or license?

2. Do indigenous peoples/communities have the right of free,
prior, and informed consent over the establishment of concession
blocks and/or the allocation of mineral rights on their customary
or titled lands?
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Protection
1.

Are there any indigenous/community lands where mining is
prohibited or limited (e.g., cropped lands, sacred groves, protected
areas, etc.)?

2. Is the government legally responsible for monitoring company
performance on customary or titled indigenous/community lands?
a. What is the basis for government monitoring?
b. Are there any legal consequences of noncompliance (e.g.,
revocation, fines, etc.)?
3. Is the mining company/miner legally responsible for any damage
caused by their operations on customary/titled lands of indigenous
peoples/communities?
a. Must they pay the indigenous peoples/communities for
any damages?

Appendix D. List of International Treaties and
National Laws and Regulations Reviewed
International treaties
▪

International Labour Organization, Indigenous and Tribal Peoples
Convention (ILO Convention 169), June 27, 1989.

▪

The United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples,
United Nations (UNDRIP), September 13, 2007.

Bolivia
Political Constitution of the Plurinational State of Bolivia, 2007
Laws and Legislative Decrees:
▪

Ley Nº 969, Ley de Protección, Desarrollo Integral y Sustentable del
Territorio Indígena y Parque Nacional Isiboro Sécure–Tipnis [Law of
Protection and Sustainable Development of Tipnis], August 13, 2017.

▪

Ley Nº 535, Ley de Minería y Metalurgia [Mining Law], May 19, 2014.

c. Is there any legal obligation to adopt rehabilitation (when restoration is possible) and/or compensation (in case of irreversible
damages) measures on customary/titled lands?

▪

Ley Nº 450, Ley de Protección a Naciones y Pueblos Indígena
Originarios en Situación de Alta Vulnerabilidad [Law on Protection
of Indigenous Peoples of High Vulnerability], December 4, 2013.

d. Are there any consequences of noncompliance with the
(rehabilitation/compensation) measures ordered by the government; for instance, revoking the mineral rights or applying fines
to the company?

▪

Ley Nº 300, Ley Marco de la Madre Tierra y Desarrollo Integral para
Vivir Bien [Law of Mother Earth], October 15, 2012.

▪

Decisión Andina Nº 774, Política Andina de Lucha contra la Minería
Ilegal [Andean Decision Nº 774], July 30, 2012.

▪

Ley Nº 180, Ley de Protección del Territorio Indígena y Parque Nacional Isiboro Sécure–Tipnis [Law of Tipnis], October 24, 2011.

▪

Ley Nº 112, Aprueba el Contrato de Colaboración Financiera N°
10219991 suscrito entre el Estado Plurinacional de Bolivia y el Banco
Nacional de Desenvolvimiento Económico e Social–BNDES de la
República Federal del Brasil (Approves the Collaboration Contract
between Bolivia and BNDES), May 7, 2011.

▪

Ley Nº 1333, Ley de Medio Ambiente [Environmental Law],
April 27, 1992.

▪

Ley Nº 1257, que aprueba y ratifica el Convenio 169 sobre Pueblos
Indígenas y Tribales en Países Independientes, aprobado en la 76a
Conferencia de la Organización Internacional del Trabajo realizada
el 27 de junio de 1989 [Law 1257 That Approves the ILO Convention
169], July 11, 1991.

▪

Decreto Ley Nº 07401, Declara "Parque Nacional del Isiboro y Sécure"
[Law of the Isiboro and Sécure Park], November 22, 1965.

b. Must they pay the government for any damages? If so, must the
government pay (or compensate in any way) the indigenous
peoples/communities?

i.

If so, what happens if the miner/mining company continues
with its operations? Is the government allowed to evict or
halt mining operations?

4. Do indigenous peoples/communities have authorities over legally
sanctioned miners/mining operations on their customary or titled
lands (e.g., evicting miners or halting mining operations if they take
illegal actions or act in ways not consistent with their concession/
license or any agreement/contract with the community)?
5. Do legally sanctioned miners/mining operations (mobilized by the
government) have authorities over customary or titled indigenous/
community lands to exercise their mineral rights (e.g., entering onto
and using indigenous/community lands)?
6. Does the government have the authority to remove illegal miners
from indigenous peoples/community lands?
a. Does it have the authority to monitor, capture, detain, or
punish illegal miners operating on indigenous peoples/
community lands?
b. Does it have the authority to take possession of their equipment
and keep or destroy any confiscated minerals?
7. Do indigenous peoples/communities have the authority to remove
illegal miners from their customary or titled lands?
a. Do they have the authority to monitor, capture, detain, or punish
illegal miners operating on their customary or titled lands?
b. Do they have the authority to take possession of their equipment and keep any confiscated minerals?
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Decrees/Regulations:
▪

Resolución Ministerial Nº 023/2015, Reglamento de Otorgación
de y Extinción de Derechos Mineros [Regulation of Granting and
Extinction of Mining Rights], January 30, 2015.

▪

Decreto Supremo Nº 24782, Reglamento Ambiental para
Actividades Mineras [Environmental Regulation for Mining Activities], July 31, 1997.

▪

Decreto Supremo Nº 22610 [Regulation of Law of the Isiboro and
Sécure Park], September 24, 1990.

Brazil
Constitution of the Federative Republic of Brazil, 1988

Court decisions and legal opinions:

Laws and Legislative Decrees:

▪

Processo Nº 1000580-84.2019.4.01.3200, 1a Vara Federal Cível da
Seção Judiciária do Estado do Amazonas, Ministerio Publico Federal
[Process Nº 1000580], August 2, 2019.

▪

Parecer Nº 001/2017/GAB/CGU/AGU, Advocacia-Geral da União–AGU
[Legal Opinion Nº 01/2017], July 19, 2017. https://www.conjur.com.br/
dl/parecer-agu-raposa-serra-sol.pdf.

▪

Parecer Nº 469/2015/HP/PROGE/DNPM, Agência Nacional de Mineração–ANM (before, Departamento Nacional de Produção Mineral,
DNPM) [Legal Opinion Nº 469/2015], December 4, 2015.

▪

Petição Nº 3.388 Roraima, Supremo Tribunal Federal [Petition Nº
3388 ED/RR], October 23, 2013.

▪

Lei Nº 13.575, de 26 de Dezembro de 2017, Cria a Agência Nacional de
Mineração (ANM); extingue o Departamento Nacional de Produção
Mineral (DNPM); altera as Leis n º 11.046, de 27 de dezembro de
2004, e 10.826, de 22 de dezembro de 2003; e revoga a Lei nº 8.876,
de 2 de maio de 1994, e dispositivos do Decreto-Lei nº 227, de 28
de fevereiro de 1967 (Código de Mineração) [Law That Creates the
National Mining Agency], December 26, 2017.

▪

Decreto Legislativo Nº 143, de 2002, Aprova o texto da Convenção
nº 169 da Organização Internacional do Trabalho sobre os povos
indígenas e tribais em países independentes [Law That Approves
the ILO Convention 169], June 20, 2002.

▪

Lei Nº 10.406, de 10 de Janeiro de 2002, Institui o Código Civil [Civil
Code], January 10, 2002.

▪

Lei Nº 9.605, de 12 de Fevereiro de 1998, Dispõe sobre as Sanções
Penais e Administrativas Derivadas de Condutas e Atividades
Lesivas ao Meio Ambiente, e dá outras Providências [Environmental
Crimes Law], February 12, 1998.

▪

Lei Nº 6.001 de 19 de Dezembro de 1973, Dispõe sobre o Estatuto do
Índio [Indian Statute], December 19, 1973.

Bills:
▪

Projeto de Lei Nº 191/2020, Regulamenta o § 1º do art. 176 e o § 3º do
art. 231 da Constituição para Estabelecer as Condições Específicas
para a Realização da Pesquisa e da Lavra de Recursos Minerais e
Hidrocarbonetos e para o Aproveitamento de Recursos Hídricos
para Geração de Energia Elétrica em Terras Indígenas e Institui a
Indenização pela Restrição do Usufruto de Terras Indígenas [Bill
191/2020], February 6, 2020.

▪

Projeto de Lei Nº 1610/1996, Dispõe sobre a Exploração e o Aproveitamento de Recursos Minerais em Terras Indígenas, de que tratam
os arts. 176, parágrafo 1º, e 231, parágrafo 3º, da Constituição Federal
[Bill 1610/1996], March 11, 1996.

Decrees/Regulations:
▪

▪

Decreto Nº 9.406, de 12 de Junho de 2018, Regulamenta o Decreto-Lei nº 227, de 28 de fevereiro de 1967, a Lei nº 6.567, de 24 de
setembro de 1978, a Lei nº 7.805, de 18 de julho de 1989, e a Lei nº
13.575, de 26 de dezembro de 2017 [Regulation of the Mining Code],
June 12, 2018.
Portaria Interministerial Nº 60, Estabelece Procedimentos Administrativos que Disciplinam a Atuação dos Órgãos e Entidades da
Administração Pública Federal em Processos de Licenciamento
Ambiental de Competência do Instituto Brasileiro do Meio Ambiente
e dos Recursos Naturais Renováveis–Ibama [Ordinance on Procedures for Environmental Licensing Processes], March 24, 2015.

▪

Resolução CONAMA Nº 237, de 19 de Dezembro de 1997, Dispõe
sobre a Revisão e Complementação dos Procedimentos e Critérios
Utilizados para o Licenciamento Ambiental [Procedures and Criteria
Used for Environmental Licensing], December 19, 1997.

▪

Decreto Nº 1.775/96, de 8 de Janeiro de 1996, Dispõe sobre o Procedimento Administrativo de Demarcação das Terras Indígenas e
dá outras Providências [Law of the Indigenous Lands Demarcation],
January 8, 1996.

▪

▪

Decreto de 25 de Maio de 1992, Homologa a demarcação administrativa da Terra Indígena YANOMAMI, nos Estados de Roraima e
Amazonas [Decree That Approves the Demarcation of the Yanomami
Indigenous Land], May 25, 1992.
Resolução CONAMA Nº 1, de 23 de Janeiro de 1986, Dispõe sobre
Critérios Básicos e Diretrizes Gerais para a Avaliação de Impacto
Ambiental [Guidelines for Environmental Impact Assessment],
January 23, 1986.

Colombia
Constitution, 1991
Laws and Legislative Decrees:
▪

Ley Nº 1955, Por el cual se expide el Plan Nacional de Desarrollo
2018-202 [National Development Plan (2018–2022) Law (Law 1955 of
2019)], May 25, 2019.

▪

Decisión Andina Nº 774, Política Andina de Lucha contra la Minería
Ilegal [Andean Decision Nº 774], July 30, 2012.

▪

Ley Nº 1333 de 2009, por la cual se establece el procedimiento
sancionatorio ambiental y se dictan otras disposiciones [Law 1333,
environmental sanctioning procedure], July 21, 2009.

▪

Ley Nº 685 de 2001, Código de Minas [Mining Code], August 15, 2001.

▪

Código Penal [Criminal Code], July 24, 2000.

▪

Ley Nº 70 de 1993, por la cual se desarrolla el artículo transitorio 55
de la Constitución Política [Law 70, about Afro-Colombian peoples],
August 27, 1993.

▪

Ley Nº 21 de 1991, por medio de la cual se aprueba el Convenio
número 169 sobre pueblos indígenas y tribales en países independientes, adoptado por la 76a. reunión de la Conferencia General de
la O.I.T., Ginebra 1989 [Law That Approves the ILO Convention 169],
March 4, 1991.
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Decrees/Regulations:

Court decisions:

▪

Decreto Nº 1666 de 2016, Por el cual se adiciona el Decreto Único
Reglamentario del Sector Administrativo de Minas y Energía, 1073
de 2015, relacionado con la clasificación minera [Decree on Mining
Classification], October 21, 2016.

▪

Sentencia Nº T-005/16, Corte Constitucional [Decision Nº T-005/16],
January 19, 2016.

▪

▪

Decreto Nº 1073 de 2015, Por medio del cual se expide el Decreto
Único Reglamentario del Sector Administrativo de Minas y Energía
[Decree of the Administrative Sector of Mines], May 26, 2015.

Sentencia Nº T-384A/14, Corte Constitucional [Decision Nº
T-384A/14], June 17, 2014.

▪

Sentencia Nº T-387/13, Corte Constitucional [Decision Nº T-387/13],
June 28, 2013.

▪

Decreto Nº 1353 de 2014, Por el cual se crea un régimen especial con
el fin de poner en funcionamiento los Territorios Indígenas respecto
de la administración de los sistemas propios de los pueblos indígenas hasta que el Congreso expida la ley de que trata el artículo
329 de la Constitución Política [Special Regime for Indigenous
Territories], October 7, 2014.

▪

Sentencia Nº T-129/11, Corte Constitucional [Decision Nº T-129/11],
March 3, 2011.

▪

▪

▪

▪

▪

▪

▪
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Resolución Nº 396 de 2013, por medio de la cual se establece
el Procedimiento para la Radicación de Solicitudes Mineras en
Ejercicio del Derecho de Prelación consagrado en los Artículos 124 y
133 del Código de Minas [Procedure for Exercising the Right of First
Refusal], June 14, 2013.
Decreto Nº 2235 de 2012, por el cual se reglamentan el artículo
6° de la Decisión número 774 del 30 de julio de 2012 de la Comunidad Andina de Naciones y el artículo 106 de la Ley 1450 de 2011
en relación con el uso de maquinaria pesada y sus partes en
actividades mineras sin las autorizaciones y exigencias previstas en
la ley [Decree on the Use of Heavy Machinery in Mining Activities],
October 29, 2012.
Decreto Nº 1320 de 1998, por el cual se reglamenta la consulta
previa con las comunidades indígenas y negras para la explotación
de los recursos naturales dentro de su territorio [Decree on Prior
Consultation], July 13, 1998.
Decreto Nº 2164 de 1995, Por el cual se reglamenta parcialmente
el Capítulo XIV de la Ley 160 de 1994 en lo relacionado con la
dotación y titulación de tierras a las comunidades indígenas para
la constitución, reestructuración, ampliación y saneamiento de los
Resguardos Indígenas en el territorio nacional [Regulation on Titling
of Indigenous Peoples’ Lands], December 7, 1995.
Decreto Nº 1745 de 1995, por el cual se reglamenta el Capítulo III
de la Ley 70 de 1993, se adopta el procedimiento para el reconocimiento del derecho a la propiedad colectiva de las “Tierras de las
Comunidades Negras” y “se dictan otras disposiciones” [Decree on
the Procedure for the Recognition of the Right to Collective Property
of Afro-Colombians], October 12, 1995.
Decreto Nº 1088 de 1993, Por el cual se regula la creación de las
asociaciones de Cabildos y/o Autoridades Tradicionales Indígenas
[Decree 1088 of 1993], June 11, 1993.
Resolución Nº 035 de 1988, Por la cual se constituye como Resguardo Indígena Yaigojé-Río Apaporis en favor de las Comunidades Tanimuca, Yucuna, Barasano, Letuama, Matapí, Macuna y Macú un globo
de terreno baldío situado en ambas márgenes de los Ríos Popeyacá
y Apaporis, en jurisdicción de los Corregimientos Comisariales de
Mirití—Paraná y Pacoa, Municipios de Leticia y Mitú, Comisarias de
Amazonas y Vaupés, respectivamente [Resolution 035 of 1988], April
23, 1988.

Ecuador
Constitution of the Republic of Ecuador, 2008
▪

Decisión Andina Nº 774, Política Andina de Lucha contra la Minería
Ilegal [Andean Decision Nº 774], July 30, 2012.

▪

Ley Nº 45, Ley de Minería [Mining Law], January 29, 2009.

▪

Ley Nº 86, Ley Orgánica de las Instituciones Públicas de Pueblos
Indígenas del Ecuador que se autodefinen como Nacionalidades de
Raíces Ancestrales [Law of Indigenous Peoples’ Public Institutions],
September 11, 2007.

Decrees/Regulations:
▪

Resolución Nº 043-DIRARCOM-2015, que Sustituye Íntegramente el
Instructivo para la Constitución de Servidumbres contenido en la
Resolución Nº. 003-INS-DIR-ARCOM-2011 de fecha 21 de Septiembre
de 2011 [Rules for the Establishment of Mining Easements], August
13, 2015.

▪

Decreto Ejecutivo Nº 119, Reglamento de la Ley de Minería [Regulation of the Mining Law], November 16, 2009.

Court decisions:
▪

Judgment of June 27, 2012, Case of the Kichwa Indigenous People of
Sarayaku v. Ecuador, Inter-American Commission on Human Rights
(IACHR) [Case of the Kichwa Indigenous People of Sarayaku v.
Ecuador], June 27, 2012.

▪

Sentencia Nº 001-10-SIN-CC, Corte Constitucional [Decision Nº
001-10-SIN-CC], March 18, 2010.

Guyana
Constitution of the Co-operative Republic of Guyana, 1980
▪

Protected Areas Act, No. 14, 2011

▪

Forests Act (Cap. 67:01), 2009

▪

Amerindian Act (Cap. 29:01), 2006

▪

Environmental Protection Act, 1996

▪

Mining Act (Cap. 65:01), 1989

▪

Land Registry Act (Cap. 5:02), 1959

▪

State Lands Regulations, 1919

▪

State Lands Act (Cap. 62:01), 1903

Peru
Political Constitution of Peru, 1993

▪

Decreto Supremo Nº 002-2016-VIVIENDA, Decreto Supremo que
aprueba el Reglamento del Capítulo I del Título IV de la Ley Nº 30327,
Ley de Promoción de las Inversiones para el Crecimiento Económico
y el Desarrollo Sostenible [Regulation of the Investment Promotion
Law for Economic Growth and Sustainable Development], January
22, 2016.

Laws and Legislative Decrees:
▪

Decisión Andina Nº 774, Política Andina de Lucha contra la Minería
Ilegal [Andean Decision Nº 774], July 30, 2012.

▪

Ley Nº 29785, Ley del derecho a la consulta previa a los pueblos
indígenas u originarios, reconocido en el Convenio 169 de la Organización Internacional del Trabajo (OIT) [Law on the Right to Prior
Consultation of Indigenous Peoples], September 7, 2011.

▪

Decreto Supremo Nº 001-2015-EM, Aprueban disposiciones para
procedimientos mineros que impulsen proyectos de inversión [Regulations for Mining Procedures That Promote Investment Projects],
January 6, 2015.

▪

Ley Nº 28736, Ley para la protección de pueblos indígenas u
originarios en situación de aislamiento y en situación de contacto
inicial [Law of Indigenous or Native Peoples in Isolation Situation
and Initial Contact Situation], May 18, 2006.

▪

Decreto Supremo Nº 017-96-AG, Aprueban el Reglamento del
Artículo 7 de la Ley Nº 26505, referido a las servidumbres sobre
tierras para el ejercicio de actividades mineras o de hidrocarburos
[Regulation on Easements for Mining Activities], October 19, 1996.

▪

Ley Nº 27811, Ley que establece el régimen de protección de los
conocimientos colectivos de los Pueblos Indígenas vinculados a los
Recursos Biológicos [Law for the Protection of the Collective Knowledge of Indigenous Peoples Associated with Biological Resources],
August 10, 2002.

▪

Decreto Supremo Nº 03-94-EM, Aprueban el Reglamento de diversos Títulos del Texto Único Ordenado de la Ley General de Minería
[Regulation of the Mining Law], January 15, 1994.

▪

Decreto Supremo Nº 18-92-EM, Aprueban el Reglamento de
Procedimientos Mineros [Mining Procedures Regulation],
September 8, 1992.

▪

Decreto Supremo Nº 014-92-EM, Texto Único Ordenado de la Ley
General de Minería [Mining Law Decree], June 4, 1992.

▪

Ley Nº 26505, Ley de la inversión privada en el desarrollo de las
actividades económicas en las tierras del territorio nacional y de
las comunidades campesinas y nativas [Law of the Development
of Economic Activities in the Lands of the National Territory and
Peasant and Native Communities], July 18, 1995.

▪

Ley Nº 24656, Ley General de Comunidades Campesinas [Peasant
Communities Law], April 14, 1987.

▪

Decreto Legislativo Nº 109, Ley General de Minería [Mining Law],
June 13, 1981.

▪

Decreto Ley Nº 22175, Ley de Comunidades Nativas y de Desarrollo
Agrario de la Selva y Ceja de Selva [Native Communities Law], May
10, 1978.

Supreme Decrees/Regulations:
▪

▪

▪

Decreto Supremo N° 042-2017-EM, Reglamento de Protección Ambiental para las Actividades de Exploración Minera [Environmental
Protection Regulations for Mining Exploration Activities], December
22, 2017.
Decreto Supremo N° 040-2014-EM, Reglamento de Protección y
Gestión Ambiental para las Actividades de Explotación, Beneficio,
Labor General, Transporte y Almacenamiento Minero [Regulation
of Protection and Environmental Management for Exploitation
Activities], November 12, 2014.

Court decisions:
▪

Resolución Nº 28, Expediente Nº 00675-2017-0-2701-JM-CI-01, Corte
Superior de Justicia de Madre de Dios [Resolution Nº 28], February
27, 2019.

▪

Resolución Nº 20, Expediente Nº 00675-2017-0-2701-JM-CI-01, Corte
Superior de Justicia de Madre de Dios [Resolution Nº 20], December
11, 2018.

▪

Resolución Nº 38/17, Inter-American Commission on Human Rights
(IACHR) [Resolution Nº 38/17], September 8, 2017.

▪

Expediente Nº 01126-2011-HC/TC, Tribunal Constitucional [Dossier Nº
01126-2011-HC/TC], September 11, 2012.

▪

Expediente Nº 00025-2009-PI/TC, Tribunal Constitucional [Dossier
Nº 00025-2009-PI/TC], March 17, 2011.

▪

Expediente Nº 05427-2009-PC/TC, Tribunal Constitucional [Dossier
Nº 05427-2009-PC/TC], June 30, 2010.

▪

Expediente Nº 0022-2009-PI/TC, Tribunal Constitucional [Dossier Nº
0022-2009-PI/TC], June 9, 2010.

Decreto Supremo Nº 001-2012-MC, Reglamento de la Ley Nº 29785,
Ley del Derecho a la Consulta Previa a los Pueblos Indígenas u
Originarios reconocido en el Convenio 169 de la Organización
Internacional del Trabajo (OIT) [Regulation of the Law on the Right
to Prior Consultation], April 3, 2012.
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ENDNOTES
1.

Revenue, including foreign exchange, is generated from royalties,
taxes, fees, fines, and other sources.

2. Commercial-scale mining has an employment multiplier effect from
two to five, including indirect jobs that support mining, and induced
jobs that are a result of direct and indirect employees spending
money in the community (Walser 2002).
3. The comparative importance of mining and contribution to the
world’s GDP during the last century shows an increase by a factor of
27 in ores and minerals production, and by a factor of eight in total
materials extraction, while GDP rose 23-fold (Carvalho 2017).
4. Peru’s Fiscal Stabilization Fund was created in 1999 to give the
government spending capacity in the face of emergencies (Salas et
al. 2018).
5. Dredging involves the extraction of gold or other minerals from sand,
gravel, and dirt on the bottom of streams, rivers, and other water
bodies.
6. More than 1,000 murders have been recorded by Global Witness
since 2010. UN Rapporteurs and regional human rights bodies,
including the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR),
have also documented a distinct surge of instances of physical violence and criminalization of defenders, especially indigenous people.
Moreover, the level of impunity is high for killings, with only 34 perpetrators charged, and just 10 convicted, of the 908 recorded killings
between 2002 and 2013 (Global Witness 2014). Nearly all the known
killings occurred in the context of large infrastructure developments,
extractive industries, and other environmentally destructive projects.
7.

In 2017, mining conflicts accounted for 36 killings (Global Witness
2018; Watts 2018).

12. The Amazon River is about 640 km long (second in length to the Nile
River) and the world’s largest in terms of discharge of water—about
6,591 cubic km of water per year.
13. Afro-descendants can be found in several Amazonian countries,
including Brazil and Colombia. In Brazil, there are 2,962 quilombolas
(Afro-Brazilian communities) with a total population of some 16
million people. Just 219 quilombolas have land titles, while 1,673 are
pursuing the process of acquiring legal title. Titled quilombola territories include 767,596 ha (1.9 million acres); these settlements have
a good record of protecting their forests (Branford and Torres 2018a).
They claim, however, more than 20 million ha (Mongabay 2018).
14. Prior to 2000, forest loss was partly due to agrarian reforms by
governments in each of the countries. In the 1990s and onwards
governments began implementing environmental protection legislation as part of the general awareness raised about the impacts
on environment (e.g., Rio Summit) and the need to take care of the
environment for sustainability and for future generations.
15. From 27,772 sq. km/year to 4,571 sq. km/year.
16. The states of Pará, Mato Grosso, and Rondônia in Brazil accounted for
nearly three quarters of deforestation—they are also major agricultural commodity producers (Weisse and Goldman 2019).
17. Almost half of the increase in deforestation in Colombia occurred in
three regions–Meta, Guaviare, and Caquetá—with new hot spots of
loss in previously untouched areas, including indigenous territories
(Jong 2018; Weisse and Goldman 2019).

8. The Amazon River basin is the portion of land drained by the
Amazon River and its many tributaries.

18. Together, the forests in South America, Africa, and Asia are now a net
source of atmospheric carbon dioxide (Baccini et al. 2017).

9. For RAISG, the total area of the Amazon—7.8 million sq. km (calculated by GIS)—refers to the biogeographical boundary in Colombia and
Venezuela; the Amazon basin boundary in Peru, Bolivia, Ecuador;
the regional boundary (referred to as the Legal Amazon region) and
the Amazon watershed in Brazil; and the entire countries of Guyana,
French Guiana, and Suriname (RAISG 2019a).

19. Although market-oriented cattle production has expanded rapidly
during the past decade, across much of the Amazon, a principal
objective for cattle ranching is to establish land claims rather
than produce beef or leather. In Brazil, 60 percent to 80 percent of
cleared land ends up as pasture, most of which has low productivity,
supporting less than one head per hectare (GFW 2020a; Barbosa
2019). In 2018, Brazil was the world’s top exporter of beef, accounting
for around one-fifth of total exports, even though nearly 80 percent
of production is for domestic consumption (GFW 2020a). Beginning
in the early 1990s, industrial agricultural production, especially
soybean farms, resulted in significant land use changes and loss of
forest. In 2006, however, the Brazilian soybean industry established a
moratorium on new forest clearing for soy.

10. The Amazon forest is Earth’s most biodiverse tract of tropical rainforest, with an estimated 16,000 tree species and 390 billion individual
trees. At least 2.5 million insect species, 40,000 plant species, 2,200
fishes, 1,294 birds, 427 mammals, 428 amphibians, and 378 reptiles
have been scientifically classified in the region. About 20 percent of
the world’s bird and fish species are found in the Amazon (Da Silva et
al. 2005).
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11. Amazonian forest is estimated to have accumulated 0.62 ± 0.37
tonnes of carbon per hectare per year between 1975 and 1996 (Tian
et al. 2000).
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20. Research shows that forests that have been selectively logged are
eight times more likely to be settled and cleared by shifting cultivators than untouched forests because of access granted by logging
roads (Butler 2019b).
21. RAISG identifies 327 oil or gas blocks available for bidding or under
exploration across the basin (covering some 1.08 million sq. km).
22. As well as oil and natural gas extraction.
23. The remote southern Peruvian Amazon was made accessible by the
completion of the Inter-Oceanic Highway connecting Peru and Brazil.
24. French Guiana, Suriname, and Venezuela were not included in this
study largely because of the paucity of spatial data for GIS analysis
on indigenous lands (Suriname), industrial concessions (Venezuela),
and illegal mining sites (French Guiana and Suriname), as well as the
difficulty of acquiring relevant national laws, regulations, and court
rulings (French Guiana and Venezuela). More than 90 percent of the
land in French Guiana and Suriname is forest, but these areas constitute only small portions of the Amazon (1 percent and 1.7 percent,
respectively) and the Amazon population (0.5 percent and 1.1 percent,
respectively). Venezuela includes 5.5 percent of the Amazon and 5
percent of the Amazon population.
25. Like minerals, the Amazon holds large reserves of oil and natural
gas, and concessions for oil and gas exploration and extraction are
proliferating across Amazon countries, especially in western Amazon.
A vast extent of the Colombian, Peruvian, Ecuadorian, Bolivian, and
Brazilian Amazon is under concession for oil and gas exploration
and production. In 2012, more than 100 million ha of the Amazon
were under concession for exploration and extraction of hydrocarbons, with Peru having the largest number of potential oil zones,
covering 659,937 sq. km or 84 percent of the Peruvian Amazon
(RAISG 2012). Colombia (193,414 sq. km–40 percent of the Colombian
Amazon), Brazil (127,862 sq. km–21 percent), and Bolivia (73,215 sq.
km–15 percent) follow (RAISG 2012). Moreover, the vast majority
of planned drilling wells, production platforms, and pipeline routes
overlap with indigenous territories, protected areas, and other
critical/sensitive areas.
26. Established in 2007, RAISG is a network of eight civil society
organizations from six Amazonian countries (Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia,
Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela) with extensive work experience with
the Amazon and its indigenous peoples. The organizations include:
Friends of Nature Foundation (Fundación Amigos de la Naturaleza,
FAN, Bolivia), Institute for the Common Good (Instituto del Bien
Común, IBC, Peru), Gaia Amazonas Foundation (Fundación Gaia
Amazonas, FGA, Colombia), Ecuadorian Foundation for Ecological
Studies (Fundación Ecuatoriana de Estudios Ecológicos, EcoCiencia, Ecuador), Provita (Provita, Venezuela), Wataniba (Wataniba,
Venezuela), Amazon Institute of People and Environment (Instituto
de Hombre y Medio Ambiente de la Amazonía, Imazon, Brazil), and
Socio-environmental Institute (Instituto Socioambiental, ISA, Brazil).
RAISG produces and disseminates knowledge, statistical data, and
geospatial information on Amazonia.

27. There is no legal (industrial and ASM) or illegal mining data for
French Guiana, and, for Suriname, there is no reliable indigenous
land boundary data and no data on ASM and illegal mining.
28. Approximately 16,000 sq. km of mining concessions were classified
as “no information,” which represents about 1 percent of the total area
of mining concessions.
29. RAISG, using a definition of the Amazon larger than the biogeographic region, calculates that mining blocks cover 1.68 million sq. km of
the Amazon. In Brazil, mining leases, concessions, and exploration
permits cover 1.33 million sq. km—79 percent of all mining concessions in the Amazon basin (CITE).
30. The equation is: Percent forest loss inside indigenous lands
2000–2015 = (Area of forest loss 2000–2015 inside indigenous lands)
/ (Area of forest cover inside indigenous lands in 2000).
31. Sustainable Development Goal 16 is to “promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, provide access to justice
for all and build effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all
levels.” Target 16.1 is to “significantly reduce all forms of violence and
related death rates everywhere” (UN 2019).
32. The Regional Agreement on Access to Information, Public Participation and Justice in Environmental Matters in Latin America and the
Caribbean, which was adopted on March 4, 2018, in Escazú, Costa
Rica. Also known as the Escazú Agreement, this binding instrument
obligates governments to, among other matters, act to prevent
attacks against defenders and address impunity. To date, of the nine
Amazonian countries, Bolivia, Brazil, Ecuador, Guyana and Peru have
signed the agreement, but only Guyana has ratified it. Suriname, Venezuela, and French Guiana have not signed the Escazú Agreement.
It needs to be ratified by 11 states to enter into force, so, given that it
has eight ratifications so far, it is not yet in force.
33. Venezuela has ratified ILO Convention 169, while Suriname and
French Guiana have not.
34. Case of the Saramaka People v. Suriname 2007; case of the Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay 2006 (Notess et al. 2018).
35. Simple translation of "La protección a la propiedad colectiva y al
territorio ancestral se derivan de la relación espiritual y ancestral
que existe con la tierra, por ser el lugar donde desarrollan sus
actividades culturales, religiosas y económicas de acuerdo con sus
tradiciones y costumbres, de modo que el concepto va más allá del
título de propiedad, y en ese orden de ideas, es deber del Estado
proteger a las comunidades indígenas frente a las perturbaciones
que puedan sufrir en el ejercicio de sus actividades en lo que han
considerado su territorio ancestral, y adoptar todas las medidas
pertinentes para evitar que conductas de particulares puedan afectar sus derechos, siendo el mecanismo idóneo la consulta previa”
(Decision Nº T-005/16, 2016).
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36. Simple translation of "la Asamblea Nacional Constituyente en la
ponencia sobre 'Los Derechos de los Grupos Étnicos' al enunciar
los derechos fundamentales étnicos, resaltó la importancia del
derecho al territorio, al afirmar que sin este, las garantías superiores
a la identidad cultural y la autonomía son un formalismo, ya que
las comunidades indígenas necesitan el territorio en el cual se han
asentado, para desarrollar su cultura" (Decision Nº T-005/16, 2016).
37. Simple translation of "La diferencia entre el concepto de tierra y territorio radica en que el primero se encuentra dentro de una dimensión
civil o patrimonial, mientras que el segundo tiene una vocación
política de autogobierno y autonomía. Así, esta dimensión política
del término territorio se ajusta a la realidad de los pueblos indígenas,
que descienden de las poblaciones que habitaban lo que ahora es
el territorio de la República del Perú. Pero que, no obstante, luego
de haber sido víctimas de conquista y colonización, mantienen sus
instituciones sociales, económicas, culturales y políticas, o partes de
ellas" (Dossier Nº 01126-2011-HC/TC, 2012).

44. Article 122 of the Mining Code provides, “Based on technical and
social studies, the mining authority shall designate and delimit
indigenous mining areas within indigenous territories, in which the
exploration and exploitation of mining soil and subsoil shall comply
with the special provisions on protection and participation of indigenous peoples and groups settled in these territories.”

38. An instrument that constitutes legal evidence of ownership rights of
property (Notess et al. 2018).

46. Ecuador is the first country to recognize rights of nature in its constitution. It provides that nature in all its life forms has the right to exist,
persist, maintain, and regenerate its vital cycles.

39. The procedure for establishing an indigenous reserve varies by
country. For example, in Brazil, the demarcation process of an indigenous reserve is the responsibility of FUNAI, although final approval is
issued by the president, after which it is officially registered.
40. Indigenous reserves are the collective property of indigenous
communities constituted in favor of them (Articles 63 and 329,
Constitution of Colombia). They are inalienable, imprescriptible, and
unattachable. Indigenous reserves are a legal and socio-political
institution of a special nature, made up of one or more indigenous
communities. With a collective property title that provides private
property guarantees, these communities possess their territory,
and through an autonomous organization protected by indigenous
jurisdiction and its own regulatory system, they are able to govern
and manage their lands and internal life (Article 21, Regulation on
Titling of Indigenous Peoples’ Lands, 1995).
41. Simple translation of: "Artículo 2. (DOMINIO Y DERECHO PROPIETARIO
DEL PUEBLO BOLIVIANO) I. Los recursos minerales, cualquiera sea
su origen o forma de presentación existentes en el suelo y subsuelo
del territorio del Estado Plurinacional de Bolivia, son de propiedad y
dominio directo, indivisible e imprescriptible del pueblo boliviano; su
administración corresponde al Estado con sujeción a lo previsto en
la presente Ley (…).”
42. “In any case, mining cannot be confused as an economic activity
with those traditional forms of extractivism, practiced immemorially,
in which the collection constitutes a cultural expression or an element of the way of life of certain indigenous communities" (Petition
Nº 3388 ED/RR, 2013).
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43. In the case of exploitation projects with significant negative environmental impacts, the environment authority, National Service of
Environmental Certification for Sustainable Investments (SENACE),
approves environmental certifications. However, for exploitation
projects with moderate negative environmental impacts and exploration projects of medium and large-scale mining, the environmental
certification is approved by the General Directorate for Environmental
Affairs (Dirección General de Asuntos Ambientales—DGAAM) at the
Ministry of Energy and Mines.
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45. Bolivia’s constitution also recognizes the right of consultation.

47. This case is notable partly because it is the first case in which the
IACHR conducted an on-site visit.
48. Further, the IACHR noted: “This case concerns the State’s alleged
lack of judicial protection, failure to observe judicial guarantees, and
limits of rights to freedom of movement and to cultural expression
of the indigenous population” (Judgment of the Case of the Kichwa
Indigenous People of Sarayaku v. Ecuador, IACHR).
49. According to title of June 2009 (SERNAP 2019).
50. The march also paved the way for Eva Morales, an indigenous leader,
to be elected president in 2006.
51. Through Law Nº 112, the government approved the Financial Collaboration Contract Nº 10219991 signed between Bolivia and Brazil’s
BNDES on February 15, 2011, for up to $332,000,000,000 intended to
finance the “Proyecto Carretero Villa Tunari–San Ignacio de Moxos.”
52. “All three sections were originally combined in a single contract
with the Brazilian firm OAS, which the president revoked in April 2012.
The southern segment, now complete, was built by a joint venture
between the state and a construction cooperative sponsored by the
cocalero union federation, with government financing. The northern
section is being undertaken directly by the Binational Army Corps of
Engineers (Bolivia–Venezuela)” (Achtenburg 2017).
53. In Venezuela, the Yanomami live in the 8.2 million-hectare Alto
Orinoco–Casiquiare Biosphere Reserve (Survival International 2020).
Considering Brazil and Venezuela, the Yanomami territory is about
17.8 million ha (178,000 sq. km) (Esri 2019).

54. The borders are dangerous flashpoints in a showdown between
Venezuela's president, Nicolás Maduro, and Venezuela's self-declared
interim president, Juan Guaidó, who is supported by Brazil, Colombia,
the United States, and other countries.
55. Known as Moxateteu. Although most Yanomami are in contact with
nonindigenous society, one uncontacted group is known to live in
the area being invaded, and authorities are investigating signs of up
to six other uncontacted communities living there (Survival International 2020).
56. The Yanomami Park, one of Brazil’s largest indigenous territories,
covers 96,650 sq. km of rainforest in the states of Roraima and
Amazonas (Branford 2019b).
57. Registered in the Registry of Traditional Indigenous Authorities 2002
(Resolution No. 0135 of October 11, 2002) and 2011 (Resolution No.
009 of February 8, 2011), respectively. Until 2017, the Association of
Indigenous Captains of Yaigojé Apaporis Vaupés was known as the
Association of Indigenous Communities of Taraira Vaupés (Acitava).
The association was created by the captains of some communities in
the Department of Vaupés who left Aciya because they did not agree
with the creation of the Yaigojé Apaporis National Natural Park. The
change of name in 2017 was motivated by the objective of working
together with Aciya for the territorial defense of their land.
58. Indigenous reserves are the collective property of indigenous
communities constituted in favor of them (Articles 63 and 329,
Constitution of Colombia). They are inalienable, imprescriptible, and
unattachable. Indigenous reserves are a legal and socio-political
institution of a special nature, made up of one or more indigenous
communities. With a collective property title that provides private
property guarantees, these communities possess their territory
and through an autonomous organization protected by indigenous
jurisdiction and its own regulatory system, they are able to govern
and manage their lands and internal life (Article 21, Regulation on
Titling of Indigenous Peoples’ Lands, 1995).
59. Cooperation Agreement No. 3.
60. The consultation process was approved by the appropriate authorities on June 30, 2009.
61. According to the information provided by the competent authority,
Department of Vaupés: Bocas de Taraira, Vista Hermosa, Bocas Uga,
Curipira, Santa Clara, Agua Blanca, and Jotabeyá. Department of
Amazonas: Puerto Cedro, Centro Providencia, Bellavista, Bocas de
Pira, Paromena, Villa Rica, Sabana, La Playa, Unión Jirijirimo, and Cordillera. Campo Alegre y Ñumi (Vaupés) also needed to be considered
although it was not in the ethnic group register but belonged to the
affected area (Decision Nº T-384A/14, 2014).

62. The ANM replaced the Instituto Nacional de Investigaciones Geológico-Mineras (INGEOMINAS) in 2011.
63. There were no mining concessions in the Yaigojé Apaporis Reserve
when the request was made.
64. Mining concession contract IGH–15001X registered in December 13,
2012, in the National Mining Registry.
65. In response, Cosigo Resources sued the government alleging breach
of contract. Until 2016, the condition of the concession was on the
exploratory stage.
66. Decision Nº T–384A/14, 2014. In this case, Benigno Perilla, representing ACITAVA, sued the competent authorities for creating the Yaigojé
Apaporis National Natural Park. He alleged the lack of prior information and consultation when the decision was made, and that the
establishment of the park would affect the autonomy of its peoples.
The Constitutional Court concluded that the consultation processes
requirements were met and, thus, no rights were violated.
67. It is alleged that Cosigo offered bribes to the Taraira communities
to oppose the creation of the park (UNDP 2016) and when the
company failed to pay, the Taraira communities joined with the other
communities to support the park. Cosigo subsequently argued that
the indigenous people only have rights over the land, not the subsoil,
which is state property. As such, they only need government approval to mine the subsoil for gold, not the support of the indigenous
communities (UNDP 2016).
68. The company requested the extension of the amount of extracted
mineral, which was approved by the authority. Thus, according to the
expansion of the Environmental Impact Study of the project, the daily
volume of treated material was doubled from 30,000 to 60,000 tons.
69. Since 2013, 47 mining easements have been applied, affecting 14
Cascomi territories (PLAN V 2018).
70. In May 2014, the church and community school of San Marcos,
Tundayme parish, El Pangui canton, Morona–Santiago province were
destroyed.
71. The expert indicated that in the territory of CASCOMI there was a
Shuar indigenous population—considered an ethnic group that is
subject to the collective rights in accordance with the constitution of
Ecuador—and a mixed-race population with a collective identification, recognized as farmers, who have acquired cultural practices of
the place (INREDH 2019).
72. The concession in the north is to METEL and is dated 1998; the center
concession is to Asiel Marcus and dated 2004, and the concession in
the southwest portion of the indigenous land is to Frank Taylor and
dated 2003.
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73. Aside from creating avenues for low-level employment, gold mining
is contributing very little, developmentally, to rural Guyanese communities.

80. A value chain is a set of activities that a firm operating in a specific
industry performs in order to deliver a valuable product (i.e., good
and/or service) for the market.

74. In September 2018, Campbelltown welcomed the partners implementing the El Dorado—Responsible Mining for Guyana Initiative
designed to eliminate mercury use from small-scale artisanal gold
mining. The initiative encompasses a Global Environment Facility
(GEF) project and a Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation-funded mining project with the objective of tackling and
reducing the use of mercury in gold mining, as well as the impact of
mining activities on forests (GEF 2017).

81. The law or rules of evidence clarify how strong evidence must be
to meet the legal burden of proof in a given situation, ranging from
reasonable suspicion to preponderance of the evidence, clear and
convincing evidence, or beyond a reasonable doubt.

75. Declarations of the former president of the Tres Islas community on
March 2017 (Movimiento Regional por la Tierra 2019).
76. Of which, 18,402 ha and 7 sq. m constituted lands suitable for cultivation and livestock, and 9,173 ha and 10 sq. m for forestry purposes by
the community.
77. To raise further awareness about the issues, the community members also participated in marches in Lima, Peru’s capital, and spoke
about their concerns at public meetings.
78. In some cases, nonindigenous communities have even fewer rights
over their land than indigenous people. Other communal tenure
regimes, however, offer similarly strong land ownership rights for
nonindigenous identifying communities in Bolivia (quilombolas),
Colombia (Afro-Colombian communities), and Peru (Tierras de
Comunidades Campesinas con Aptitud Forestal).
79. Land and high-value natural resources are often governed by different sets of national laws and administered by different government
agencies.
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82. High-value minerals are commonly national or public goods with
national governments receiving most of the revenue from mining
companies in the form of taxes, fees, and royalties. This public
revenue is used for national development with the affected local
governments and communities rarely receive their fair share.
83. For example, the Newmont Ahafo Mine Development Foundation
Agreement in Ghana, West Africa, contains multiple types of financial
benefit sharing. The agreement requires the company to pay to a
community foundation $1 for every ounce of gold from the mine
sold, as well as 1 percent of the company’s net pre-tax income, and
of any gains made in selling assets that total $100,000 or more
(Loutit et al. 2016).
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